

CONFIDENTIAL

NEWS, VIEWS and ISSUES

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16 APRIL 1976

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DESTROY AFTER BACKGROUNDER HAS
SERVED ITS PURPOSE OR WITHIN 60 DAYS

CONFIDENTIAL

Governmental Affairs

The New Leader
March 29, 1976

Euro Vista

BY RAY ALAN

Mercenary Pressmen

BERNARD D. NOSSITER, London correspondent of the *Washington Post*, brought into the open a subject journalists sometimes mutter about in quiet bars but rarely discuss in print. First, he reported that a "British" features agency, Forum World Features, had been run by the CIA for nine years. This drew an angry denial from the agency's director, Right-wing publicist Brian Crozier. ("I have never had the misfortune of meeting Bernard D. Nossiter," Crozier declared frostily, "and I hope I may be spared it.") People in the know said Nossiter was right; and in due course the *New York Times* revealed that, according to authoritative sources, Forum had been designed as a conduit for secret payments to foreign journalists working for the CIA.

Nossiter subsequently disclosed that Crozier's new employer, the London-based Institute for the Study of Conflict, was also the creature of an undercover service—British this time. Continental newsmen took this up and concluded that the ISC is CIA-controlled but drops hints that it is run by the British Secret Intelligence Service so as to keep away inquisitive British reporters and members of Parliament.

In December Nossiter wrote that "a remarkable number of British journalists" are reputed to work for the SIS. This was firmly denied, of course—as firmly as a devaluation rumor two days before a change of parity. In mid-February the *London Times* reported that operatives of British military intelligence in Northern Ireland had been issued phoney press cards and were posing as newsmen. The next day this was officially confirmed.

Phoney press cards are not a new invention. A curio in my possession

is a press card issued by a British official organization in a Mediterranean country declaring its bearer to be the correspondent of a leading Scottish newspaper. The young man to whom it was issued had never written a newspaper article in his life and did not even know the name of the editor of the paper he was supposed to represent.

There was unhealthily close collaboration between a few genuine pressmen and British brass in the Near East at one time. Well-informed Arabs used to identify as "Whitehall cavalry" some who regularly broadcast a "commentary" (a five-minute talk following the news) in the BBC World Service. The World Service is government-financed and, overtly and legitimately, used to plug Whitehall's views.

Its "commentaries" are now fewer and less propagandist than they once were; but up to a few years ago the journalists who read them were carefully briefed, had close connections with officialdom, and were viewed with some distrust by the politically sophisticated when they popped up in Mideastern capitals. Frequently, it must be admitted, the distrust was justified; and, simply by keeping tabs on such visiting firemen and their contacts, Arab security services (and probably the

Russians) were able to learn a lot.

Personally, I am not shocked by the newsmen with honest convictions who pass on useful information to an organization he believes to be doing good work, whether it be a labor union, Amnesty International or the SPCA. The people who debase journalism are the mercenaries who intrigue and ingratiate in order to sway editorial policy, discredit more conscientious colleagues, and carve out private zones of influence, the better to serve their covert paymasters. If they are foreign correspondents, the suspicions they arouse eventually create difficulties for other newsmen they don't even know—just as the use of false press cards in Ireland is bound to endanger the lives of genuine reporters there.

The CIA has announced that it will discontinue using American journalists as agents. One wonders why it bothered. It has no means of convincing skeptical Europeans and others that it is keeping its word. And its announcement may simply persuade some witchhunters that, say, British or Australian newsmen have been recruited to fill the gap (Australians are especially suspect in Europe because of rumors that the CIA has, in effect, taken over the Australian intelligence service). Sadly, some newsmen in sensitive areas may now feel it advisable to display a little anti-American bias to ward off suspicion.

NEW YORK TIMES
6 April 1976

Schorr to Receive Award
By National Headliner Club

ATLANTIC CITY, April 5 (AP)—Daniel Schorr's report on the Central Intelligence Agency for his CBS radio network is among the winners of this year's National Headliner Club achievement awards.

The winners, announced here yesterday, were selected from more than 1,000 entries in various categories for daily newspapers, photography, television and radio.

The prizes will be presented Saturday at the 42d annual awards dinner.

In addition to the public service award to CBS and Mr. Schorr, a radio network achievement award, for outstanding documentary by a radio network, was awarded to the ABC network, New York, for "Scenes From A War."

NEW YORK TIMES
15 April 1976

HERSH GETS AWARD
FOR C.I.A. ARTICLES

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, April 14—Seymour M. Hersh of The New York Times received the \$5,000 Drew Pearson Award today for "general excellence in investigative reporting."

The award in honor of the late Washington columnist went to Mr. Hersh because of his articles exposing domestic spying by the Central Intelligence Agency and American efforts to "destabilize" the Chilean Government of President Salvador Allende Gossens.

The award was made at a luncheon at the National Press Club and was presented to Mr. Hersh by Luvie Moore Pearson, widow of the columnist.

A special award went to Maxine Cher, society columnist for the *Washington Post*, for her articles disclosing that United States officials and members of Congress had illegally kept gifts given to them in their official capacity by foreign officials.

NEW YORK TIMES, MONDAY, APRIL 12, 1976

Link of Kennedy Friend To Mafia Is Still a Puzzle

By NICHOLAS GAGE

The disclosure last December that President Kennedy and two major Mafia figures maintained close friendships with the same woman — Judith Campbell — has puzzled many private citizens, disturbed some law enforcement officials and aroused extensive speculation in and out of Government.

The speculation has been stimulated because the two Mafia figures, John Roselli and Sam Giancana, maintained the relationships with Mrs. Campbell at the very time she said she was having an affair with the President. And both men had been involved in the Central Intelligence Agency's abortive plots to assassinate Prime Minister Fidel Castro of Cuba.

But the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, which investigated the C.I.A. plots, referred only briefly to Mrs. Campbell's relationships, devoting slightly more than a page to them in its 349-page report last December. The report did not identify Mrs. Campbell (now Mrs. Judith Exner) by name or sex, and left a number of questions unanswered.

Among them were whether Mrs. Campbell used her relationship with Mr. Kennedy to benefit the Mafia, and whether the President learned as a result of the Campbell friendship that the C.I.A. was working with the Mafia on a plot to kill Mr. Castro.

Interviews and Findings

During the last two months, The New York Times, in interviews with the current and former Justice Department officials, participants in the C.I.A. plots and underworld figures, has examined these questions and found the following:

¶ Several recommendations were made within the Justice Department in 1962 for a thorough investigation of Mrs. Campbell's Mafia ties, but no inquiry was ever conducted. When high Justice officials learned about her friendship with President Kennedy in early 1962, they looked upon it as a "domestic matter," as one of them put it, and merely passed information on her to the White House.

¶ Sam Giancana—who was slain last June — and John Roselli boasted to fellow gangsters about sharing the affections of a woman who was seeing the President, but they do not appear to have benefited

further from their knowledge of Mrs. Campbell's friendship with Mr. Kennedy.

¶ While the Senate committee found no evidence that President Kennedy knew about the C.I.A.-Mafia plots to kill Mr. Castro, the possibility appears high to some former Justice officials that Robert F. Kennedy, then the Attorney General, told his brother about the plots in view of what he learned about the relationships of Mr. Giancana, Mr. Roselli and Mrs. Campbell in 1962 and early 1963.

¶ When the Senate committee investigated Mrs. Campbell's friendships, not only did the committee not call Frank Sinatra, who introduced Mrs. Campbell both to President Kennedy and to Mr. Giancana, but other key individuals were merely interviewed rather than questioned under oath, even though a deeper inquiry might have produced information affecting the committee's conclusion that President Kennedy did not know about the C.I.A.-Mafia plots against Mr. Castro.

Staying Out of Sight

A spokesman for the committee, Spencer Davis, said that the panel's mandate was to determine whether Mrs. Campbell was involved in an intelligence operation and not to conduct a broad investigation of her Mafia ties.

"We found that she was not engaged in intelligence and that was that," he said.

A close friend of the two Mafia figures said that Mrs. Campbell's initial contact with the Mafia was with Mr. Roselli, who was born in Italy, immigrated to Boston as a child, joined the Mafia in Chicago and later became involved in labor racketeering in Los Angeles.

Mr. Roselli, who has been staying out of sight since Mr. Giancana was slain last year, has told friends that he first met Mrs. Campbell in 1951—she was then Judith Immoor—when she was 17 years old and "hanging around the studios" in Hollywood. Mr. Roselli, who had served three years in Federal prison for extorting money from the studios, was then associated with an independent production company. Miss Immoor had ambitions of becoming an actress.

Mr. Roselli stopped seeing her when she married William Campbell, an actor, a short time later, according to the friend of the two Mafia leaders.

The couple was divorced in 1958, and a year later she began to date Mr. Sinatra, she said in the outline for a book she plans to write. Mrs. Campbell said that she ended her affair with the singer because their tastes in sex differed, but continued to travel with the Sinatra crowd.

In reply to this assertion, Mr. Sinatra issued this statement: "Hell hath no fury like

a hustler with a literary agent."

Mrs. Campbell said in the outline that Mr. Sinatra introduced her to John F. Kennedy on Feb. 7, 1960, in Las Vegas, Nev., and they made plans to meet in early March in New York, where they began to have an affair.

After her New York meeting with Mr. Kennedy, according to the outline, she accepted an invitation to meet Mr. Sinatra in Miami Beach, where he was performing at the Fontainebleau Hotel, and the entertainer introduced her there to Mr. Giancana.

Five months later Mr. Giancana and Mr. Roselli became involved with the C.I.A. in plots to kill Fidel Castro—recruiting Cuban agents who might be persuaded to poison Mr. Castro's food—but apparently they did not tell Mrs. Campbell about them. Mafia members traditionally do not confide in their women and Mr. Giancana and Mr. Roselli made no exception with Mrs. Campbell, according to the close friend of both men.

His contention is supported by participants in the plots, including Robert Maheu, who has acknowledged bringing together the Mafia and the C.I.A. Mrs. Campbell said in her book outline that she had "no knowledge of C.I.A. involvement with the Mafia."

The close friend of Mr. Giancana and Mr. Roselli said that, at that time, Mrs. Campbell was one of about 20 women, some of them well-known actresses, who were in the Sinatra crowd and were introduced to the entertainer's friends in public life and in the underworld.

"The difference with Judy was that she was pushy and reckless," the friend said. "She'd go to Johnny's place and call everyone she knew from his phone, or she'd call Sam at his home and at the Armory Lounge in Chicago, where he hung out. So the Feds picked up her tracks."

"The other girls were careful. They didn't call Sam or Johnny because they knew their phones were tapped. And they didn't call the White House, for God's sake!"

The Federal Bureau of Investigation first picked up Judith Campbell through electronic surveillance of Mr. Roselli in early 1961, according to Justice Department sources.

The F.B.I. checked out her long-distance calls over the next two years and found that she was in frequent contact with Mr. Roselli, Mr. Giancana and Mr. Sinatra.

For example, Government records show that during one four-week period, from June 8 to July 5, 1962, Mrs. Campbell called Mr. Giancana 23 times at his Chicago home and 37 times at the Armory Lounge from her Los Angeles residence at 8401 Fountain Avenue. During the same period, she called Mr. Sinatra 16 times at the Cal-Neva Lodge in Lake Tahoe, Nev., which he then owned.

Seven months before these calls, in November 1961, the F.B.I. found out that Mrs. Campbell had made two phone calls to the White House. They were

followed by a third call early the following February. (The Senate committee found White House records showing that Mrs. Campbell had called a total of 70 times, but initially the F.B.I. knew of only three calls.)

On Feb. 27, 1962, J. Edgar Hoover, then director of the F.B.I., sent a memorandum to Attorney General Kennedy and to Kenneth O'Donnell, then special assistant to President Kennedy, saying that an investigation of Mr. Roselli disclosed that he had been in touch with a Judith Campbell. The memo also said that Mrs. Campbell was maintaining a relationship with Sam Giancana, "a prominent Chicago underworld figure," and that Mrs. Campbell had made calls to the White House from her home in Los Angeles.

It is not known how Robert Kennedy reacted to the memorandum, but a high official in the Justice Department at that time said that his staff did not take it very seriously.

"By that time a lot of stories were coming out of the Secret Service about the President's interest in women," one former official said. "We looked on it as a domestic matter and, as I recall, the whole thing was referred to Carmine Bellino, who handled personal stuff for the President."

Kennedy-Hoover Lunch

Another former Justice Department official also said that the matter was referred to Mr. Bellino, who was then a special consultant to the President. But Mr. Bellino said in an interview that he never heard of Mrs. Campbell until the recent articles in the press about her.

"The only personal matter I ever handled for the President was once when Jackie was spending too much money and he asked me to find out where it was all going," Mr. Bellino said.

The contradiction between the former Justice Department officials' recollections and Mr. Bellino's statement was never confronted by the Senate committee. The Justice officials who recall the matter being turned over to Mr. Bellino were not questioned under oath by the committee, but merely interviewed by staff members, whom they did not tell about Mr. Bellino.

Mr. Bellino, too, was never questioned under oath, but was merely interviewed at the committee's offices.

On March 22, less than a month after the Hoover memo was sent, President Kennedy and Mr. Hoover had lunch together, the Senate committee's report said. "According to White House logs," the report added, "the last telephone contact between the White House and the President's friend [Mrs. Campbell] occurred a few hours after the luncheon."

However, Mrs. Campbell said in her book outline that her relationship with the President continued for several months after that.

In the months following Mr. Hoover's memorandum of Feb. 27, the Justice Department

NEW YORK TIMES, TUESDAY, APRIL 13, 1976

2 Mafiosi Linked to C.I.A. Treated Leniently by U.S.

By NICHOLAS GAGE

received further information from the F.B.I. about Mrs. Campbell's close relationships with Mr. Giancana, Mr. Roselli and Mr. Sinatra.

The information was included in a series of reports prepared by Dougald McMillan, a Justice Department attorney studying the involvement of Mr. Sinatra with Mafia figures.

Mr. McMillan is still with the department and refused to discuss the matter, but former Justice officials who saw the reports said that they strongly recommended that Mrs. Campbell's relationships with the Mafia and with Mr. Sinatra be investigated.

Testimony Urged

They said that one of the reports urged that Mrs. Campbell be brought before a Federal grand jury, given immunity from prosecution and compelled to testify under oath about her Mafia contacts.

No action was taken on any of the recommendations by the Justice Department. Several officials who were asked about them said they did not remember reports specifically mentioning Mrs. Campbell.

But they said they did remember that several reports on Mr. Sinatra were prepared at the time, and it was in some of those reports that the recommendations about Mrs. Campbell were included.

The Sinatra reports apparently were seen by Attorney General Kennedy, because everything about Mr. Sinatra developed by the department was sent up to him at his request, according to William G. Hundley, former chief of the department's Organized Crime Section. Thus Attorney General Kennedy presumably saw everything included in the reports about Mrs. Campbell.

Robert Kennedy learned on Feb. 27, 1962, in the memorandum from Mr. Hoover, that a woman was calling the White House who had a relationship with Mr. Giancana, one of the top Mafia bosses in the country and a main target of his department.

Involved in Plots

Just 10 weeks later, on May 7, 1962, according to the Senate committee's report, he was informed in a conference with C.I.A. officials that their agency had been involved with Mr. Giancana in plots to assassinate Prime Minister Castro.

In view of these two discoveries and what Robert Kennedy later learned about Mrs. Campbell in the Sinatra reports, some of Mr. Kennedy's former associates at the Justice Department believe that he told the President what he knew about Mr. Giancana, the C.I.A. plots and Mrs. Campbell.

"He had to; he told Jack everything," one of the former associates said.

But others feel that he did not inform President Kennedy. "Any man would tell his brother, one would suppose," said Herbert J. Miller, who was head of the Justice Department's Criminal Division under Attorney General Kennedy.

"But you must remember that the C.I.A. lied to Bobby and told him the plots against Cas-

Few organized-crime leaders have ever been pursued as vigorously by the Justice Department as was Sam Giancana in the early 1960's, according to official records. The late Mafia boss of Chicago was followed constantly, jailed for contempt and finally driven into self-exile in Mexico.

But the records show that on three occasions when Federal officials had Mr. Giancana in a tight spot, they let him out of it. They blocked his indictment on wiretap charges, declined to cross-examine him about his Mafia activities when they had the chance, and turned down an opportunity to send him back to jail.

The account of this unusual handling of a Mafia boss emerged from a two-month investigation by The New York Times of Mr. Giancana and John Roselli, another Mafia figure, focusing on the treatment they received from the Government after they participated in Central Intelligence Agency plots to assassinate Prime Minister Fidel Castro of Cuba.

The Times investigation was begun after it was disclosed that the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence had uncov-

ered evidence that the two Mafia leaders and President Kennedy had a close friendship with the same woman, Judith Campbell, in 1961 and 1962.

The investigation included interviews with present and former Government officials, persons who participated in the C.I.A. plots, underworld figures, and a long-time friend of Mr. Giancana and Mr. Roselli.

The Senate select committee disclosed that both Mr. Giancana and Mr. Roselli escaped prosecution on wiretap charges through the C.I.A.'s intervention in 1962. But The Times investigation found that the two men received generous treatment from the Federal authorities in other instances as well, and that, while Mr. Roselli tried to use his C.I.A. connections when he got into legal trouble, Mr. Giancana apparently did not.

Bizarre Liaison

The investigation also uncovered new details of the bizarre liaison between the C.I.A. and the Mafia that were not in the report that the Senate committee issued last November.

In an interview in Las Vegas, Nev., Robert A. Maheu, who has said he brought the C.I.A. and the Mafia together, recalled that in 1959 he met Mr. Roselli in Las Vegas, where he looked after the interests of the Chicago Mafia leaders.

After that meeting, Mr. Maheu and Mr. Roselli became friends and when Mr. Roselli's travels took him to Washington he would sometimes be invited to parties at Mr. Maheu's home in Virginia.

Mr. Maheu was then head of a detective agency in Washington (he later went to work for Howard R. Hughes, the industrialist) that received a \$500-a-month retainer from the C.I.A., and Mr. Roselli would often meet C.I.A. agents at the Maheu parties.

Mr. Maheu said that, when C.I.A. officials wanted to enlist the aid of the Mafia in the Castro assassination plot in 1960, they asked him to act as the intermediary.

In an appearance before the Senate select committee, Mr. Maheu testified that Mr. Roselli was initially reluctant to take part in the assassination plot, but was eventually won over by an appeal to his patriotism. Mr. Roselli then recommended that Mr. Giancana, an old friend of his, be brought into the plot because of his excellent contacts in Cuba, where he had had extensive gambling interests before Mr. Castro assumed power after the collapse of Fulgencio Batista's government in 1959.

According to the long-time friend and confidant of Mr. Giancana, the Chicago Mafia boss was also reluctant to join the plot, and felt all along that the assassination attempt

would not succeed.

"You can't hit an entrenched leader like Castro," he quoted Mr. Giancana as having told him, "but all they [the C.I.A.] want from me is some names in Havana, so how can I turn them down?"

Mr. Roselli, Mr. Giancana and Mr. Maheu went to Miami Beach in the late summer of 1960 to plan the assassination attempt, according to Mr. Maheu, and the three men stayed there for several months, with their headquarters in the Fontainebleau Hotel.

Unhappy Over Separation

During that period Mr. Giancana's spirits were very low, according to both Mr. Maheu and the long-time confidant. He was unhappy at being separated from his girlfriend Phyllis McGuire, the singer, who, he believed, was seeing other men during his absence from Las Vegas.

"Sam was crazy in love with Phyllis at that time," Mr. Maheu recalled, "and threatened to drop everything and fly to Las Vegas to check up on her."

In an effort to keep him in Miami, Mr. Maheu said, he hired a private detective agency to shadow Miss McGuire, and one of its agents was arrested by the Las Vegas authorities while trying to tap the telephone of the entertainer Dan Rowan's hotel room. Mr. Maheu contended, in his interview with The Times, that he did not ask the detective agency to tap Mr. Rowan's hotel phone, but only to follow Miss McGuire.

"The wiretap was stupid anyway," he said, "because Rowan wasn't going to be talking on the phone while making love."

The arrest of the private detective led to an estrangement between Mr. Maheu and Mr. Giancana, and nearly disrupted the assassination plot. The apprehended detective told the authorities that he was working for Mr. Maheu; Mr. Maheu then told the Federal Bureau of Investigation that he was involved in a C.I.A. operation.

"Sam was furious at Maheu for spilling the beans to the F.B.I. about the plot," Mr. Giancana's confidant said. "He thought Bob should have been a stand-up guy and taken the rap himself."

The F.B.I. wanted to prosecute Mr. Maheu, Mr. Giancana and Mr. Roselli on wiretapping charges, but the C.I.A. eventually intervened with the Justice Department and arranged to have the charges dropped, according to the Senate committee's report. But by then the C.I.A. was so fed up with Mr. Maheu and Mr. Giancana that they dropped them from the Castro assassination project, retaining only Mr. Roselli for new efforts against Mr. Castro in what was later referred to as "phase two" of the unsuccessful plot.

Herbert J. Miller, who was then the Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Justice Department's Criminal Division, said that the decision not to prosecute Mr. Maheu and Mr. Giancana for wiretapping was made reluctantly.

"We weren't happy about it, but we felt we had to do it for

the national interest," he said in an interview.

It has been speculated that Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, knowing that Mr. Giancana and Mr. Roselli could embarrass the Kennedy Administration with their story of the C.I.A. plot, told his men to go easy on the two Mafia leaders. But the opposite happened, according to William G. Hundley, chief of the Organized Crime Section under Mr. Kennedy.

'Bobby Pushed Us'

"I remember some of those meetings in his office," he said. "Bobby pushed to get Giancana at any cost."

The F.B.I. agents followed Robert Kennedy's orders so conscientiously that Mr. Giancana eventually decided to take them to court. In 1963, he sued in Federal District Court in Chicago for relief from the surveillance, saying that F.B.I. agents' cars clogged the street outside his home and that the agents followed him to his favorite cocktail lounge and even to his family mausoleum.

"It was something, the way those agents stuck to him," his confidant said. "When he went to play golf, four agents played the hole behind him, and when he would miss a shot they would all boo."

Because Mr. Giancana brought a civil suit against the Federal Government, he had to go on the stand to testify in his complaint, leaving himself open to cross-examination.

"It was the greatest opportunity the Justice Department has had or will ever have to cross-examine a Mafia boss," Edward V. Hanrahan, former United States Attorney in Chicago, said in a telephone interview.

But John Peter Lulinski, the Assistant United States Attorney selected by the Justice Department to handle the case, never questioned Mr. Giancana on the stand.

"There is no cross-examination," he told the court.

Mr. Giancana was brought to the stand a second time during the proceedings, and the judge again gave the Government the opportunity to cross-examine Mr. Giancana.

"No cross, your honor," Mr. Lulinski said.

Mr. Giancana, who had walked into the courtroom looking uncharacteristically nervous, walked out beaming after the judge ruled in his favor.

Why didn't Mr. Lulinski ask Mr. Giancana any questions?

"We were told by the Justice Department not to cross-examine him," said Thomas James, who assisted Mr. Lulinski on the case.

Many observers were dumfounded by the Justice Department's performance. Why had it thrown away its big chance to squeeze Mr. Giancana? Today it is difficult to find out because both Mr. Lulinski and his superior, United States Attorney Frank McDonald, as well as Attorney General Kennedy are dead.

Mr. James said he could not remember what reason the Justice Department gave for its instructions.

Mr. Hundley, then chief of the department's Organized Crime Section, said that he recalled that everyone in his agency was upset at what had happened in Chicago, but the case was handled by the Civil Division and not by his section.

John W. Douglas, who was head of the Civil Division at the time, said he could not remember the case.

Court records do not show why the Government did not cross-examine Mr. Giancana.

Neither Mr. Hundley nor Mr. Miller believes that the kid-glove treatment of Mr. Giancana was the result of fear that he would divulge the C.I.A. plot. They say that if the Government was afraid of this, Mr. Giancana would not have been followed so rigorously in the first place until he was driven to sue. They add that if the Government feared disclosures, the Justice Department would not have worked so hard two years later, to send Mr. Giancana to jail.

In 1965, Mr. Giancana was brought before a grand jury and asked about his underworld activities. But, except for his name, he had no information to offer beyond citing the Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination. The grand jury then gave him immunity, which meant that if he did not talk he would be held in contempt. Mr. Giancana still refused to say anything and was sent to jail for the duration of the grand jury's term.

1942 Prison Term

It was the first time he had been behind bars for 23 years. In 1942, Mr. Giancana was released from the Federal penitentiary in Leavenworth, Kan., at the end of a sentence for violations of the Prohibition laws.

Mr. Giancana, who was born in 1910, served his first prison sentence when he was 15 years old. By the time he was 20, he had had 51 arrests, three of them on murder charges. (One murder case against him collapsed when the state's chief witness was killed.)

A year after Mr. Giancana's imprisonment for contempt, the grand jury's term expired, ending his jail sentence. At this point, the judge who had sent Mr. Giancana to jail, the foreman of the grand jury and United States Attorney Hanrahan all wanted Mr. Giancana brought before a new grand jury, given immunity again, and, if he still refused to talk sent back to jail.

But Mr. Hanrahan said that the Justice Department ordered him not to give immunity to Mr. Giancana again, and the Mafia leader was freed.

"The biggest mistake I made as United States Attorney," Mr. Hanrahan said recently, "was going along with Justice and not trying for another contempt case against Giancana."

Again the question arises: Was Mr. Giancana given special consideration because of his role in helping the C.I.A.? Mr. Hundley and Henry E. Petersen, his successor as chief of the Organized Crime Section, say no. Mr. Hundley said

that the decision not to give Mr. Giancana immunity a second time resulted from considerable debate within the Justice Department.

At that time, he said, the present immunity statutes did not exist. The legal basis for sending Mr. Giancana to jail in 1965 was a Federal Trade Communication statute that said that if a witness before a Federal grand jury was asked about telephone calls he was automatically given immunity.

"So we were on thin legal grounds to begin with," Mr. Hundley said, "and I basically did not believe that the way to fight mobsters was to immunize them and put them away. It's gimmickry, no matter how you cut it."

Mr. Hundley, now a criminal lawyer in Washington, said that he was opposed to immunizing Mr. Giancana the first time.

"I was against it and Hanrahan was for it," he said. "[Assistant Attorney General] Jack Miller sided with Hanrahan and Giancana was immunized. Then Jack Miller resigned and Fred Vinson was put in charge of the Criminal Division. Fred sided with me."

Special Treatment Discounted

Mr. Giancana's confidant said that if Mr. Giancana received any special consideration from the Government, he never asked for it. He said that when Mr. Giancana was cited for contempt in 1965, his attorney, Edward Bennett Williams, who Mr. Giancana had told about the C.I.A. plot, wanted to "tell the judge about it and get Sam off the hook," but Mr. Giancana refused to allow it.

Mr. Roselli, on the other hand, did ask for consideration for his part in the C.I.A. plot on two occasions after the wiretap case, and in one he got it.

In 1966, efforts were begun by the Government to deport Mr. Roselli, who was born Filippo Saco in Italy and allegedly came to the United States illegally as a child. The deportation efforts were begun after Mr. Roselli reportedly refused to become a Federal informant on the Mafia.

Mr. Roselli got in touch with

Sheffield Edwards, the C.I.A. official who directed the early phase of the agency's assassination plots with the Mafia, according to the Senate committee's report, and Mr. Edwards persuaded the Justice Department to stall the deportation move. (It has since been revived and is proceeding in a Federal court in Florida.)

Rigged Card Games

In 1967, Mr. Roselli was arrested for fraudulent gambling activities at the exclusive Friar's Club in Beverly Hills, Calif. Along with three other men, he was convicted of cheating Tony Martin, the singer, Harry Karl, a shoe store executive, and other persons out of more than \$400,000 in rigged card games. The crooked players were purportedly signaled by electronic means by an observer looking through a ceiling peephole.

Again, Mr. Roselli tried to use his involvement with the C.I.A. to save himself, but this time he failed.

Mr. Maheu, who had brought Mr. Roselli and the C.I.A. together, said that an attorney for Mr. Roselli called him and asked him to make a statement to the judge about Mr. Roselli's help to the C.I.A.

"I categorically refused and told him I would deny the whole thing happened," Mr. Maheu said.

The Justice Department also refused to intercede again on his behalf, but Mr. Roselli told the judge about his role with the C.I.A. anyway. It did him no good; he was convicted in the case and sentenced to five years in jail and a \$55,000 fine. He served half his term and was then paroled.

Shortly after Mr. Giancana was released from jail in 1966, he moved to Mexico—to avoid prosecution in the matter of a stolen ring, according to his long-time friend.

Nine years later, back in the United States and just before he was scheduled to appear before a grand jury, he was fixing himself a snack in the early morning hours of last June 19 when someone killed him with seven .22-caliber bullets pumped into his neck and head.

WASHINGTON POST
15 APR 1976

CIA Names

TOKYO — The Japan Communist Party released what it said was a list of past and present U.S. Central Intelligence Agency agents operating in Japan. The list of 196 names, announced by a party parliamentary group, included 93 "agents" now in the country.

Sun., April 4, 1976

Los Angeles Times

Oswald Met With KGB Agent, CIA Data Show

BY NORMAN KEMPSTER
Times Staff Writer

WASHINGTON—Less than two months before President John F. Kennedy was shot to death, Lee Harvey Oswald conferred in Mexico City with an agent of the Soviet KGB's assassination department, newly declassified CIA documents indicate.

The CIA memo said that on Sept. 28, 1963, Oswald spoke with Soviet Consul Valery V. Kostikov, whom Oswald later referred to as "Comrade Kostin."

The memo said Kostikov, "who has functioned overtly as a consul in the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City since September, 1961, is also known to be a staff officer of the KGB. He is connected with the 13th, or 'liquid affairs' department, whose responsibilities include assassination and sabotage."

The reference to Kostikov as an officer of the assassination department was in a 63-page chronology of Oswald's meetings with Soviet citizens between June 13, 1962, and the day Kennedy was killed, Nov. 22, 1963.

Also declassified was a CIA historical analysis of the 13th Department of the KGB.

"It has long been known that the Soviet state security service (KGB) resorts to abduction and murder . . . These techniques, frequently designated as 'executive action' and known within the KGB as 'liquid affairs,' can be and are employed abroad as well as within the borders of the U.S.S.R.," the analysis said.

"Foreign political leaders are also potential targets of Soviet executive action operations . . . There is, however

CIA USES NAZI DOCUMENT AGAINST GERMAN AUTHOR

From a Times Staff Writer

WASHINGTON—Ever since the Warren Commission issued its report on the assassination of President John F. Kennedy, the FBI and the CIA have been critical of books challenging the commission's finding that Lee Harvey Oswald was the lone assassin.

A recently released CIA memo shows that in at least one case the agency used a captured Nazi document as the source for derogatory information on Joachim Joesten, German author of a book titled, "Oswald: Assassin or Fall Guy?"

"You will note that the attention of the German security organs was directed at Joesten as early as 1936," the CIA memo said. "At that time the Communist Party had been outlawed in Germany . . ."

The memo said that in 1937 the Gestapo had accused Joesten of being a Communist.

no evidence proving that any Western leader has been the victim of Soviet executive action," it said.

The memo on Kostikov and the paper on the 13th Department were given to the Warren Commission. Its published report did not indicate how much attention the matter was given by the commission.

The newly declassified documents show that the CIA considered an exotic array of conspiracies linking the assassination to Communist governments in China and Cuba as well as to the Soviet Union.

Five days after Kennedy was killed on Nov. 22, 1963, the CIA took a 3,000-word statement from a Soviet defector who speculated that the Soviet KGB had helped Lee Harvey Oswald return to the United States from Russia, knowing that he was a potential killer.

A week later, the CIA station in Stockholm received a report from a man who identified himself as a Chinese diplomat in the Swedish capital. In a cable to Washington, the Stockholm station said the diplomat reported:

"President assassinated direct orders People's Republic China. Chicoms established contact with Oswald when he in Soviet Union. When Oswald returned States he recon-

tacted and threatened with exposure unless he agreed work for Chicoms. Chicoms thought U.S. would attack Cuba when it learned assassin was Cuba sympathizer. Soviets would attack U.S. Chicoms would ask for atomic weapons. Commies would win war. Chicoms would then assassinate Khrushchev and take over totally."

The CIA documents show that the agency—like the Warren commission—ultimately concluded that there was no conspiracy, that Oswald acted alone in killing Kennedy.

But on Nov. 27, 1963, five days after the assassination, the CIA appeared to take seriously the hypothesis of a Soviet defector who said that even if the KGB did not order Oswald to kill Kennedy, the Russian intelligence agency must have known he was the kind of person who eventually would cause some kind of damage.

This Russian informant—unlike another Soviet defector, Yuri Ivanovich Nosenko—never has been identified. His name was removed from the CIA documents before they were made public, which could indicate that he still is considered a reliable source of information.

The defector said that Soviet responsibility in the Kennedy assassination might be doubted by those who believe Oswald "was a nut and properly would not be entrusted with such an operation."

"However, the KGB properly knows that historically most assassins have been unbalanced maladjusted types," the defector said.

He speculated that before Oswald was permitted to return to the United States in 1962 after a three-year stay in the Soviet Union he was subjected to long lectures on the evils of "American millionaires, such as Rockefeller, Kennedy and others."

"Because to make a good agent takes a long time and because Oswald was impatient . . . the KGB decided not to make of him a good agent, but did not break relations with him and decided to use him in a more or less open way," the defector theorized.

Although the Warren commission discounted the defector's theory, as late as June 14, 1964, it sought and received a CIA analysis of Soviet brainwashing techniques.

The defector's statement was included in a stack of documents the CIA declassified at the request of David Belin, a Des Moines, Iowa, attorney. Belin was on the staff of the Warren Commission and was staff director of the Rockefeller commission, which last year investigated illegal domestic activities of the CIA.

In a telephone interview, Belin said he was convinced that release of the material "will reinforce the conclusion (of the Warren Commission) that Lee Harvey Oswald was the sole gunman who killed President Kennedy."

He said he sought the files because "there has been such a ripoff of the intellectual community by people making false charges so far as the question of whether or not Oswald did it."

Belin said he asked that all CIA documents relating to the Kennedy assassination be made public. However, the agency withheld many papers and heavily censored many of those that were released.

Meanwhile, a Senate intelligence subcommittee headed by Sen. Richard S. Schweiker (R-Pa.) is preparing to issue a report on its investigation of relationships among the CIA, the FBI and the Warren Commission.

Schweiker, who said last year that if Oswald were alive "he would be entitled to a new trial," refused to be interviewed recently on grounds, according to an aide, that his report was nearing its final stages and he did not want to discuss its contents.

Schweiker said earlier that he was investigating the possibility that Oswald had ties to the CIA, FBI or milita-

ry intelligence. He said also that he was trying to find out if Oswald's often-expressed Marxism was a cover for a relationship with anti-Castro Cuban refugees.

The newly released CIA documents contain no indication that the agency considered conspiracies other than those involving Communists.

Belin said the Warren Commission did not find any evidence of a Communist conspiracy. But he added that the commission was not aware of CIA-backed plots against the life of Cuban Premier Fidel Castro that have come to light recently.

"I question that at this time there would be any proof that would show a conspiracy," Belin said.

The newly released documents indicate that the Rockefeller commission relied heavily on information supplied by the CIA in reaching the conclusion that Oswald and Jack Ruby, Oswald's killer, had no links with the agency.

A CIA memorandum dated April 15, 1975, shows that Robert Olsen, the Rockefeller commission staff member assigned to investigate the CIA's relations with the Warren Commission, contacted an agency official for advice on how to proceed.

"I explained that much of the detail surrounding this topic is 12 years old and there are few around with de-

tailed knowledge," the official, whose name was withheld, wrote. "We do have the files of what we have provided the Warren Commission and there may be other material which will be of assistance."

Belin told The Times that the commission "investigated CIA files to see if there was any evidence at all of any CIA involvement with Jack Ruby or Oswald." He said the files contained no such evidence.

The April 15 CIA memo was written in response to an analysis of the CIA and the Warren Commission written by Paul L. Hoch, a UC-Berkeley physicist who has made a study of the Kennedy assassination.

The memo called Hoch's document "very scholarly" and said Rockefeller commission member Edgar Shannon "believes that the treatise is worthy of examination."

However, the Rockefeller commission's report ignored most of the points raised in Hoch's paper, while concentrating on sensational charges by comedian Dick Gregory that Watergate conspirators E. Howard Hunt Jr. and Frank Sturgis were the Kennedy assassins.

Belin said, however, that although the report concentrated on the Gregory charges, the commission considered points that were not mentioned in the report.

"Proving a negative is extremely difficult," he said.

THE WASHINGTON POST Sunday, April 11, 1976

Navy, CIA Reported Using Dolphins in War Training

By Robert E. Kessler

Newsday

NEW YORK, April 10—The Navy and the Central Intelligence Agency have been secretly training and using dolphins in military and intelligence programs for at least a decade, according to a former Navy research scientist and other sources within the government.

The scientist, Michael Greenwood of Moorhead, Minn., says his career was ruined when he protested that the programs here immoral and a waste of the taxpayers' money.

In testimony submitted to the Senate intelligence committee, Greenwood said that:

- Dolphins were trained to detect or attack enemy frogmen in a program known to the Navy and CIA as "swimmer nullification" and that several were used in Vietnam.

- Dolphins were taught to place electronic monitoring devices or explosives on or near enemy ships. In one instance in the late 1960s, a dolphin was trained at the Key West naval base to enter Havana harbor with an electronic device designed to measure the efficiency of a Soviet nuclear-powered ship.

- The Navy considered using dolphins in the early 1970s to track Soviet submarines and to steal mines from Chinese waters. There was no indication whether the plan was carried out.

- The Navy and the CIA trained dolphins in an attempt to recover an unexploded nuclear bomb that accidentally had been dropped by a Navy plane off the coast of Puerto Rico.

- The dolphin programs were only a small part of a large-scale effort to recover Soviet items lost at sea that included a mission in which Navy divers, without the aid of dolphins, recovered a missile from a Soviet plane that sank

in the Sea of Japan.

A spokesman for the Senate committee, which has not released a copy of Greenwood's statement, said it had not spent much time investigating the scientist's assertions. "We reached the conclusion that (they were) more a military matter than an intelligence matter," the spokesman said. Greenwood also gave Newsday a copy of his 150-page statement to the committee.

The CIA declined to comment. While the Navy has widely publicized its training of dolphins, whales and sea lions to recover lost U.S. rockets and mines, a spokesman denied that marine mammals had ever been trained to attack people or ships or had been used in intelligence missions.

The Navy did acknowledge that it had sent five dolphins to Vietnam in 1970 to test the animals' abilities to detect enemy frogmen in Cam Ranh Bay. The results are still classified. But the Navy had no comment on the recovery of any Soviet equipment in the Sea of Japan in the late 1960s or the loss of a nuclear weapon near Vieques Island off Puerto Rico in 1966.

The outline of the various secret projects was confirmed, however, during a Newsday investigation in which scores of Navy and CIA personnel were interviewed.

Although it could not be determined whether attack-trained dolphins were ever used in actual combat, dolphins were trained at the Navy base in Key West in a joint project with the CIA, to attack swimmers, according to four separate sources.

"We had them trained like real Marines," said one source. He said frog-

men were paid \$25 apiece to try to penetrate waters in which dolphins were patrolling.

"The divers failed every time," he said. "You really get bruised being hit by a 300-pound dolphin."

The animals detected the frogmen with their natural ability to send out and receive sonar signals. Then the animals were trained to press an alarm buzzer floating in the water and intercept the swimmers. Others said the dolphins were capable of knocking the face masks off frogmen or tearing their air hoses.

The animals were also trained to tow or push through the water dummy packages that weighed up to 100 pounds. The packages were the kind that could have contained explosives or spy gear, the sources said.

Greenwood, 44, said his job at the secret Navy research base at Kaneohe Bay, Hawaii, was illegally eliminated in 1971 when he requested that the dolphin programs be reconsidered and he refused to release \$150,000 in government funds to a civilian contractor whose work he felt was shoddy. The Navy says that Greenwood's discharge was routine, caused by a lack of project funding.

The scientist, who worked for the Navy for 10 years, says that the marine mammal programs were a waste of taxpayers' money because frogmen and underwater vehicles could have done the same jobs and because the training was so rushed that the animals were unreliable. For example, he said, they occasionally placed dummy practice packages on private boats.

Los Angeles Times

Tues., Mar. 23, 1976

CIA Discredits Defector's Statements About Oswald

BY JACK NELSON
Times Washington Bureau Chief

WASHINGTON—The CIA has released previously secret documents discrediting some of a Soviet defector's statements that the Warren Commission relied on in concluding that Lee Harvey Oswald had not been acting as a Soviet agent when he assassinated President Kennedy.

The documents raise serious questions about several statements by Yuri Ivanovich Nosenko, former KGB officer, who assured the CIA and the FBI that Oswald had never acted as an agent for the Soviet secret police agency.

A CIA memo says Nosenko's ignorance of Oswald's communications with the Soviet Embassy in Washington "discredits his claim to complete knowledge of all aspects of the KGB relationship with Oswald."

In addition, the memo questions Nosenko's statements that he did not know whom Oswald had contacted at the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City two months before the assassination. The memo says the CIA learned the contact was "a KGB officer under consular cover."

The documents were made available to The Times Monday after having been declassified and released earlier to David W. Belin, who had been a counsel to the Warren Commission. Belin has called for reopening of the assassination investigation, although he has expressed confidence that a new inquiry would substantiate the Warren Commission's conclusion: that there was no conspiracy and that that Oswald was the lone gunman who killed Kennedy and Dallas police officer J. D. Tippitt on Nov. 22, 1963.

In calling for the new investigation, Belin criticized the CIA and the FBI for withholding from the Warren Commission evidence of CIA plots to assassinate Cuban Premier Fidel Castro. Some of the CIA documents released to Belin deal with a Cuban defector who told the CIA in 1964 that Oswald might have been in contact with Cuban intelligence agents seven weeks before he killed Kennedy.

One of the theories being investigated by a Senate subcommittee headed by Sen. Richard S. Schweiker (R-Pa.) is whether Kennedy might have been killed as a result of a Communist plot organized in Cuba or the Soviet Union. There have been suggestions that the assassination might have been planned by Cubans who had learned of the plots to assassinate Castro.

The Warren Commission relied on statements to the FBI by Nosenko, who never testified before the commission.

The importance the commission attached to Nosenko's statements about Oswald's relationship with the KGB is reflected in an internal commission

memo dated June 24, 1964:

"Most of what Nosenko told the FBI confirms what we already knew from other sources and most of it does not involve important facts, with one extremely significant exception.

"This exception is Nosenko's statement that Lee Harvey Oswald was never trained or used as an agent of the Soviet Union for any purpose and that no contact with him was made, attempted or contemplated after he left the Soviet Union and returned to the United States.

"Nosenko's opinion on these points is especially valuable because, according to his testimony, at least, his position with the KGB was such that had there been any subversive relationship between the Soviet Union and Oswald, he would have known about it."

Nosenko defected on Feb. 4, 1964, 10 weeks after the Kennedy assassination, when attending a disarmament conference in Switzerland. He quickly was granted asylum in the United States and was interrogated intensively by the FBI and the CIA.

Although some CIA officials questioned whether Nosenko was a bona fide defector or a double agent, their suspicions were never relayed to the Warren Commission.

Nosenko, who is living in the United States under an assumed name, still is regarded as suspect by some U.S. intelligence sources.

Nosenko said that, when he defected, he had been a lieutenant colonel and deputy chief of the tourist department of a KGB directorate concerned with internal security.

He said he was familiar with Oswald's visit to the Soviet Union, had supervised the handling of his KGB file and had reviewed the file on orders of superiors immediately after the assassination to be sure that Oswald had no connection with the KGB.

Nosenko assured American intelligence agencies that he was completely familiar with KGB surveillance of Oswald when he lived in the Soviet Union from 1959 to June, 1962, and that the KGB considered Oswald to be "abnormal" and never considered using him as an agent.

After Oswald returned to the United States, Nosenko said, KGB headquarters in Moscow received no further word of him until he appeared at the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City in September, 1963, and requested a visa to reenter the Soviet Union.

A CIA memo notes that Nosenko said he did not know whom Oswald

had contacted at the embassy "and he knew of no contacts between Oswald and Cubans or Representatives of the Cuban government there or elsewhere."

This official CIA comment has included at the bottom of the memo page:

"Independent sources, however, reported on visits by Oswald to the Cuban as well as Soviet embassies in Mexico City between 29 September and 3 October 1963 and on his (apparently overt) contact with a KGB officer under consular cover at the Soviet Embassy.

"Nosenko originally said he knew nothing of any such contact. In October, 1966, he revised this to say that Oswald did not have contact with the KGB in Mexico City.

"Nosenko, explained that he had been sitting in the office of Seventh Department chief, K. N. Dubas, when a cable arrived at Moscow headquarters from the KGB legal residency in Mexico. The cable, which Nosenko said he did not personally see, reported that Oswald had visited the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City requesting permission to return to the U.S.S.R. and that the cable specified that Oswald had dealt with Soviet Foreign Ministry personnel only."

In pointing out inconsistencies in Nosenko's statements about reviewing Oswald's KGB file, the CIA memo notes that at one time he said he had "only skimmed the file" and another time he said he had it in his possession for 20 minutes.

The CIA, which continued to question Nosenko periodically over the next few years, noted that in October, 1966, "He again said that he read the file and that while doing so he saw a picture of Oswald for the first time. Nosenko added that he never met Oswald personally."

An assertion by Nosenko that the KGB's First Chief Directorate first learned of Oswald when he applied for a reentry visit in Mexico City "is probably incorrect," the CIA memo said.

"The consular file turned over to the U.S. Government by the Soviet Embassy in Washington after the assassination indicated that the KGB First Chief Directorate would have known of Oswald as early as February, 1963, if not earlier. That file contained Marina Oswald's (Oswald's Russian-born wife) letter of February, 1963, and a letter of July, 1963, from Oswald, both of which indicated that Oswald had earlier requested permission to return to the Soviet Union."

Without regard to possible earlier correspondence, the CIA concluded: "Oswald's request for a Soviet visa addressed to the embassy in Washington in July, 1963, would require the Washington residency to report the matter to Moscow, just as Nosenko described the Mexico City residency later did."

Nosenko's ignorance of such communications "discredits his claim to complete knowledge of all aspects of the KGB relationship with Oswald," the CIA memo said.

Saturday, April 3, 1976

The Washington Star

CIA Denies Lockheed Bribe Role

The CIA denied yesterday that it was involved in any illegal payments in Japan by Lockheed Aircraft Corp. The denial came after reports surfaced that the CIA knew of the payments.

The New Republic magazine said the CIA may have been aware of the payments because of its connection with an international currency-dealing firm that served as a Lockheed conduit.

And The New York Times reported that many details of the payments were reported at the time to the CIA.

"The CIA has not been involved in any Lockheed bribery operations," said the agency's statement.

ASKED WHETHER the CIA was aware of the illegal payments in Japan, the spokesman said the on-sentence statement was all the agency had to say and that it "gets to the heart of the matter."

Lockheed has said it paid out \$12 million to help promote business in Japan and that \$2 million of that went to Japanese government officials over several years.

In a copyrighted article in its April 2 issue, which also appeared in The Washington Star yesterday, The New Republic says that Deak & Co. of New York, dealers in international currency, was the channel for about \$8.2 million of the Lockheed money.

There was no comment from Deak & Co.

The New York Times reported that many details of Lockheed's bribery of Japanese politicians in the

sale of its F104 fighter plane in the late 1950s were reported at the time to the Central Intelligence Agency.

THE TIMES quoted a former CIA official and unidentified Japanese sources as saying details of Lockheed's spending an estimated \$1.5 million to win the fighter contract from Grumman Aircraft Corp. were sent through CIA channels from the American embassy in Tokyo.

The former official was quoted as saying the CIA station in Tokyo "was checking with headquarters every step of the way when the Lockheed thing came up. Every move made was

approved by Washington."

The Times said Mitchell Rogovin, CIA counsel, would neither confirm nor deny that the agency knew of the payments to Japanese officials.

Author Tad Szulc said in the New Republic article that Deak and Co. "for many years has . . . served as a covert channel for worldwide financial operations of the CIA" and that this is "a matter of guarded knowledge in Washington's intelligence community."

"Therefore, it is more than likely that the CIA was aware all along of Lockheed's secret activities in Japan, including the pay-

ments of millions of dollars . . . to the leader of an extreme right-wing Japanese political faction and still unidentified senior Japanese officials," he wrote.

Szulc quoted "well-placed American sources" as saying the CIA "may even have orchestrated much of Lockheed's financial operations in Japan, pursuant to secret U.S. foreign policy objectives."

The Lockheed payments became known last February during hearings of a Senate committee, with much of the money allegedly going through Yoshio Kodama, identified as an influential power broker.

ROLLING STONE

8 April 1976

The Press Establishment and the First Amendment

While the press establishment gathers for the film premiere of *All the President's Men*—a film which celebrates the triumph of two crusading reporters and of the First Amendment—another reporter's "triumph" is being rewarded by a congressional inquiry into the source of his story and by the criticism of his colleagues.

Indeed, CBS newsmen Dan Schorr's assignment to cover the congressional investigation of the "intelligence community" was, in Schorr's own brisk turn of phrase, the "son of Watergate."

Yet now we witness the spectacle of the *New York Times* attacking Schorr for providing his copy of the report to a competitive New York weekly. The *Times* charges that Schorr's release of the report was tainted by attempting to secure a donation to the Reporters' Committee for Freedom of the Press. Would the *Times* care to account for their receipts from the sale of the *Pentagon Papers* leaked to them by Daniel Ellsberg?

The *New York Times* attack would have appeared bizarre were it not joined by the pliant executives of CBS, who quickly removed Schorr from his assignment and finally suspended him from active duty altogether. Only days earlier, the *Washington Post* revealed secret meetings of the executives of the *Times* and CBS with CIA director George Bush about CIA infiltration of their companies.

How do we explain these things? Bernstein and Woodward are rightfully celebrated and rewarded today for essentially the same kind of reportage only months ago. CBS, despite riches and power that surpass most news organizations in America, backed off in a fashion that cannot be blamed on cowardice alone.

The Pike report had been widely disseminated by the national press; the publication of Schorr's copy seemed almost an afterthought until Henry Kissinger, in a full-dress State Department press conference, went after the report and its leakers.

Perhaps just a casual series of events, but to those familiar with the Nixon/Kissinger style—the furiously unleashed governmental attack coupled with an orchestra of editorials and congressional investigation—the Watergate ways are back with us, larger than ever.—Jann Wenner

WASHINGTON STAR
1 APRIL 1976

NEOFOCUS *Bureaucracy's Molasses-Like Reluctance to Disclose*

By Jerry Oppenheimer
Washington Star Staff Writer

Like a toddler told to share its toys, the federal bureaucracy is kicking and screaming as it drags its feet in opening files to the public under the new Privacy Act and Freedom of Information Act amendments.

But the bureaucratic tantrum, government officials maintain, is not over the intent of the disclosure laws. Rather, they blame their growing anger and molasses-like implementation on two factors — the 10-day time limit imposed on the government to respond to requests under freedom of information (FOI), and what they perceive to be increasing "misuse" of both acts by groups and individuals.

Since the FOI amendments became effective 14 months ago and the Privacy Act took effect last September, federal agencies report, they have been bombarded by thousands of requests — many of them broad in scope, obscure, sometimes even threatening — for information from people whose intentions, it is suspected, are neither serious nor honorable. Nonetheless, they must be answered.

AGENCY LAWYERS and administrators assert that this "harassment" is, in part, the reason for the huge backlog of FOI and privacy requests — more than 6,000 at the FBI alone. It is also cited in the soaring number of lawsuits against the government because either access was denied or those requesting access refused to follow the administrative review process.

As an example, a response to a recent request from Rep. Bella S. Abzug, D-N.Y., who chairs the House government information and individual rights subcommittee, as to what steps the FBI was taking to clear up its backlog, said in part:

"There have been instances where organizations have encouraged their members to submit requests for records, making clear that their purpose is harassment and a conscious attempt primarily to bog the FBI down in processing requests, rather than to seek access to records. We have no way of predicting how many similar requests will be made in the future."

The purpose of the FOI amendments and Privacy Act is to curb official secrecy and open up government. Both laws go a long way to require federal agencies to disclose records.

The main difference between FOI and privacy is that the Privacy Act requires the disclosure of records on individuals requested by the individuals themselves.

CRITICS INSIDE and outside of government scoff at bureaucratic charges that groups or individuals are abusing the new disclosure laws. They contended in interviews that officials never have been happy with disclosure and never will be.

These critics assert that the disclosure of records can be and already have been embarrassing to government agencies and political administrations. They contend that bureaucrats will try to avoid opening the acres of government filing cabinets to the public as a result.

The government officials, however, cite the following as examples of what they consider to be "harassment."

Item: The California-based Church of Scientology, which has had a running battle with the Internal Revenue Service over loss of its tax-exempt status, for over a year has been besieging government agencies with broad-stroke requests for any and all files they may have ranging from those on the church's founder, L. Ron Hubbard, to those on one of the church's controversial devices, the E-Meter, to State Department communications regarding the Caribbean comings and goings of one of its vessels, the Apollo.

The church now has actions now pending against the State, Defense and Transportation departments, the Navy, the Coast Guard, the IRS, the Postal Service and the Drug Enforcement Administration.

Item: A Newark lawyer who pens a conservative newsletter has made numerous requests for information about the activities within the office of the U.S. attorney in New Orleans. These requests, officials said, included: How many Italian-Americans work in the office and information about them; whether prosecutors in the office are required to wear American flag pins in their lapels; the amount of contributions made by the U.S. attorney to the 1968 and 1972 Nixon campaigns.

Virtually every time an indictment is announced by the office, no matter how routine, the lawyer requests information pertaining to the case. A Justice Department official contends that the lawyer is working for a Louisiana client who has a grudge against the U.S. attorney and is "looking for

information to embarrass him via the disclosure laws."

Item: At the CIA, an official involved in handling FOI and privacy requests said that a good many of them come "from people who are less than enthusiastic" about the agency. Requests are often broad — "I want everything you have on the Bay of Pigs." The official says that some of these requests contain threats. "I've even gotten them at home." The threats, he said, have included some of bombings. "We have reported them to the FBI and Secret Service."

Item: Numerous requests have been received by government agencies as a result of an advertisement placed by a California firm that promises it can supply everything the government has on a person for a \$15 fee. Officials believe that those responding are "doing it for a lark, while those who have serious requests must wait their turn."

Item: An Alexandria lawyer — one of a growing number of lawyers across the country beginning to specialize in FOI and Privacy Act cases — has sent in numerous requests for clients using a lengthy, detailed form that checks dozens of government agencies whose files he wants searched. In an interview, he acknowledged that some of his clients might have once attended a demonstration of some sort and now want to see what, if anything, the government has on them.

Item: It is not unusual, officials say, to get a large number of requests from a political science class whose professor assigned it to send in to see what the government had on each student. "In very few cases like this," said a Justice Department official, "do we ever find anything, but the files must be searched involving a lot of manpower. It's a total waste and sometimes I have a vision that that's all we'll be doing if things continue this way."

Item: Hundreds and hundreds of requests come in

from "jailhouse lawyers" who decided one day that "it would be a fun thing to do." Said an official who handles these requests: "That's part of what makes the disclosure laws intolerable."

Atty. Gen. Edward H. Levi recently told a group of reporters that those kind of requests "do an injustice to those who have legitimate requests. It's a very difficult problem. I suppose the hope is that after a while the novelty will die down."

IN RECENTLY submitting to Congress the Justice Department's first annual report on the operations of the FOI amendments and the first six months under the Privacy Act, Deputy Atty. Gen. Harold R. Tyler Jr. emphasized that "the receipt of over 30,000 requests for access, a number far in excess of what anyone had anticipated, has transformed this into a major area of departmental operations."

Tyler said that the requests, which took up more than 120,000 man-hours, "demonstrate the adverse impact on the department's ability to carry out its traditional substantive missions during the past year. Moreover, the figures for the first two months of 1976 offer no indication that the tide is ebbing."

He called for a "critical re-examination of the many substantive and procedural inconsistencies between FOI and the access

provisions of the Privacy Act."

The direct cost to the FBI for processing disclosure requests last year was more than \$1.6 million, a figure that does not reflect personnel not assigned full-time to processing requests, but whose services are indirectly required for consultation and classification review.

The FBI's estimated cost for this year is more than \$2.6 million and the projected cost for next year is more than \$3.4 million. These figures are in stark contrast to the initial estimate of the House Government Operations Committee — \$100,000 annually between fiscal 1975 and 1980 for all federal agencies.

RONALD L. PLESSER, general counsel for the Privacy Protection Study Commission, which was formed by the Privacy Act, said he feels the crush on agencies, particularly the FBI, CIA and State Department, is transitional, but acknowledged that there are "serious processing difficulties."

"After all," declared Plessler, "you are looking at three agencies which historically have been the paragons of secrecy and so all of a sudden after 200 years the public has the right to ask them for information — it does not seem to me that it is unreasonable that there has to be a transition period. Before, they had been acting totally without accountability."

But Plessler asserted that

the government "has to get comfortable with the fact that opening its files to the public is one of the things it does like its other functions. One of the complaints I hear all the time is that this takes time, effort and money away from our mission. But this is part of their mission."

Jeff Axlerad, a Justice Department Civil Division attorney who oversees the government's defense of suits filed under the acts — except for those filed against the IRS and some of the regulatory agencies — said that litigation has soared from under 100 cases early last year to well over 300 today.

CITED MOST often by government lawyers interviewed about possible misuse or harassment under the disclosure laws was the case of the requests made by the Church of Scientology. But Joel Kriener, the Hollywood, Calif., attorney who represents the church and whose signature appears on some 200 requests in government files, calls the charges "absurd."

Kriener said he files so many requests "because they don't respond to the first, or we'll have reason to believe that agency A has files on us. We'll know this because agency B released some documents to us, some of which came from agency A, yet agency A will deny having documents or do nothing."

As a result of his requests and follow up suits against

the government, volumes of documents have been released. Kriener said that one such document, which he refers to as "Foley memorandum," accused the church of "blatant criminal activity. For example, shooting people, murder, use of drugs, this type of thing. The document, which came from the Labor Department, attributed its source to the IRS."

He said that other material released by government agencies were "along the same lines, but not with as serious allegations. I find that as we enter litigation documents turn up, searches are found to be incomplete. Without fail, after we file suit we get more documents. Suits pay off."

THE LAWYER contended that all of the scurrilous material found about the church in the government records were lies and that the difficulties the church has had over the years — deportation actions, tax problems, loss of postal mailing permits, drug investigations — "can be linked to the stuff that's in those files."

As for the charges of harassment, Kriener said, "All they're saying is that we're making numerous requests under the law. That's the nitty-gritty. I think they're overprotective of themselves and of the files and are just not reading the acts with the intent Congress wants them to be read."

THE WASHINGTON POST (POTOMAC)

4 April 1976

AVEDON SHOOTS UP WASHINGTON

In the past, New York was where fashion photographer Richard Avedon shot his Vogue covers and Washington was where he protested. But now Avedon, who was arrested at the Capitol while protesting America's involvement in Southeast Asia in 1972, has just finished a round of picture-taking in Washington on assignment from Rolling Stone magazine. His project: to photograph a Bicentennial series of portraits of people who have most influenced America. Among those who have received the Avedon treatment: George Bush, Mike Mansfield, Frank Church, George McGovern, Eugene McCarthy, Ted Kennedy, Jimmy Carter, Ronald Reagan, George Wallace, Katharine Graham, Carl Albert, Edmund Muskie, Hubert Humphrey and Gerald Ford.

While Avedon is best known for his fashion shots

of models such as Lauren Hutton, Margaux Hemingway and Verushka, the 52-year-old lensman only makes his pictures pretty for fashion assignments; his portraits are more stark. Avedon waited patiently one day while Frank Church struck a self-conscious pose — a profile of himself looking upward. Not until Church looked back at him did Avedon click the shutter of his big, 8 x 10 Deardorff camera. At the CIA, national security prevented George Bush from wearing his customary ID during his portrait sitting. And on the Hill, it still isn't possible for a photographer to shoot with strobe lights without throwing the entire Capitol's electrical system awry. At Carl Albert's office on a Friday—when the House is generally adjourned—Avedon's strobes annoyed legislators by setting off the bells that signal a vote on the floor.

DALLAS MORNING NEWS

1 APRIL 1976

William Colby

Ex-CIA head sees African clash

By ANN ATTERBERRY

William Colby predicted Wednesday the next clash in Africa will be between the Soviet Union and African whites whom the United States "cannot and will not support."

Colby, who resigned as director of the Central Intelligence Agency in January, told El Centro students the CIA was trying in Angola to support two black nationalist groups against Soviet intervention.

The CIA believed a Soviet takeover "would be dangerous," Colby said. Congress was asked and refused to allow U.S. intervention when Cuba sent 12,000 soldiers into Angola last July.

"Now, with that victory in the past, Castro feels he has some great mission in Africa," Colby warned.

Asked if Soviet influence in Angola will have an immediate effect on the United States, Colby said the trend of world history indicates allowing the takeover in Angola to go unchallenged indicates trouble later.

GERMANY'S INITIAL expansion into Czechoslovakia in March of 1939 was "no immediate problem," Colby pointed out. Historically, the expansion emerged as one of the first steps to World War II.

Colby defended "quiet assistance to friends of America," saying assistance "where necessary and when necessary" can "forestall something more serious."

He cited the Bay of Pigs as an example of unsuccessful assistance and the prevention of the spread of communism into Latin America as an example of successful assistance.

Only 5 per cent of the CIA budget is now spent for political and para-military operations, Colby said, compared to 40 per cent in the 1940s.

The remainder goes for what Colby described as information collection and processing which has been revolutionized by technology.

The CIA must have its secrets, Colby stressed both at a press conference and in his speech, but the public also has a right to know.

"WE MUST not insist on total disclosure or total secrecy," said Colby, who believes there are plenty of checks and balances on the secrets side to prevent the CIA from overstepping its boundaries.

In addition to the President, the CIA must report its secret activities to six committees of Congress. Colby said, "I think that's too many committees. One

in each house would be enough."

Colby, who became director of the CIA in 1973 and resigned in January at the request of the President, said some individuals and some foreign agencies have refused to help the CIA during the past year for fear of exposure. He thinks "we can go back now and reestablish our confidence" because those sources have been "almost totally protected."

COLBY SAID he is traveling and speaking to correct "sensational misimpressions" growing out of exposure of CIA involvement in areas including plots to assassinate Cuba's Fidel Castro and Patrice Lumumba of Zaire, a neighboring nation of Angola.

The plots were known outside the CIA, Colby said, but he is not sure "how high" the information went in the political structure. i r f a

The press and sources outside the CIA are partly to blame for leaks, but "restraints should be on people who gather intelligence," Colby said.

The CIA did not interview Lee Harvey Oswald while he was in Russia because Oswald "wasn't that interesting, and he had been in touch with other agencies."

THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR

31 March 1976

Readers write

Vietnam 'analysts'

The Monitor has, over the years, provided some good, informative reporting on Vietnam. But you do your readers a disservice by printing the article on "trouble spots" in Vietnam by Geoffrey Godsell. Mr. Godsell offers a long list of items as gospel, giving no source for most of this "information." Only in two places does he refer in the vaguest terms to "American analysts" and "U.S. analysts."

I would like to call to your readers' attention that such attribution has, in the past, quite often indicated that the information came from the CIA. I would also like to point out that one lesson to be drawn from the recent congressional hearings is that the CIA has no qualms about distorting the truth, or even outright lying and fabrication when they feel that will serve their political goals.

I would also like to remind your readers of a lesson we should have learned from revelations in the Pentagon papers and elsewhere. The CIA interest in such discontent as there may be in Vietnam is not simply that of an observer. The Pentagon papers recounted the story of the elaborate program, headed by Gen. Edward Lansdale, of physical and economic sabotage against North Vietnam in 1954. Similarly, news reports in the late '60s revealed CIA operations of espionage and sabo-

tage against China, directed from Laos.

It must also be remembered that the administration has publicly shown itself as hostile as ever to Vietnam. It imposed a trade embargo on Vietnam, vetoed Vietnamese entry into the United Nations. The CIA serves these same policy goals of continued enmity toward Vietnam, and we cannot lightly dismiss the suggestion that the agency may be involved in stirring up trouble in that country.

I should mention that I spent three of the past 10 years in South Vietnam (most recently in 1974), and am fluent in Vietnamese. I have visited several of the regions where Mr. Godsell's "analysts" predict trouble. I do not want to minimize the depth of misunderstanding and hatred which have been sown over the years of war (with the not inconsiderable help of U.S. propaganda). But CIA analyses of frictions there cannot be considered reliable.

More than that, now that the war is over we should insist that our government help to heal the wounds of war, not engage in activities designed to exacerbate them.

Berkeley, Calif.

John Spragens Jr.

[Editor's note: Mr. Godsell states that his sources did not include the CIA.]

WASHINGTON POST

25 MAR 1976

Sweden Protests

Diplomat Activities

STOCKHOLM, March 24 (AP) — The Swedish Foreign Office summoned the U.S. charge d'affaires today to deliver a verbal protest against alleged spy activities by an American diplomat who already has left the country.

A spokesman said ministry officials expressed the government's "strong disapproval" that Bruce Hutchins, a former second secretary at the U.S. embassy, had been operating in Sweden as an agent for the Central Intelligence Agency.

The diplomatic move followed a report in a leftist magazine that Hutchins had tried to hire a Kenyan citizen, to get information about African embassies in Stockholm and Swedish newsmen who covered the war in Angola.

CHRISTIANITY AND CRISIS
15 March 1976

"Render Unto Caesar" MISSIONARIES AND THE CIA

THE CURRENT CONTROVERSY about whether missionaries should or should not give information to US intelligence agencies raises once again the question of the split loyalties of Christians.

To assess the present situation some historical recall is necessary. In the early days of the missionary movement, most missionaries felt no sense of conflict between their identities as citizens of a particular nation and their roles as bearers of the universal good news. Indeed, they often tended to identify the two.

For its part the Government tended to rely in part upon missionaries for information about foreign countries. The US Foreign Service was small, and missionaries frequently had more extensive and better contacts. Many missionaries routinely visited the State Department to be debriefed upon their return to their native country on furlough. One example of this kind of relationship was the large number of foreign service personnel and journalists from a missionary background.

Such a simple combination of roles was increasingly overtaken both by theological analysis and the objections of indigenous Christians on the one hand and by events, most notably the changing world role of the US, on the other hand.

The turning point was World War II. It was then that the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) was formed, which led to the Central Intelligence Agency in 1947. The OSS was the first pure intelligence agency ever established by the United States. This in itself was symptomatic of our emergence as a superpower. Finally, the end of World War II and the beginning of the cold war saw the transformation of US national interests into a world ideological struggle.

The individual whose life symbolizes this change for the missionary was John Birch. (Yes, Virginia, there was a John Birch as well as the John Birch Society.) John Birch was a Baptist missionary in China who served with the US Air Force and later the OSS during World War II; he was killed after the war ended by a Chinese Communist while leading a patrol of Chinese Nationalists. Despite the fact that his death seems to have been a mistake following a quarrel, he was adopted by Robert Welch and the radical right as the "first martyr" of the coming world struggle.

Clearly, the old easy relationship between US missionaries and their government had undergone a radical transformation, but such changes take time to become apparent. Many missionaries continued to support the old arrangement; some, al-

though increasingly fewer, probably still do. An ever-larger number became critical of US policy and tried to distance themselves from any connection with it. Probably the largest number saw their role as nonpolitical and tried to be friendly with their government, but noninvolved. As US power and influence spread around the world, this last stance became increasingly difficult to maintain. So seemingly "pure" an act as distributing relief supplies is inescapably political in a politicized world.

Each missionary worked out whatever solution he/she could square with personal circumstances and conscience, and it would be pointless (as well as self-righteous) to criticize those individual decisions at this late date. The question remains, what are the guidelines for the future?

The old arrangements are certainly dead, and good riddance. The easy assumption that missionaries are there as Americans whose primary loyalties are to their native country was always bad theology, even though its fatal flaws did not show up until recently. The bland assumptions of President Ford and former CIA Director William Colby in this respect were the attempts of drowning men to grab at any support, as even the new CIA Director, George Bush, has realized.

On the other hand, it is a current wishful misconception to imagine that missionaries can shed their national and cultural identities. Just as missionaries must open themselves to understand and feel other cultures and identities, so must they retain a grasp of their own culture and identity. They must be partly at home in two worlds. Even if they switch nationalities, this dichotomy remains. Improperly handled, leads to schizophrenia; properly handled, it shows how the Christian both appropriates and transcends culture.

A corollary of this truth is that the final decision on the relationship between the individual and his/her government does not rest with the government but with the individual. It is very well, perhaps even wise and proper, to pass bills such as that proposed by Senator Hatfield keeping the Government off the back of missionaries, but any attempt to erect an absolute wall of separation between a missionary and his/her government is as dubious theologically as it is impractical. The Christian serving abroad is not a government agent but neither does he/she stop being a citizen of his/her country.

Legalisms won't do the trick. In terms of government suspicion in other countries, the damage has been done and will take some time to repair, but those who are suspicious will not have their questions miraculously erased by a Government declaration that it will not use missionary information. That's one of the best cover stories one could think up.

This is one of those continuing tensions that Christians must always live with and that they never really can get sorted out neatly. The missionary giving information to the CIA, the missionary leading demonstrations against the US consulate, the missionary seeking to ignore the problem—all are dealing with the problem in their

own way. Interestingly enough, the person seeking to escape the question has perhaps less grasp of Christian responsibility than either of the others.

Part of the furor about missionary connections with the CIA has a positive value. Part of the public shock (vastly overrated by the churches) stems from the old myth of the superhuman missionary, floating serenely above the problems of ordinary mortals. That myth dies hard, but anything that helps to kill it can't be all bad. Of course, most missionaries were never on Government payrolls and loved the countries and the people where they worked far too much to knowingly damage them. To suppose otherwise is to substitute cartoon characters for real people: to

replace unthinkingly the cardboard heroes of yesterday with cardboard villains for today.

Neither will do. In working out his/her salvation with diligence, the Christian must constantly try to keep a universal commitment and a particular identity in some sort of balance. The missionary is an exemplar of that tension. The struggle is never easy. It is only through grace that any kind of harmony is ever achieved.

ARTHUR J. MOORE

This viewpoint also appeared in the February issue of New World Outlook, of which Mr. Moore is the editor.

TIME
22 MARCH 1976

Soviet Spying on Capitol Hill

Posing as diplomats, embassy officials and newsmen, Soviet intelligence agents have been conducting a determined effort to get classified information on Capitol Hill by bribing or compromising staff members in key positions. TIME has learned that in more than a dozen cases in the last decade or so the FBI has stepped in to "control" the relationship, fearing a staffer might begin giving out restricted data. In some cases, the FBI has used the aide as a double agent, allowing him to pass on worthless material while actually spying on the Soviet officials. To date, the FBI says, it has found no staffer who has given unauthorized information to the Russians.

Charming Official. The Soviet KGB agents—who constitute an estimated 40% of the embassy staff in Washington—concentrate on the Foreign Relations and Armed Services committees, which receive secret testimony and intelligence briefings. The agents apparently make no real efforts to suborn the Senators or Congressmen on the committees. "The Soviets may be a bit clumsy, but they aren't fools," says an intelligence source. "They know that a Congressman or a Senator is pretty much a prisoner of his staff. What he knows, the staff knows, and it's easier to get the information from the staff."

The names of aides who are now double agents, or who have been systematically wooed by the Kremlin, are being kept under tight security. But one case has been uncovered that illustrates how the Soviets work the halls of Congress. James Kappus, 29, a printing consultant in Largo, Md., became an assistant to Wisconsin Congressman Alvin E. O'Konski in 1967. At the time, O'Konski, who retired from Congress in 1973, was a member of the House Armed Services Committee. Kappus recalls how he met a charming Soviet embassy official named Boris A. Sedov and was soon being invited to Soviet embassy parties. Kappus was genuinely dazzled. "I was just a kid," says he, "two years out of Eau Claire, Wis., and there I was—waiting to be introduced to the ambassador."

In ways that remain a mystery to Kappus, the FBI learned about his friendship with Sedov. With O'Konski's approval, the bureau began supervising Kappus' contacts with the Russian, who was actually a KGB spy. At Sedov's sug-

gestion, Kappus first wrote a story for a Soviet newspaper about presidential candidates for the 1968 election. He was paid only \$20, but in the months that followed, Kappus received some \$2,000 more for passing on unclassified information that had first been screened by the FBI. "We both knew that I had been 'compromised,'" says Kappus. "Sedov didn't talk about it and neither did I, but we both understood it."

Sedov began pressing Kappus for classified information. Where did O'Konski keep classified documents? Could Kappus get at them? When Kappus hesitated, Sedov said, "You know, I helped you out when things were tough."

Kappus insists that he never did turn over any secret material to Sedov. Their relationship ended in 1970 when Kappus went into the Army and the Russian was called home.

Another Capitol Hill aide who says he worked as a double agent is Kenneth R. Tolliver, 42, now an advertising man in Greenville, Miss. In 1966, Tolliver joined the staff of Mississippi's Senator James O. Eastland, a staunch friend of the Pentagon. Although U.S. intelligence sources cast doubt on some parts of his story, Tolliver says he was recruited by the Soviets in 1968 and—with the approval of the FBI—began providing information. He also performed chores for the Russians, such as getting labor permits and Social Security cards for "illegals"—a term for spies. That same year, after learning about Tolliver's activities, Eastland dropped him from his staff. The former aide claims he continued to work as a double agent until 1974. In all, Tolliver says, he received nearly \$20,000 from the Russians, which he turned over to the FBI.

Long Harangues. In the past two years, the Soviets have substantially increased their efforts to penetrate Congress. They are particularly anxious to tap the committee that is expected to be created to oversee U.S. intelligence agencies, including the CIA and the FBI.

The Soviet intelligence squad on Capitol Hill is at least 15 strong. One of the prominent members is Yuri Barsakov, whose cover is the Izvestia News Agency. Says a Senate aide: "Barsakov is right out of central casting. He's a heavy guy with bushy eyebrows. He offers tips on Soviet affairs, hoping to swap

that dope for information." Another well-known operator is Igor Bubnov, an embassy counselor, who is described by a Senate staffer as "impossible—pompous and arrogant" and given to delivering long harangues in defense of his country. Other members of the Soviet squad: Anatoly I. Davydov, second secretary at the embassy; Victor F. Isakov, counselor; Vladimir A. Vikoulov, attaché; Vadim Kuznetsov, an embassy official; Stanislov Kondrahov, an Izvestia reporter; Ilya Zavrazhnov and Alexander Kokorev, both embassy secretaries; Andre Kokoshin, librarian; Anotole Kotov, attaché; and Embassy Officials Alexander Ereskovsky, Vladimir Trifonov, Alexander Rozanov and Valeri Ivanov.

A great deal of the Soviet effort in Congress takes place in the open—and is legal. Agents cover congressional hearings and collect reports and printed matter of all kinds. Higher-level Soviet agents work, legitimately and publicly, like regular lobbyists, trying to sell Congressmen and Senators the Soviet position on crucial strategic matters.

Last fall, after hearing Vice President Nelson Rockefeller discuss the subject with concern, Senator Barry Goldwater told newsmen that Soviet agents had infiltrated the offices of seven Senators. In the ensuing furor, 52 Congressmen endorsed a letter asking Senator Frank Church, chairman of the Select Committee on Intelligence Activities, to look into the charges. Church, in turn, asked the FBI to investigate.

On Oct. 30, just two days after he got the request, FBI Director Clarence Kelley issued a report confirming that the KGB had tried to reach people who could provide sensitive information. But the report concluded there was no information indicating that "Soviet KGB officers have infiltrated any congressional staffs." On the side, Kelley gave Church a still-secret report on Soviet activities that is said to contain material about the cases in which the bureau "doubled" (turned into double agents) the KGB's congressional contacts.

Church, however, ignored the secret report. Preoccupied with his own investigation of U.S. intelligence operations, he seized upon the other report from Kelley to announce that the "allegations" about Soviet spying had been "put to rest." His committee did not even discuss the Soviet electronic "bug" that fell out of a chair in the House Foreign Affairs Committee room in 1973.

AMERICA

13 March 1976

BRIAN O'CONNELL

Doing Away With Covert Activities

A proposal that all secret political actions in other countries
be put off-limits and that intelligence be limited to gathering data,
with five possible objections and answers to them

Americans have heard of the many controversial activities of the Central Intelligence Agency in recent years. Assassination plots, efforts to destabilize governments, secret financial aid to foreign political parties, secret arms supplies and other clandestine activities have been reported. We know that such activities took place in Ecuador, Bolivia, Venezuela, Iran, Guatemala, the Dominican Republic, Cuba, Albania, Greece, Italy, the Congo, Indonesia and Indochina. In most of these instances, the secret activities took place in conjunction with an attempted or actual overthrow of a government, although secrecy hides the degree of CIA influence.

There are instances where the CIA used missionaries or company representatives as funnels of support or covers for secret activities. In doing this, it helped to undermine the credibility of many U.S. missionaries and company representatives not involved in such practices. The recent adulation given to Richard Welsh, the special assistant to the U.S. Ambassador to Greece who was murdered in an ambush, may have given due credit to a man for service to his country, but the widespread advertisement of the fact that he was the CIA office chief in Greece hurts the credibility of all our embassy staffs around the world.

The Rockefeller Report documented "illegal" opening of the mail of U.S. citizens and the keeping of files on domestic dissidents in direct contradiction of the CIA charter.

Congressional estimates put the CIA budget in excess of \$750 million. The agency employs 15,000 people. Controller General Elmer Staats estimates the annual combined budget total of all U.S. intelligence agencies is about \$6 billion. The combined employment of these agencies is about 150,000. Most are directly involved in military intelligence gathering, but secrecy shrouds the number involved in other covert activities.

News of the size and kind of CIA operations has made little impact on the public. Few people have evaluated or passed any kind of moral judgment. Sadly, almost no comment has come from the churches. One Senator remarked that he had almost no constituent response on the subject. Congressional committee members investigating the CIA have found it to be of less and less value from a political point of view. We know that a former CIA director lied about intervention in Chile before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1973, but there has been no moral outcry.

There are moral issues here that we cannot sweep under the rug. Perhaps in the wake of Watergate, we simply do not want to face any more harsh facts, but there are basic issues of truth and the preservation of rights that demand moral evaluation, and in some cases, condemnation.

Should not all secret political action in other countries be considered immoral, and the intelligence services be limited to the mere gathering of intelligence information? The following considerations offer justification for, or answer objections to, this principle.

1. We would consider such secret actions of agents of other countries in the United States to be criminal. If our political parties got secret foreign funding, or if paramilitary groups in the United States got outside assistance, or if certain segments of the American news media were supported by secret foreign funds, or if foreign agents plotted domestic assassination attempts, Americans would be justly outraged. Should an act which is considered criminal here not be considered criminal in another country?

2. Such covert actions interfere with the sovereign rights of other countries. Their laws prohibit it, and no other international law sanctions it.

3. The necessity of secrecy inevitably leads to lack of credibility. Officials of the U.S. government admit to

\$30 million spent secretly for Angola and \$13.4 million in Chile. (This would be comparable to \$134 million spent to influence U.S. elections, for this country has 10 times as many people as Chile.) When people in other countries know that the United States has such large funds to dispense secretly, they are justly suspicious. American missionaries in Latin America are now reporting back that the CIA, is being blamed for many things that go wrong. Secrecy breeds suspicion.

4. The people of the United States bear the responsibility for the actions of their government. In one of the early attempts of the U.S. bishops in 1967 to spell out principles to govern our Vietnam involvement, they said: "All issues in the Vietnam conflict are to be kept under constant moral scrutiny. No one can avoid personal responsibility in this, for the government is moved by public opinion." The same principle can be applied to covert action. If Americans receive only "guesses" about the extent and cost of this activity, how can they make responsible judgments?

Certain people use the veil of secrecy to avoid responsibility for immoral acts. Senator John C. Stennis (D., Miss.) made the following observation on the floor of the Senate on Nov. 23, 1971: "You have to make up your mind that you are going to have an intelligence agency and protect it as such and shut your eyes some, and take what is coming." This is reminiscent of Germans who knew that something was happening to the Jews, but were content to remain in ignorance of the total situation. In the same Senate debate, the late Senator Allen Ellender (D., La.), then chairman of the Senate Intelligence Subcommittee, said in response to Senator Alan Cranston (D., Calif.) that the five members of the committee who were supposed to monitor CIA activities neither inquired, nor were interested in inquiring, about CIA activities in Laos.

Other people use the veil of secrecy

to shirk responsibility less consciously. Perhaps they do not want to face embarrassing situations, or they are tired of Watergate-type disclosures, or they think that dirty tricks and other covert actions are necessary to survive in this world while letting the secrecy keep them from facing the "ends justifying the means" question.

The House of Representatives has elected to keep itself in the dark by not even requiring the total CIA budget to be reported to Congress. (It is now hidden in other items.) The Foreign Assistance Act of 1974 did stiffen the reporting requirements for clandestine overseas political operations to the appropriate committees of Congress. Congressman Leo J. Ryan (D., Calif.) claims this still does not give any right of approval or disapproval to Congress. Since the appropriate committees are still dominated by people who accept CIA activities unquestioningly, individual members with reservations have no recourse other than press leaks that would be censured. After the Angola revelations, the Senate overwhelmingly voted to stop further covert aid to Angola, but still did nothing to force more disclosures or stop the process in other countries.

The secrecy issue affects Americans in two ways. We must be sure that neither the elected representatives nor the people use secrecy to avoid moral responsibility for the acts of an agency of their government. Second, we must provide enough knowledge for the American people to make responsible moral judgments about this major thrust of American foreign policy.

5. We must ask what may follow from intensive covert activities. The Nixon Administration could find employment for E. Howard Hunt, who responded in the "plumbers trial," when asked what he had done for the last 20 years: "Oh, subversion of prominent figures abroad, the overthrow of governments, that sort of thing." Lying, assassination and disruptive acts were all legitimated as a means to a higher end.

The objection that merits the most consideration comes from those who claim that everyone else is doing it, that, in fact, the Communists are doing it much more than we are. They claim that people in many parts of the

world welcome our secret intervention because they know it has prevented subversion in their countries. Michael Novak sums this argument up by saying: "I prefer a war fought through intelligence services to a war fought with atomic weapons used by armies." No realist can ignore the fact of large-scale and destructive Communist subversion.

In a short-range view, this argument is cogent and difficult to reject. But now that these covert activities have been going on for almost 30 years, we can look at some long-range results. How many times has this policy aligned us with repressive, rightist governments? How many times has it succeeded or backfired? How many times has it identified the United States with former colonialists like the French in Indochina or the Portuguese in Angola? Has it helped to develop a climate where countries shaking off old colonial powers are drawn into the cold war of the superpowers? Has America maintained its ethical and moral leadership with this policy?

Clark M. Clifford, who helped draft the 1947 act creating the CIA, feels that its subsequent operations have impaired this ethical and moral leadership. This leads us back to one of the new bases of peace that recent Popes have advocated. In *Pacem in Terris*, Pope John XXIII said that "first among the rules governing relations between political communities is that of truth." Truth can hardly be the first among the rules when secret actions play such a large role in international relations. Truth so often gets subverted in this process.

Cyrus R. Vance proposes a solution in allowing such covert actions only when they would be absolutely essential to the security of our nation. But suppose we took the full step and announced to the world that the United States would not engage in any further covert political action. The Communists would most probably try to take advantage of the situation with their own covert activities. There are certain behavior patterns, however, that would likely be resistant to this subversion. National liberation movements often pride themselves on their independence, and a new climate could exist in which the newly devel-

oping nations would feel safer without becoming dependent on one of the superpowers. Our intelligence gathering could still work to expose and embarrass those involved in Communist subversion, whereas our voice is not now respected when we point to Communist covert action: "Your President admits you do the same thing." Most probably we have been hesitant to expose Communist covert actions for fear that our own covert actions would be exposed, and our first response to increased Soviet activity in Angola was to initiate our own covert help.

With such a new policy, we might also have new weapons to resist Communist subversion with ethical and moral leadership. Increasingly, Americans are getting an ambiguous response to their actions around the world. We are both loved and hated by many people. Nations that were formerly friendly to us now complain more about our covert activity than about the more extensive covert activities of the Russians. Perhaps this happens because they are disappointed in us. After disclosure of CIA secret funding in Italy, one Italian said that they always expected this of the Russians, but not from the United States. Apparently some people have trouble reconciling these actions with our democratic ideals and past achievements. Our ethical and moral leadership has been compromised.

Looking for a new basis of peace is a radical move. In *Populorum Progressio*, Pope Paul VI recognizes that many will consider his vision Utopian and naive. But he says that it is his critics who are "not realistic enough." History teaches us too well how reliance on force, and the mistrust and subversion of truth that flow from it, have constantly brought nations to war. Pope Paul's message has been repeated by him many times in the past 10 years. Peace—based on truth, love, justice and trust—is both "obligatory" and "possible."

[Brian O'Connell, C. M., is an assistant professor of sociology at St. John's University, Jamaica, N. Y., and a member of the World Justice and Peace Commission of the Diocese of Brooklyn. He has previously contributed "New Credentials for Moralists" (2/19/72).]

FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW

2 April 1976

WHERE THE SPIES ARE: The embattled American CIA is fighting back by leaking details to the press of Soviet spy activities in the US. It is estimated that about 40% of all communist officials in the US are intelligence officers, which would mean that there would be about 380 KGB or GRU agents in the US and that New York is the biggest Soviet spy centre in the world. Many are attached to the UN, including identified intelligence officers such as Y. M. Ribakov, V. I. Baulin, N. Y. Bogarty, V. M. Krenov, Y. I. Shcherbakov and F. D. Serebryakov. Interestingly, the sons of three other identified KGB officers are also working in the UN — V. F. Zhigalov, N. N. Br Borovsky and V. M. Abrashkin.

GREENSBORO DAILY NEWS
15 March 1976

Bush Says CIA Vital To Freedom

BY HARVEY HARRIS
Daily News Staff Writer

George W. Bush, director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), said Sunday that the CIA is "vital to freedom" because it provides the information needed to avoid warfare, political upheavals and major calamities around the world.

Bush became CIA director six weeks ago and said his speech at Guilford Courthouse National Military Park here gave him his first opportunity to defend the CIA against outspoken critics who recently called attention to some of the agency's abuses and blunders.

The CIA director was keynote speaker for colorful ceremonies on the eve of the 195th anniversary of the Battle of Guilford Courthouse. He said intelligence-gatherers similar to those in the CIA were active in the Revolutionary War and today's agents are demonstrating the same kind of unselfish loyalty shown by soldiers so many years ago on the battlefield here.

The CIA is being reorganized and an "oversight board" will assure that its agents will never again be involved in such abuses as planned assassinations of foreign leaders, Bush added. He said he doesn't condone abuses but the CIA put an end to these abuses before President Gerald Ford handed down an executive order against them.

"The CIA and the entire intelligence community is under control," said Bush. He added that all of his employees will follow the guidelines laid down by Ford.

Bush said he made a pledge to the President, congress and senate that he would end CIA abuses and maintain the CIA as the best possible intelligence-gathering organization.

He said some oversight, such as that planned by the congress, is necessary but it is also necessary for the public to put "some degree" of trust in the nation's intelligence-gathering organizations.

The crowd applauded loud and long when Bush said the CIA won't abandon its secrecy. "You can't conduct an intelligence operation in the open," he added. There was more applause when he said "the American people don't want a reckless exposure" of the identities of CIA agents and what they are doing.

Acknowledging public anger and doubts about CIA involvement in recent controversies, Bush said, "When the furor is over, the vast majority of Ameri-

cans will support the need for secrecy' in the agency's work.

The CIA continues unshaken by all the controversy and is providing "valid information" so the nation's policy-makers can react wisely when foreign intrigue, buildups of arsenals and missile installations and other dangerous happenings threaten the security of the free world, he added.

He said the CIA has been highly successful in its struggle against hijackings, the international drug traffic, efforts of some nations to raise prices in such a way as to endanger the world's economy and to spread communism, terrorism and disruptions around the globe.

The nation's "intelligence-gathering community" has been badly harmed during the past year by the investigations and disclosures of the identity of some agents, said Bush. But the CIA's successes come when it "aborts crises, and you don't hear about them," he added.

Bush said the CIA is conducting intelligence-gathering operations "not to weaken, but to strengthen our country." He said the patriotism and unselfish service of agents in this work is "unlike those recklessly disclosing the identities

of CIA agents."

Richard Welch's son displayed a loyalty and pride after his CIA agent father's identity was disclosed in Greece, where the elder Welch was gunned down, "that tells much about the fiber of our country in 1976," said Bush.

The CIA director said his organization's agents have impressed him with their competence and dedication. He noted that more than 500 CIA agents have earned Ph.D. degrees which would enable them to earn much more money and live more comfortably.

But the agents are displaying patriotism and service "much like the spirit of those who fought so unselfishly for our freedom 195 years ago on this battlefield," he added.

Bush was introduced by U.S. Rep. Richardson Preyer, D-N.C., who described the battleground here as "the very soil on which the Revolutionary

War was won" and added that this nation "wouldn't be entering our third century of freedom without what took place here 195 years ago."

Preyer, Bush and other platform personalities were escorted by a colonial-garbed color guard shouldering muskets and marching to fanfare from the Allen Jay High School Band. Participants included the First Maryland Regiment and Ninth Virginia Regiment and the adult choir of Friendly Avenue Baptist Church in Greensboro.

Gary Everhardt, a native of Lenoir who is director of the National Park Service, said observances of the Bicentennial such as that held at Guilford Courthouse National Military Park here were among reasons for more than 250 million visits expected this year at the nation's parks.

Everhardt said the visitors are coming "to find answers to questions about their heritage." He said persons becoming more attached to their past are also becoming "more involved in citizenship in today's world."

The Japan Times Sunday, April 4, 1976

Paper Exposes 81 Alleged CIA Men

PARIS (Kyodo-Reuters) — The left-wing Paris newspaper Liberation Friday published the names of 81 American diplomats in 21 African countries whom it claimed were agents of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).

The newspaper, which published the names of 44 alleged CIA agents working in Paris earlier this year, said the agency's African operations were controlled from the

French capital.

It did not say how it knew the people named were CIA agents, but it based its previous claims on a system of cross-checking diplomatic lists and internal embassy telephone directories.

A U.S. Embassy spokesman here would make no comment on the report and referred callers to the CIA headquarters in Langley, Va.

Liberation said the CIA had moved its African headquarters and communications center to Liberia from Ethiopia after the fall of Emperor Haile Selassie's regime. A staff of 74 maintained the information center in Liberia, it said.

The other main CIA centers in Africa were in Nigeria, Ghana,

Kenya and Zaire, Liberation said.

The agency was less active in former French colonies and the French Secret Service competed with the CIA in several countries, although the two services had cooperated in Angola, Liberation said.

Agents worked through contacts in diplomacy, journalism and aid programs and in some cases had succeeded in infiltrating governments.

"The ideal prey for the CIA are Africans who go to study in the U.S.," Liberation said. "The agency contacts them and later tries to make them work for it when they return home," the newspaper added.

THE NATION
3 April 1976

'Intelligence' and Horse Sense

Three adjacent little stories, together measuring less than a column of type in the back pages of the March 19th *New York Times*, tell as much about the present climate of opinion on the democratic "right to know" as half a dozen learned volumes.

The first one's small headline reads:

Aerospace Institute Bids
Newsman Quit Over Leak

The "leak" in this case was a report by a journalist named Arthur Kranish, editor of *Science Trends*, a newsletter, of a so-called background briefing by "senior officials of the Central Intelligence Agency." It was what is known to the hierarchical world of security as a "nonclassified briefing," but this classification seems to mean to the initiates "speak no evil, even if you hear it." What Kranish and his fellow members of the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics heard the high CIA official say was that Israel possessed anywhere from ten to twenty nuclear weapons "available for use."

The question of Israel's possession or nonpossession of a nuclear capability has been much rumored, debated, denied and generally agitated for years without any clear resolution of the mystery. Now here was a "senior official" of the CIA in a "nonclassified" session called a "backgrounder" saying that indeed the gossip was true and putting a number on the Israeli nuclear arsenal. It was a very interesting, even startling, disclosure about the balance of force in the Middle East, and derived from what must be called "a qualified source." Kranish thought he should reveal this unclassified intelligence revelation, and wrote an article on it which *The Washington Post* published. For his professional pains, the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics has told Kranish the "honorable action for you" is to resign. (Kranish is talking to his lawyer first.)

The CIA has lately been going through an "open" phase. The dagger may still be poised, but the cloak is lifted, at least the hem, while Congress tries to decide what kind of controls it should try to impose on this previously unchecked agency of Presidential intervention abroad and, even more shockingly, at home. The former head of CIA, William Colby, whom President Ford fired in what seems to have been more a White House cleaning than a purge, spent his last months in a paroxysm of openness, going around posing as the outspoken manager of your friendly neighborhood spy shop. In this phase, which is not likely to

last long, it is apparently all right for the higher spies to come in from the cold and tell all about the weaponry of our friends abroad. They leave it to the ground rules of the groups with which they share these dangerous secrets to define a "leak" and punish the leakers. It would seem that this single revelation of an Israeli nuclear capability would be more damaging both to stability in the Middle East and to the reputation for discretion of American intelligence agencies than ten or twenty Pike Committee reports.

But the "intelligence community" is taking precautionary measures on another front. The headline right below the Kranish "leak" story reads:

U.S. Halts Two Booklets
Used to Spot C.I.A. Agents

The story says that the State Department has stopped publication of the *Foreign Service List* and that when its *Biographic Register* appears again it will be classified "for official use only." These two listings have made it famously easy for even an untutored spy to detect, behind clumsy "cover" jobs, the likely espionage functions of many of this country's operatives abroad. The most notable recent case was that of Richard Welch, a CIA agent in Athens,

mysteriously murdered after he had been identified as such and his name had been published in various anti-U.S. intelligence publications. There was much official indignation at the anti-CIA groups that made known his true identity, and Welch was given what amounted to a state funeral and buried in Arlington National Cemetery. The trail he left behind him was quite clear in those official publications which have now at last been suppressed or classified. This story is not so much about the right to know as it is on belated prudence and common sense on the part of the U.S. Government.

Finally, and from another world, is the story headlined:

Amins Lose Positions
In Cairo Press Shifts

It concerns two brothers who prospered and gained influence as newspaper publishers in Egypt after the military threw out King Farouk. Now President Anwar el-Sadat has removed them from the newspapers they started thirty years ago and announced that, though they can stay on as writers, they will be replaced as editors by men with "no hatred for the Socialist Revolution."

It is not a bad idea to remind ourselves that that is how the press is handled in most of the world and that the First Amendment—still in force—is what makes such things difficult, if not impossible, here.

INDIANA DAILY STUDENT
17 March 1976

CIA 'teach-in' may be offered

Tentative plans to sponsor an April 1 "teach-in" to educate students about the CIA were discussed Monday night by the Committee to End Campus Complicity with the CIA.

According to committee spokesman John Fry, senior, several professors would engage in a panel discussion and offer "concrete reasons why we should be against the CIA and why they should be kept off campus."

The committee also will set up "educational tables" on the CIA in

residence halls.

Fry said educating students about the CIA will be the committee's primary goal this semester.

He told the committee the Anti-CIA-recruiting rally last week "was very successful even if we did not get the files."

The committee wants made public CIA-related files it believes the University has.

The committee will circulate a petition calling for a ban on future CIA recruitment at I.U. and for the opening of files it believes the University has. It plans to present the petition to I.U. administrators.

Fry said about 50 persons signed the petition at the rally last week.

WALL STREET JOURNAL
15 APRIL 1976

The Central Intelligence Agency has twice stopped assassins heading for the U.S. with orders to kill elected public officials, former Defense Secretary Melvin Laird stated. He also said the CIA once uncovered preparations by one non-Communist country to invade another, and the U.S. was able to bring about negotiations. Laird, a member of Ford's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, made the statements in a Reader's Digest article.

INDIANA DAILY STUDENT
15 March 1976

Paper tigers, YSA victorious by default

Some persons have a phenomenal knack for arranging triumphant rallies and winning debates every single time their opponents fail to show up. These courageous traits once again were displayed Wednesday by the Young Socialist Alliance (YSA) at a demonstration demanding an end to Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) recruiting and opening of University CIA files.

YSA positions never have been distinguished for precision or logical thought, so they should not be faulted now for the nonsense in which their latest escapade abounds. But when someone else's assassinations and misdeeds solemnly are criticized by those who appoint themselves orthodox interpreters of a doctrine described by Lenin as "unlimited power based on force and unrestricted by any laws," which has claimed in the last 50 years more human lives than all the wars preceding it together, some kind of comment obviously is called for.

1. The first thing which stands out is that YSA is utterly grief-stricken over the CIA-inspired assassinations of right-wing dictators Diem and Trujillo. What it has forgotten to explain (but such lapses are entirely excusable in bereavement) is how those rulers would have fared if delivered to the tender mercies of the Socialist Workers' Party!

To venerate all life without exception is very altruistic and commendable, but to indict someone else for the very things one gladly should have done himself is the lowest sort of hypocrisy and cynicism that could be imagined.

I apologize if, as I hope, I am completely wrong. Perhaps the Trotskyites have really become so outspokenly heretical that, instead of liquidating the bourgeois ruling class, they merely would retire it on a comfortable pension.

2. The faked indignation over CIA attempts to blow a cigar in Castro's face is doubly disgusting because (a) dictator Castro is guilty of sending thousands of Cubans to the firing squad, holding 30,000 imprisoned (according to Amnesty International) in the most hideous conditions, and exiling half a million, and (b) the much maligned CIA, which knocks down governments as if they were bowling pins, was so inept at it that it was unable to accomplish the act it is being charged with.

If any proof is required that Castro is alive and well, the fact that only last month he sent 10,000 troops to prop up a similar dictatorship in Angola — with enthusiastic YSA support — serves the purpose.

So, indeed, what a great loss to mankind, what an undeserved fate it would have been if the dark plots had succeeded. Most Cubans undoubtedly would call the CIA to account in this matter, only not because it tried to liquidate Castro, but because it failed.

3. No "indictment" would be complete without accusing the CIA of civilian casualties in Vietnam. But every indictment is incomplete as long as it fails to ask the question how the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese still managed to win the war — by saying the right prayers and shooting harmless blanks?

Civilian casualties are an unfortunate part of every conflict. But the acid test is how a country treats its own mistakes. Every aspect of American conduct has been

discussed publicly (and often magnified) in this rotten country. One of the culprits has even been court-martialed.

Have the Viet Cong investigated the 1968 Hue massacre, in which during barely a month of "liberation," 10,000 persons were dumped into a common grave, and does YSA know whether anyone has been court-martialed for that?

4. They make an infernal noise of the fact that they have been under CIA "surveillance." But in spite of CIA's machinations, the rally seems to have been held as scheduled. How many YSA rallies have been held at Moscow State University lately? The KGB, which YSA scrupulously avoids to mention, does not keep Trotskyites under surveillance; it still treats deviationist hotheads — and always will — with as much compassion as its inhuman assassin showed to Leo Trotsky 40 years ago.

Yet YSA does not fail to magnify any speck in America's eye, while ignoring any beam, no matter how obtrusive, in the eyes of the Soviet Union and other Communist countries, where it is persecuted with unparalleled ferocity.

What kind of a doctrine is it which so completely has repressed the law of self-preservation that its followers are cheerfully paying the way for their own executioners? How is the same act moral when done by one side, but inexcusably wrong when done by another?

Only an ideology of suicidal hatred, uncontrolled by reason and unlimited in scope, could suppress the first law of nature. In his brilliant study of socialism as a historical phenomenon, Soviet academician Igor Shafarevich maintains that it remains an enigma until it is recognized that Thanatos, the death instinct, also manifests itself in mass movements and that socialism has been its foremost incarnation.

The arbitrary outbursts of moral indignation, which never occur when the communists are on the defensive but always when their blows are even meekly returned, are not really a mystery.

YSA books and pamphlets never tire of repeating that there are no laws, no elections, no moral norms to restrain YSA, but that the state and society which it is YSA's formal objective to destroy strictly are forbidden to defend themselves.

When the society which guarantees them the fundamental rights to speak and act merely uses its intelligence agencies to keep a record of their activities, that is fascism; but when YSA shuts down a university or seizes power by force, that is the flowering of democracy and academic freedom.

So the key to all Communist morality, without which attacks on the CIA and silence about the KGB are eternally confusing, is that whatever promotes the interests of Communist power, any aggression, murder or violence, is automatically progressive, humanitarian and indescribably good; but anything that impedes it — even minimal police surveillance or a newspaper column — is reactionary, fascist and unspeakably bad.

But the obvious truth, which only is reaffirmed with each effort to distort or deny it, is that YSA is amply benefiting from a legal order which respects the

rights of even its vicious enemies and active destroyers to an extreme, often irrational, degree. If they are exercising a constitutional right to disgorge their malice — instead of sharing their leader's fate or digging potatoes in Siberia — the Trotskyites owe a large debt of gratitude to all the institutions of this hateful society, and a considerable share of it must be allocated to the execrable CIA.

There is no doubt that all non-academic institutions should keep out of the University. Those interested in working for General Motors or the CIA should go to the respective personnel office and apply. But between that observation and YSA's morally duplicitous and factually one-sided tirade, there is no moral or logical connection.

Their daring confrontation with an opponent who did not show up, and their heroic abstention from demanding an international inspection of the files of the most murderous intelligence organization in history, the Soviet KGB, proves once again that the Trotskyites are the bravest people on earth.

Not because there is nothing that they fear, but because there is nothing of which they are ashamed.

Stephen Karganovic

Stephen Karganovic is a first year law student who writes "ce matin" (this morning) weekly for the Daily Student.

THE PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER
22 March 1976

CIA propaganda

To the Editor:

The recent "private discussions" by the CIA during which CIA estimates of Israel's atomic capability were disclosed are purportedly part of a new CIA policy of public disclosure and frankness.

Presumably this is at least partially in response to congressional attacks on the CIA for its secret involvement in domestic and foreign political activity.

Regretfully, however, the suspicious time and place of the disclosure may only provide further evidence that the CIA is primarily a political tool of the incumbent administration.

The disclosure was made to a group with little direct interest in the Middle East arms balance — the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronauts. Significantly, the disclosure was made during a strong administration drive to pressure Congress into believing that huge new military armaments to Egypt will not upset the Middle East balance of power.

Increased information from the CIA about its activities is refreshing, but such information should not be designed to be little more than administration propaganda.

MICHAEL J. KLINE
Philadelphia.

INDIANA DAILY STUDENT
17 March 1976

reader opinion

Protest a move to halt crimes

The March 10 demonstration against campus complicity with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was a big step forward in building a movement to halt CIA and CIA-style crimes. It should hasten the day that the CIA recruiters pledge, "We do not go where we are not wanted," will be applied to Angola, Chile, Iran and elsewhere throughout the world.

Less impressed was noted logician Stephen Karganovic, who took up half the Monday Daily Student opinion page to rant and rave about how horrible the Young Socialist Alliance is for helping build the demonstration and working with the Committee to End Campus Complicity with the CIA (CECCIA). He tells us that we Trotskyists should be "grateful" to the CIA for not having murdered us (not in the United States, at least, although the CIA's record in other countries, notably Chile and Argentina, is less generous) but "only" infiltrates and disrupts our movement. As a law student Karganovic could at least point out that such domestic surveillance supposedly is forbidden by the CIA's own charter. But he is too busy lecturing us about "hypocrisy" to allow facts to get in his way. With equally astounding logic, Karganovic tells us that we should show our "gratitude" to the American government for granting certain civil liberties by not fighting to *expand* those civil liberties and by not opposing the governments *abridgment* of these rights.

Karganovic accuses the Trotskyist movement of a "death instinct" and charges it with "abstention" in the fight against Stalinism and the KGB. Absurd! The Trotskyist movement was born out of a struggle against Stalinism and its police state terror and remains to this day its bitter opponent. Trotskyists have campaigned throughout the world against the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, in solidarity with anti-Stalinist upsurges in Eastern Europe, for freedom for all Soviet dissidents, from Solzhenitsyn to Pyotr Grigorenko and Leonid Plyusch, and for freedom for political prisoners in Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, the Ukraine, China and elsewhere. We have built rallies, demonstrations, petitions drives and teach-ins in this effort. We do so because we believe socialism and democracy are inseparable and that the anti-Stalinist revolution in the East will deal a powerful blow to capitalism in the West.

Karganovic raises the specter of Stalinism only to white-wash the crimes of U.S. imperialism and police state agencies such as the CIA — incidentally these crimes have been going on long before there was a "Communist threat" bogeyman to "save" us from. He doesn't like it being pointed out that the CIA is so cynical that it even murders the errant U.S. hirelings in the Third World such as Diem and Trujillo. There isn't much horror among the thieves

INDIANA DAILY STUDENT
15 March 1976

forum

Readers view CIA recruitment

Editor's Note: Due to the volume of response the issue of CIA recruitment elicited we'd like to devote the entire page today to the reader's views. Thursday's demonstration was successful in that the CIA cancelled recruitment interviews, although they reportedly interviewed students who had previously expressed an interest in CIA employment off campus.

Freedom to choose

To the editor:

On Wednesday there was a much publicized meeting to discuss "Getting the CIA off campus." I didn't go, and as I'm writing of Wednesday, I don't know how it turned out. However, I have something to say about it. I address my words directly to the young lady with the bullhorn, but indirectly to all like her.

Miss, you and your friends claim to be in favor of liberty, justice, equality and all other nice things. Fine. So why don't you base your actions accordingly? You are opposed to the CIA, and I don't fault you for that. But isn't every other student entitled to judge for himself? You would deny the other students at I.U. their freedom to choose for themselves,

Karganovic apologizes for.

Where Karganovic shows his true colors is on the issue of Vietnam. He justifies the sordid record of imperialist bloodletting in Vietnam by bringing up the alleged 1968 NLF "terrorist" massacre at Hue — a massacre which subsequently has been shown to be the work of U.S. bombers and artillery, the real practitioners of terrorism in Vietnam. Karganovic whines about the exposure of U.S. war crimes in Indochina; "Every aspect of American conduct has been discussed publicly (and magnified) in this rotten country." "Rotten country"? It's amusing how fast Karganovic's assessment of the American people changes once they become upset over governmental wrongdoing. He adds, "One of the culprits has even been court-martialed." Our Daily Student Kremlinologist hardly should need to be reminded that even the Soviets can produce scapegoats when they are needed. The real culprits, or war criminals to be more exact, are men like Nixon, Kissinger, Laird, McNamara — and their like who walk the streets as free men.

Karganovic's justification for U.S. involvement in Vietnam during his defense of the CIA is no coincidence. It was revelations about the real nature of U.S. involvement in Vietnam which showed many Americans that the "enemy" was not some foreign power but here at home and headquartered in Washington, D.C. Furthermore, the "enemy" which the U.S. government hides its secrets from turned out to be not some foreign power (they knew about it anyway) but the American public. When the people found out the real nature of the war they forced the government to pull out of Vietnam, and U.S. imperialism lost its first war. And very few persons, Karganovic among them, were terribly shook up when this happened. I suppose that's why he calls the United States a rotten country. And that is why the public has a right to know about the CIA and other sordid police state agencies.

Steve Miller
for the Young Socialist Alliance

whether or not they will approve of the CIA, and to have the CIA present us its case. You apparently do not regard your fellow students as mature and intelligent enough to judge the CIA for themselves according to its merits, but would censor anything that agency might say in its own defense.

I am compelled to compare you with the man who wants to outlaw pornography. That pornography is wrong is only his personal opinion, and if it means so much to him, he should do his best to persuade people not to patronize X-rated movies; *not* tell them that they *cannot* patronize them. Similarly, no matter how sure you are that the CIA ought to be abolished, it is not up to you to force your decision on others, but to persuade them that you are right, and let them act in accordance with their own conscience. In other words, your approach ought not to be "Don't let CIA speak on campus," but "CIA is wrong because — and —, so please don't support them." Then let each listener choose for himself, even as you chose for yourself.

I happen to agree that the CIA is bad, but that makes no difference; no matter how indefensible their position may appear to you or me, they are entitled to try and defend it, *and we students are entitled to hear their defense if we so choose, and to agree, and even join, if we so choose.*

Besides, don't you know that the best way to hang a fool is to let him talk?

Mike Snyder
Bloomington
March 11

U.S. needs CIA

To the editor:

I surely must agree with the majority of my peers on this campus that the CIA is far from perfect, and has committed acts that even in our 'existential' society we deem to be morally wrong per se. However, I find the

current solution of banning CIA recruiting on the I.U. campus, to be far removed from a plausible or appropriate solution. I must also admit that our country has a need for an organization such as the CIA. Although it is imperfect, it has its positive aspects too; but alas the "bad" is always far more sensational than its lesser remembered counterpart — the "good."

In a technological society such as ours and with the vast interdependence of hostile countries and peoples, a nation such as ours demands internal security and intelligence. The key to it is an organization such as the CIA. When such an organization becomes so powerful as to abuse the power granted to it, then its powers must be effectively checked,

not eliminated. The CIA has at times borne out Lord Acton's words, "absolute power corrupts absolutely," and has shown us that all forms of power or authority need a check against that very power, so that it does not become despotic to its ends. This is the essence of the greatness of our Republic: that authority and power is checked so that our government does not become tyrannical by the gradual usurpation of power by those in power, at the expense of the freedoms of the people.

The solution isn't banning CIA recruiting, but rather a reformation in Washington where the real problem lies. I would tend to feel that within the confines of our University, there are qualified individuals who are capable of bringing the CIA the type of leadership it needs more of. Denying these people the opportunity is a greater wrong than denying the CIA their opportunity to recruit.

The 1960s and 70s have shown us that our leaders have committed covert acts that again we deem wrong. Are we likewise to deny all political parties the right to seek support or recruits on this campus? Are we to ban all legal entities that have committed wrongs from our campus, and thus closing another door to reform. Would we not in effect be banning everyone and everything. I hope not.

Surely direct correspondence to our elected officials with regard to our views is far more effective than boisterous pamphlet passing in front of Ballantine. Perhaps though 13 cents worth of concern is too high a price to pay for better government. Again I say let the CIA recruit on our campus, and let's press on to more direct and efficient means of reform.

Greg Shoup
Bloomington
March 11

No business at I.U.

To the editor:

Over the last few months exposures of massive illegal intelligence and terrorist activity by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency have filled even the establishment media. Masses of Americans now know that:

- the CIA has systematically spied on American citizens at home,
- the CIA has sponsored assassination attempts on several foreign heads of state,
- the CIA has contributed millions of dollars to the coffers of extreme right-wing political parties all over the world in an attempt to undermine democratic political institutions,
- the CIA has organized, trained, supplied and funded right-wing terrorist armies seeking to overthrow or prevent the advance of progressive forces in several countries. A current focus of this CIA activity is southern Africa, where CIA-paid mercenaries are accomplices of the racist white-minority regimes.

These and other exposures may come as shocking revelations to the naive but to the bulk of the world's population they only confirm what was already wellknown from decades of bitter experience: the CIA is an enormous underground terrorist organization engaged in a world-wide struggle against every progressive force in the battle of working and oppressed people to free themselves from

domination.

We also know, contrary to the claims of the liberal media, that the CIA is *not* out of control. According to all the evidence now available, every "illegal" CIA operation recently exposed was approved or even initiated by the Secretary of State and/or the President. The CIA is not failing to do what it is supposed to do, it is succeeding.

If we understand these facts, our analysis and our struggle must be much more far reaching than many have yet recognized.

To be sure, it would be nice to get the CIA off campus. They have no more (and no less) business recruiting on campus and supporting and organizing academic programs with American universities than the Mafia has. And if we build *this* movement, there is some prospect that we can at least make it more difficult for the CIA to operate within the universities.

But we must build this movement without illusions. The CIA cannot be fundamentally reformed. Every ruling class in every class society must have secret police and terrorists at its command. There is no way to "clean-up" the CIA. (Ask yourself, what precisely would a "cleaned-up CIA do?")

The CIA doesn't need to be laundered, it needs to be destroyed. And there is only one force and one program which can accomplish this goal. The CIA will exist, dirty as ever, as long as American capitalism lasts. Only by joining the movement for workers' power in this country, the movement to overthrow the capitalist system and replace it with a society in which working people democratically control all institutions — only in that struggle will we succeed.

The front lines of the struggle for workers' power are not at I.U. But they are nearby. In every shop, factory, mill, and office a rank and file movement is growing which as its final victory will destroy the CIA.

Bloomington International Socialists

'Eye for an eye...'

To the editor:

The protestors against the CIA on this campus act as if there is no threat from communism. I disagree.

It's my understanding that the USSR is spending something like 40 per cent of their GNP on weapons and weapons research. Moreover, they have many people starving in rural areas while they spend enormous amounts of money on such things as nuclear guided missile cruisers. I rather believe they aren't building all of this just to look at, but to use.

I suspect the realities of world politics dictate the use of such tactics as financing foreign political parties, supplying insurrections, and assassinating communist leaders. It's unfortunate, but after all, this is the strongest country in the world, and one can't expect us to stand by while our enemies advance on our weaker friends. I only wish we had the CIA in World War II, and had killed our dear friend, Adolph Hitler a few years earlier.

In conclusion, it's a very naughty world, and the U.S. is not John Wayne. We must deal

with our enemies exactly as they deal with us. And if that includes blowing their heads off, by all means let's do it.

Tom Black
Bloomington
March 11

Aids foreign policy

To the editor:

A well functioning CIA is vital to a successful foreign policy. The correct assessment of the military situation in the Middle East prior to the 1967 war allowed the U.S. to act with the knowledge that the Israelis would win. It could be argued that a correct intelligence assessment might have prevented the U.S. from becoming entangled in an unwinnable situation in Southeast Asia. The protestors against the CIA should realize its necessity, its abuses notwithstanding.

Hal Harvey
Bloomington
March 11

Salutes protestors

To the editor:

I want to take this opportunity to salute the efforts of those few brave students who prevented the CIA from recruiting on campus.

INDIANA DAILY STUDENT
18 March 1976

forum

Tyranny of minority

To the editor:

It is with pleasure that I note that most students can see through the absurd rhetoric of the YSA with regards to CIA recruitment on campus and on many other subjects (for their position on all issues can be easily predicted and their vocabulary is identical in discussing no matter what topic beginning with "capitalist aggressor" and ending with "working class struggle.") It is also with pleasure that I read Mr. Kargonovic's column as well as several well written letters pointing out the hypocrisy of the YSA's support of a government with an organization such as the KGB while condemning the CIA. The need for an intelligence agency, while very important to realize, is overshadowed by the most fundamental concept expressed which is our right to choose whether or not to join the CIA, perhaps even in the hopes of ameliorating it. We, as supposedly free individuals, are being denied that right. And why?

One explanation offered by John Mohr in one of the most ludicrous paragraphs I have ever had the misfortune to read, is that those who believe that they have a right to seek employment (was I so mistaken as to think that we did?) must submit to the "opinion of a majority or vociferous minority of students as to what is proper and fitting employment for our graduates." Perhaps Alexandre de

This University must not become the supplier of young minds for organizations who deal daily in the breaking of laws, corruption of government officials and other immoral and heinous crimes.

Even though we have successfully stopped one such organization, our work has just begun. We must rally to protect this campus from recruiters of other criminal employers. The CIA is nothing more than a tool to manipulate foreign opinion to tolerate getting ripped off by American business.

We should not permit large corporations such as Dow Chemicals, IBM or that most vile rate hiker, Indiana Bell, on campus. I propose that any business who has been publicly criticized by the New York Times in the last three years be banned from campus.

Let us not yield to the cries of those few people who believe that they have a right to seek employment or who feel that employers have some sort of right to associate with our students. Since when did any individual or small group or individuals ever have the right to seek employment, which in itself is not violative of the law, when it runs contrary to the opinion of a majority or vociferous minority of students as to what is proper and fitting employment for our graduates.

John Mohr

Toqueville was correct when he warned of America's potential tyranny of the majority. Even worse it appears in this case to be a tyranny of the minority. How inappropriate it is on the eve of our 200th anniversary to suppose a view so against the foundations of our nation.

Lauren Pinzka
Bloomington
March 15

Communist menace

To the editor:

This letter is in response to the Bloomington International Socialists (B.I.S.) letter of March 15. This organization has learned Lenin's lesson well. Lenin taught that the enemy must be weakened in advance. To wait for something to happen is not the way to achieve revolution. The way must be prepared. The enemy must be softened up: weaken his will to resist, nullify his capacity for counteraction and impair his morale. Then when the crisis comes, Communists can march to power through the ranks of a demoralized enemy.

The B.I.S. letter is a perfect example of how the Communists deliberately try to subvert agencies of the U.S. government. The B.I.S. says, "The CIA does not need to be laundered, it needs to be destroyed." This is an obvious attempt to sow the seeds of discontent, weaken, divide and neutralize anticommunist opposition; and above all, undermine the CIA.

The B.I.S. also states their concern for the working people. The Communists say they are interested in the laboring man, higher wages,

better working conditions and shorter hours. When in reality all the Communists want is to penetrate unions, to remain in them and to carry on Communist work in them at all costs.

Finally, the B.I.S. would have us believe that freedom can be attained only under their system. Yet, history of every nation under a Communist regime demonstrates conclusively that the Communist version of freedom is only a new form of total slavery.

During the Bicentennial year of the greatest country on earth, I feel it is the duty of

every loyal American to inform themselves about Communism, the major menace of our time. Communism is more than an economic, political, social or philosophical doctrine. It is a way of life; a false, materialistic "religion." It would strip man of his belief in God, his heritage of freedom, his trust in love, justice and mercy. So let's get some courage and stand up to organizations like B.I.S., and not let them use us as pawns to achieve their goals.

Tom Hickox
March 16

HE NEW YORK TIMES, SATURDAY, APRIL 10, 1976

Job-Hungry Students Turning to C.I.A.

By ROBERT LINDSEY
Special to The New York Times

LOS ANGELES, April 9—Despite the recent disclosure of wrongdoing by the Central Intelligence Agency, the number of college students seeking jobs in the agency has increased 30 percent over the last year, according to C.I.A. officials.

Recruiting efforts by the agency have touched off campus protests in a few cases, and some colleges still ban campus interviews by the agency. But, for the most part, according to a check with college administrators and students in 10 states, indifference and a search for work in a tight employment market has supplanted much of the campus anti-C.I.A. sentiment, which reached a peak in the final years of the Vietnam War.

"I'm not that thrilled with working for that organization," said Richard Mintzer of New Rochelle, N.Y., a Duke University senior who specialized in Soviet studies. "On the other hand, there is a tight job market." Mr. Mintzer has an application for an agency job in his room, but has not decided yet whether to submit it.

"I'd like to get a job using my skills; I know college grads who are packing groceries," said Michael Welsch, a senior who majored in Russian at Arizona State University. His application with the agency was turned down.

Victor Lindquist, director of placement at Northwestern University, said he thought that publicity about the agency, which included several Congressional investigations and disclosures of unlawful operations, had led to a "heightened interest" in intelligence work.

"They've dragged the C.I.A. activities out of the cloakroom," he said. "They've lost some of the cloak-and-dagger aura. I think there's greater acceptance on the part of students pursuing a career; anyone expressing an interest in a C.I.A. job is not going to be

ostracized."

Many students and administrators who were interviewed interpreted the agency's generally improved reception on college campuses as a reflection of the current job market. Another symptom of this, they said, is the general ebb of protest activities by the current generation of students as against those of a few years ago.

F. W. M. Janney, C.I.A. director of personnel, said in a telephone interview that, while the agency is now finding it easier to conduct interviews on campuses, the interviews themselves have sometimes tended to be more difficult for the interviewers.

"They [students] are asking us a lot more searching questions about our policies and about our activities, and we have had to give more answers and better answers than we have in the past," he said.

Advertising Is Cited

Dr. Janney agreed that the recently depressed economy and resulting poor job outlook for graduates was apparently a major factor in the increased interest in the agency, but he said it was not the only one.

The 30 percent increase in applications, he said, is running almost 10 percent greater than the general increase this year in applications for Civil Service jobs.

"I would tend to equate the difference to the advertising that's taken place, in terms of the coverage we've received," he said wryly. "They know how to spell our name."

Dr. Janney would not specify the number of applications the agency had received. And, while he said the number of on-campus interviews increased this year, he added that this still lagged behind the number prior to 1968.

"Generally, we conduct interviews on campus unless we have reason to believe it would cause some embarrassment to the university or ourselves," he said.

The increase in applications has not been matched by a rise in job openings, enabling the agency to be more selective.

Dr. Janney said that the number of new employees hired by the agency this year would be about the same as last year—approximately 700 clerical workers and 400 in "profes-

sional" positions. Of the latter, about half of the new employees will have bachelor's degrees, the rest advanced degrees.

Without giving details, he said that the agency's efforts to hire more persons from minority groups had been moderately successful.

"We've had some better luck in our effort with Hispanics," he noted, but said that more efforts were needed in this area of recruitment.

Although the overall reception of C.I.A. recruiters has improved recently, visits or projected visits by agency representatives resulted in serious disruptions this year at the University of Indiana, the University of Michigan and the University of California, San Diego.

With only a few exceptions, however, the recent disclosures about the intelligence agency appear to have had little effect on recruiting.

Similarly, several college placement officials said there was generally little resistance to recruiting by the National Security Agency, which has also been accused of improper spying on American citizens.

Several students interviewed at Boston University said they had found it amusing that the college administration still discouraged campus interviews by the C.I.A.

"The C.I.A. is just like another business; why can't they recruit on campus?" said Mi-

chael Caraëff, a junior from Brooklyn.

One of about 50 Brown University students who took an examination to join the National Security Agency said, "Basically, everybody went for the same reason; it wasn't their first choice, but they wanted a job."

Another Brown student, Ana Marie Padilla, a senior majoring in mathematics, said that she liked the idea of working at the N.S.A.

"I'm not going to be out in the field assassinating people," she said. "I don't have any qualms about it; we need national security, and I would be assisting in national security."

Michael Curtin, a Brown senior described by friends as a radical on some issues, commented: "I don't see that the C.I.A. is intrinsically worse than a lot of other organizations. What it does is no worse than what the Chase Manhattan Bank does in other countries,

drawing off the profits and controlling industrialization. If I had time, I'd protest them all."

James Darling, a student of the University of Florida, said that despite the recent publicity he retained a "lifelong dream" to work for the agency. His biggest concern now over the disclosures appeared to be less ethical than practical. "All this publicity has hurt the C.I.A., just like it hurt Lockheed," he said.

"Personally, I wouldn't take a job with Lockheed right now," he said. "I just don't think there's any security in it. And I imagine a lot of people might feel the same way about the C.I.A."

NEW YORK TIMES
9 April 1976

C.I.A. QUERIED ON TIE TO LOCKHEED AGENT

WASHINGTON, April 8 (Reuters)—Secretary of Commerce Elliot L. Richardson said today he had asked the Central Intelligence Agency to investigate whether there had been any links between it and the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation's agent in Japan, Yoshio Kodama.

Mr. Richardson told the Senate Banking Committee he had asked for the information because of allegations of a con-

nection between the C.I.A. and Mr. Kodama, who is a central figure in the inquiry under way in Japan paying out \$200 million at least \$22 million of it in bribes, in countries such as Japan and the Netherlands. Some of the money allegedly went to officials.

Mr. Richardson said he made the request as chairman of the President's Task Force on Foreign Corporate Payments, a commission just set up to recommend steps to stop payments abroad to promote overseas sales.

The C.I.A. has not yet supplied the information.

THE GLOBE (NORTHERN VIRGINIA)
1 APRIL 1976

College Students Are Flocking To New CIA Job Opportunities

by Allan Rabinowitz

"Unique employment opportunities, international travel, mystery, good pay, many benefits - all yours when working for this well established, international corporation."

Sound like a dream job? It's the CIA's latest recruitment pitch to college seniors and graduate students across the country.

And nearly the only response from students - even on campuses that were hostile during the Vietnam War years - has been to beat down the doors to get in for interviews with recruiters.

According to CIA officials in Washington, D.C. and Boston, student interest in working for the counter-intelligence agency is increasing.

A CIA-sponsored minority hiring conference, held recently in Washington, D.C., drew more than 60 career counselors from 23 U.S. universities. All expenses were paid by the CIA.

Representatives from the University of Michigan at Ann Arbor, UCLA, University

of Wisconsin at Madison, Michigan State University at East Lansing and the University of California at Berkeley all came to talk with the CIA about employment opportunities.

A University of Michigan employment recruiter at the conference said the campus would not recruit for the CIA, but "encouraged the CIA to come back to campus."

Most of the career placement officials said it was their duty to provide all possible employment opportunities for students.

Company Pitch

The CIA's pitch is simple. The agency is playing down its role in political murders, toppled governments, Mafia collaborations and domestic spying. The CIA is being billed as just another government agency.

Student protests have been scattered and ineffectual.

Demonstrations at Berkeley, UCLA, University of Michigan and Michigan State University have produced no change in campus recruitment policies.

But at the Univ. of California at San Diego, president Davis Saxon was forced to leave the campus by police car after anti-CIA groups stopped him from addressing the academic senate about CIA recruitment.

Shortly after the disturbance, the senate defeated a proposal requiring full disclosure of CIA-university connections, which would have banned CIA campus recruitment and stopped agency research by faculty members.

The CIA, in advertisements, makes special pitch for Ph. D. candidates doing research. The agency offers one of the few opportunities for employment in research, said Robert Ginn, associate director of career placement at Harvard, with the opportunity to publish "substantive scholarly research" throughout the intellectual and intelligence community.

Ginn speculated that recent publicity on the CIA's activities actually helped recruitment activities

because "it makes the kids think about the agency."

Whatever illegal and corrupt CIA actions may be disclosed, there are practical considerations - jobs and research money - that now hold a high priority for graduating university students.

"Why should they protest?" asked Angus Thurmer, assistant to the director of the CIA. "Jobs are very scarce these days."

The CIA internship program for foreign studies has received more than 1,000 inquiries for 50 openings. Internship program participants, about half of whom become fulltime CIA employees, come from a wide range of colleges, including Harvard, Yale and the Univ. of Chicago. They receive monthly salaries of between \$800 and \$1,000.

Students accepted into the program come from a wide range of disciplines and usually at the top of their classes, with masters degrees or higher.

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TRIBUNE, Salt Lake City
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'No Assassinations,' Former CIA Agent Asserts

By Bob Bryson
Tribune Staff Writer

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has never been involved in assassinations because "it is not part of our character," a former agent in charge of some covert operations in South America says.

True, Milton R. Bissegger said Tuesday, some individual agents discussed assassination of Fidel Castro and Congo Leader Patrice Lumumba.

"But the position of most CIA men is that espionage is such a dishonest business, only honest men can be in it. Everyone in the CIA I knew was highly principled," he told the Rotary Club of Salt Lake meeting at Hotel Utah.

Mr. Bissegger is now a West Jordan resident. He is a University of Utah graduate and was a CIA operations officer in Argentina. He became a member of the CIA Western Hemisphere Division's Covert Action Staff and monitored all covert action expenditures in Latin America.

He noted that he was speaking as an individual and that he has received a change in CIA status to that of an "overt" retiree. He took the step, he said, because of "all the propaganda" the CIA has been receiving.

He noted that "many allegations about the CIA are false and others are distorted by the media and people with political status."

Mr. Bissegger said that former Senate Intelligence Committee Chairman Frank Church, now a presidential candidate, said that Americans would be "shocked and amazed" at the committee's report on CIA activities.

"The comments by Sen. Church had very little truth in them. I am not saying the man is a liar, but perhaps he had other motives besides the assassinations. This statement brought him a lot of propaganda and publicity."

No Assassinations

The final report, he noted, said the CIA has never assassinated anyone.

"There were five alleged CIA assassination plots. Three of these involved South American leaders. I had access to the files going back to the late '50s. The committee's report is then true," he said. The other plots involved Lumumba and a coup in South Vietnam.

The CIA is very careful, Mr. Bissegger said, to eliminate "nuts" from the

service.

"The allegations made by the media are preposterous. There has never been a case where the CIA was involved in the assassination of a foreign individual or on the domestic scene either," he said.

He said agents are taught that assassination is not acceptable and anyone who suggests it is subject to dismissal.

Mr. Bissegger noted that the CIA has provided training to police departments in other countries.

He also said that the CIA spent from \$11 to \$20 million in Chile.

"I don't apologize for that money spent. A lot of people say we shouldn't be interfering in the domestic affairs of another country. But we have a responsibility to the world for the promotion of the principles on which our country is founded."

NATION
13 MARCH 1976

THE TYRANNY OF 'INTELLIGENCE'

Ford's Blueprint for Arrogance

ROBERT L. BOROSAGE

Gerald Ford's Second Pardon. The President's reform program for the intelligence agencies is a direct challenge to the rule of law. Faced with hard evidence of illegality and abuses by the intelligence officials, Mr. Ford has issued a blanket pardon for past crimes and a charter for future abuses. In case anyone was confused by the President's rhetoric of reform, the Justice Department made it clear by announcing that it would not prosecute Richard Helms, the former director of the CIA, for his admitted role in a 1971 burglary. The quality of the administration's mercy is apparently not strained when it comes to official crime.

When Ford pardoned the crimes of Richard Nixon, he made the error of openly admitting what he was doing (if not why he was doing it), and thus erased his early popularity in one grand act. He did not repeat the mistake in the matter of secret agencies: he announced his second major pardon in the guise of a reform program, a cover story worth unraveling.

The Restrictions: Making It All Legal. The centerpiece of the President's program is an Executive Order which outlines new charters for the foreign intelligence agencies (the FBI is omitted from the program), along with new restrictions on their activities. To underline what he considers to be his inherent "constitutional responsibilities to manage . . . foreign policy," the President issued an Executive Order rather than seeking legislation. An Executive Order has many advantages for a President. No criminal penalties attach to violations of its provisions. Moreover, its restrictions can be changed or rescinded by the stroke of a pen—in secret if so desired. Merely an expression of "higher orders," it may even be superseded in practice by oral commands from the President. No intelligence agency official is likely to tell a President that his oral orders violate his own Executive Order.

Many of the restrictions in the President's order prohibit the agencies from engaging in activities—mail opening, wiretaps, tax-return intrusion—that are already against the law. In the past, these agencies apparently felt that ordinary law did not apply to them, and the inescapable implication of the order is that criminal laws apply to intelligence officials only if reaffirmed by Executive Order—or more simply, that our secret agencies are governed only by higher orders.

Many other clauses phrased as restrictions contain exceptions that empower the agencies to do things which previously were considered abuses. For example, the 1947 law establishing the CIA specifically bans it from engaging in any domestic police, law enforcement or internal security functions. The CIA's massive illegal domestic surveillance programs were the cause of the entire review of the intelligence agencies. Yet the President's order provides authority for the CIA to get back in the business of spying on Americans. President Ford authorizes the CIA to collect information on the "domestic activities of United States persons" who are "reasonably believed to be acting on behalf of a foreign power . . ." or "who pose a clear threat to foreign intelligence agency facilities or personnel. . . ." The CIA's Operation CHAOS—whereby agents infiltrated domestic organizations and spied and reported on more than 300,000 individuals and organizations—was justified

within the CIA as an investigation of the "foreign contacts of American dissidents." The CIA's Office of Security program, which placed agents in groups like the Women's Strike for Peace and the Washington Peace Center, was justified as necessary to insure the safety of CIA buildings.

If this were not enough, the President's order also allows the foreign intelligence agencies to collect information on the domestic activities of the following Americans: "present and former employees, present and former contractors and their present and former employees," and any "persons in contact with the foregoing. . . ." This group is subject to physical surveillance (tailing), if need be. For the CIA, NSA and the military agencies, even a restrictive reading of this section of the order could encompass millions of Americans. The order also permits the NSA and CIA to intercept international communications to or from the United States under classified procedures. The CIA is empowered to conduct secret scrutiny checks on "potential sources or contacts."

The President's order even provides the foreign intelligence agencies with authority for their own COINTELPRO operations. (COINTELPRO was the FBI's program to infiltrate and disrupt domestic organizations, which included its harassment of Dr. Martin Luther King.) Apparently the foreign intelligence agencies had felt deprived in this respect, for the President now authorizes them to infiltrate an organization in the United States "for the purpose of reporting on or influencing its activities or members," if the organization is composed "primarily of non-United States persons" and is "reasonably believed" to be acting on behalf of a foreign power. The obvious targets are foreign student groups and émigré organizations.

Secrecy: Keeping It All Covered Up. The only criminal legislation called for by the President is not directed at the officials who abuse their authority but at those who disclose such misdeeds to the public. Mr. Ford has called upon Congress to pass criminal penalties and injunctive relief against officials who leak "intelligence sources or methods."

Over the past decade, secrecy has often been used to cover up illegal or unpopular activities by the executive. The intervention in Angola is a recent case in point. Since the cold-war consensus dissipated, information from courageous middle-level bureaucrats often provided the means whereby the abuses and crimes of the intelligence agencies were exposed.

Many of these illegalities have, of course, been ordered by Presidents, including President Ford. Thus, it is not surprising that the White House now seeks official secrets legislation from the Congress. For months, President Ford and Henry Kissinger have tried to change the focus of public attention from official crimes to keeping secrets. The cynical use of the death of CIA station chief Richard Welch and the official suppression of the House Intelligence Committee report have greatly helped their case.

However, the President may have overreached himself with his proposed bill. It provides criminal penalties for any bureaucrat who releases information concerning intelligence sources and methods to "unauthorized individuals," including Congressional representatives. If the President gets his way, a governmental official giving information to a member of Congress could be prosecuted as a felon. As his bill would have it, information

could be provided to Congress only in response to a formal request from a sitting committee and, of course, unless the bureaucrat had already leaked the information the committee wouldn't know what to request.

Administration spokesmen claim that the bill is not an "official secrets act" because it applies only to officials and only to intelligence sources and methods. But that is a distinction without a difference; intelligence sources and methods include virtually any activity of an intelligence agency. CIA Director William Colby once provided a sworn deposition which argued that disclosing a single gross figure for the CIA's budget (as required by the Constitution) would reveal "sources and methods." Richard Nixon used the same rationale to deflect temporarily the FBI's investigation of CREEP money in Mexico.

Although the provisions of the law apply only to government officials, nothing would stop a prosecutor from summoning a reporter or an editor before a grand jury to be asked, upon threat of jail for contempt, to reveal his or her source.

The President's plan instructs a middle-level official faced with an illegal order to report the abuse to "competent authority"—the agency's inspector general. In the past, the inspector general system has served primarily to warn the director of any "flap material," and to help prepare a cover story. According to the President's order, the inspectors general are to report to the Presidentially appointed Oversight Board. But the Board is similar to the moribund PFAIB—Presidential Foreign Advisory Intelligence Board—which existed in blissful ignorance throughout the period of past abuses. If anyone took the President's program seriously, his first appointments to the board—three geriatric cold warriors—were sufficient to dissuade officials from using the system to avoid committing illegal acts.

Congressional Oversight: Reforming the Club. The President's recommendations for Congressional oversight follow the same themes as his proposals for secrecy legislation. His primary concern is not independent Congressional monitoring, but the retention of secrets within a handful of sympathetic initiates. Thus, Mr. Ford calls for a joint committee; he asks for repeal of the Ryan Amendment which now requires that the administration brief six committees on each new covert action program abroad. He wants discretion as to when he will inform the committees about what is going on in the undercover state.

Further, the President states that no classified information given to any oversight committee may be disclosed without Presidential approval. Ford suggests that neither an elected representative, nor a committee, nor one house of Congress has the constitutional power to release information classified by any one of the 15,000 executive officials empowered to classify information. He would support the outlandish position of Mitchell Rogovin, the CIA's special counsel, that a two-thirds vote of both houses should be necessary to declassify any information over the President's opposition.

For President Ford, "successful and effective Congressional oversight" depends upon the "mutual trust" between the Congress and the Executive. The phrase has the hollow ring of another statement by an executive spokesman. In 1971, before the revelations of the CIA's programs in Chile, Angola, Iran and Italy, before the disclosure of the CIA's illegal activities at home, before we knew about the assassination plots, the underworld associations, the routine lies, perjuries and distortions—Richard Helms, then director of the CIA, was asked how

anyone could be certain the CIA was obeying the law. He replied, "the nation must . . . take it on faith that we, too, are honorable men. . . ."

The Missing Links. The fraudulent nature of the President's program is even more apparent in what he failed to do. As noted above, he made no mention of any plans to prosecute intelligence officials for their past crimes. Edward Levi, the President's disappointing, compliant Attorney General, has denounced Congressional calls for a special prosecutor as an attack on the "integrity" of his department. Yet his minions—with their integrity totally intact—have failed to indict one member of the intelligence agencies for perjury, for mail opening, for illegal surveillance, for illegal break-ins, for COINTELPRO activities. The obvious message is that the law did not apply to their activities.

The President has also refused to notify the hundreds of thousands of Americans who were the targets of illegal surveillance. General Motors treats an owner of one of its defective cars better than Ford treats a target of his defective agencies.

Most important, the President refused to consider any limitation on covert interventions abroad—except for a ban on assassination ("Certainly not in peace time," he said at a press conference), previously considered murder in American law. In response to a reporter's question, CIA Director George Bush admitted that the President's program would "not bar bribery" of foreign officials abroad. Mr. Bush might have added that it also would not bar kidnapping, coups, paramilitary adventures, extortion, "disinformation," and the broad range of other routine CIA foreign operations.

Indeed, the President has apparently adopted the position that covert action overseas—the secret interference in another country's internal affairs—is an inherent power of the Presidency. This dangerous idea, discredited after the departure of Richard Nixon, has been hawked around Washington by CIA spokesmen. It would place the President's secret foreign policy above the limits of law.

Taken together, the President's actions and inactions have one consistent theme: intelligence officials are responsible only to higher orders from within the executive branch. The issuance of Executive Orders, restrictions that instruct officials not to do illegal acts, secrecy legislation and restrictive oversight provisions—all are designed to exempt the intelligence agencies from accountability to law, while insuring that they will obey the President.

The legal philosopher, Bernard Schwartz, once defined three fundamental elements of the rule of law: "(1) the absence of arbitrary power; (2) the subjugation of the state and its officers to ordinary law, and (3) the recognition of basic principles superior to the state itself."

With his proposals the President has set the foundations for exempting the covert arm of the state from the reach of ordinary law. He is creating a dual state, one part open and governed by law; the other covert and governed by whim. In the name of reform, the President has reconstituted a covert executive spying and paramilitary capacity for use at home or abroad. □

Robert Borosage, a Washington attorney, is director of the Center for National Security Studies. He is co-editor of The CIA File (Grossman).

GENERAL

WASHINGTON POST
21 MAR 1976

Demitente: Living With the Russians on Two Contrasting Levels

By Harry Rositzke

NOW THAT Mr. Ford has banned the word "detente" from his lexicon, he needs a substitute. It will be awkward, even for the duration of the campaign, for him to talk about "the present relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union" or "the Soviet-American connection."

The thesaurus contains no good Anglo-Saxon word for "reduced tension." Nor are the Latin roots of this tainted French word of any help. "Distension" would be ambiguous, "dystension" too clinical, "detention" is from a different root. For the moment let us speak of the present Soviet-American relationship as "X."

If the old word is no longer fashionable at least in part that is because we were oversold or oversold ourselves into the belief that "detente" marked a new dawn. Mr. Ford now urges us to consider our relations with the Soviet Union in realistic terms. What is the reality of X?

Neither Mr. Ford nor Henry Kissinger will question the basic hostility of Soviet leaders from Lenin to Brezhnev to the capitalist world. Their beliefs — that the main facts in human society are economic; that socialism is superior to capitalism as a system for producing goods; that communism will triumph in the end — are simply the reality lying beneath and behind Soviet policy decisions. The ideological struggle, as Brezhnev keeps reminding us, is paramount.

It is, however, with Soviet actions, not Soviet thinking, that a President or secretary of state must deal. And here their problem is compounded by the fact that the Soviet regime operates abroad on two separate, yet interlaced, levels — the official government level and the political action level, both open and covert, with the party its main stimulus.

What appears to irritate and confuse Kissinger is not so much the recalcitrance of Soviet behavior on the official level as the contradictions between their actions on the two levels. It has proved far easier for him to handle the macropolitics of official negotiations than the micropolitics of Communist Party actions.

Under X, official Soviet diplomacy has been notably successful in reaching a European settlement on its own terms: a

split Germany, the legalization of the post-war European frontiers created by Soviet power, and fruitful trade and capital investment relations with the European powers. Moscow's military and economic aid diplomacy in the developing world has served to extend its national influence in Southeast Asia, the Indian subcontinent, the Middle East and, spasmodically, in Africa. It has achieved these ends without committing its military forces to fight on foreign soil.

Mr. Ford rightly defends X at the official level for its clear pluses. It has created a climate for negotiations rather than polemics on such crucial issues as the limitation of strategic arms and the mutual reduction of forces in Europe. It has diminished the likelihood of a military confrontation in the Middle East. It has apparently spelled the end of Berlin blockades and missile crises.

The principal long-term profit of X to the Russians is economic: the growing availability of Western technology to increase Soviet productivity, of Western capital that can only help Soviet industry catch up more rapidly and of American wheat to compensate for the appalling inefficiency even without droughts of Soviet agriculture. There is no reciprocal advantage we can expect to get for ourselves.

It is an ironic but inescapable fruit of X that the Soviet Union is now being generously helped by the capitalist world with which it competes. If the main facts in human society are economic facts, as we in the West are beginning to realize, the export of goods or credits by the capitalist to the communist nations can only help improve the performance of the socialist system. Both Marx and Lenin argued that capitalism cannot grow on the domestic market alone. The drive to external investment that created our multinational corporations now extends its benefits to Soviet production.

Whatever Kissinger's private view of this one-sided benefit, his public utterances display an almost panicky frustration with Moscow's conduct on the second, or political, level: its open action in exploiting foreign Communist parties and its covert and open support of indigenous wars of national liberation.

— It is the increasing power of foreign Communist parties that has most bedeviled Kissinger in recent years:

Rositzke's book, "U.S.S.R. Today," was published in 1973. He is now writing a book on the CIA, from which he retired in 1970.

the Marxist coalition in Chile, the threat of a Communist revolution in Portugal, the likely participation of the Italian party in a coalition government.

Are these to be construed as Soviet threats to the American interest, as Soviet violations of X?

It is now 20 years since the 20th Congress of the Soviet Party endorsed the peaceful road to socialism for the legal parties abroad. The Italian and French parties have since played the Western political game by the rules. Are the citizens of France or Italy not to be permitted, as Kissinger seems to have felt about Chilean citizens, to elect Communists into their governments? If the Communists do win, does their success violate X? And the crucial query: will they then become automatic instruments of Soviet political action?

Here Kissinger must be realistic. A strong Communist Party in an advanced industrial society, despite the old myth of monolithic communism, cannot be a minion of Moscow. It must, in a democratic arena, pursue its own national interests to survive and prosper. It must pursue its own road, not the Soviet path.

The speeches of the Italian and French party delegates to the recent Moscow Congress clearly illustrate this built-in compulsion. Once in a coalition, they will be faced with the same problems that beset their Christian Democrat or Gaullist colleagues, and they will stay in power—if they perform well. They will naturally influence the policies of their own governments, but those will be Italian and French, not Soviet, policies.

Whoever runs the State Department can do nothing about this fact of life unless he wants to get back to the old game of matching Soviet subsidies for the Communists with American funds for their democratic opponents. Whatever positive role this may have played in the past, it would now be a sorry stratagem bound to backfire. The Europeans will determine their own politics, not Washington or Moscow.

The recent Communist threat in Portugal underlines the gap between Soviet power and the national Communist parties. Though harbored by the Soviet party during their long underground existence, the Portuguese Communists broke the rules of the peaceful road by taking to the streets. The Portuguese leader, Alvaro Cunhal, almost certainly operated on the basis of his own estimate of the situation—and failed. Would Moscow be guilty of violating X if he had succeeded . . . or the same thing happens in Spain?

X at the foreign party level is a meaningless term. Ask the Italian party not to compete with the Social-

ists and Christian Democrats for power? Expect Moscow to ask them not to?

THE EUROPEAN PARTIES are at best an uncertain instrument for the extension of Soviet power. In its continuing support of wars of national liberation, directly or by proxy, openly or covertly, the Soviet regime simply declares that X does not apply to the Third World. Korea, Vietnam and now Angola register a failure and two successes.

The initial stages of Soviet support to rebel groups are normally covert and, until their success seems almost assured, modest. The Russians have invested in the anti-Portuguese rebels since the 1950s with money, training, indoctrination and small arms. Their investment in the Angolan MPLA paid off after the Portuguese withdrew—and the more modest American and Chinese investment was lost.

Kissinger has objected to the Soviet action in Angola as a violation of X. His objection is understandable but even by American rules, incorrect. It was only when the MPLA established a de facto regime in Luanda that the Soviet government began openly supplying large-scale military aid. Theirs was an official and legally justifiable response to the request of another regime—as ours was once in Lebanon and, more recently, in South Vietnam. Kissinger can complain that their side won and our side lost, but laments play no role in *realpolitik*.

The Angolan case intrudes another complication into the game of who is to blame? The Cuban commitment of arms and men to the Angolan fighting cancelled the need for sending Soviet soldiers to fight in Angola—a need Moscow has avoided from Korea to Vietnam. These wars were fought, as we like to say, by proxy. Yet no case can be made out that Moscow forced Hanoi to liberate South Vietnam—or that Brezhnev somehow directed Castro to send his troops to Angola.

Is Castro simply a Soviet stooge in his African adventures? The Cubans have intervened in Africa with arms and men for over 10 years. They now have advisers in Guinea and Somalia. And no one is in a position to say what the Cuban troops in Angola will do next. Perhaps "liberate" Namibia? If they do, will it be Castro's decision, or a joint decision by Castro's African friends, or by a committee meeting with Brezhnev?

Pinning the blame on Moscow for the wars in black Africa is a fruitless exercise. Shall we challenge Peking for its support of the Rhodesian rebels in Mozambique?

THE KGB naturally plays its part in these political action operations, a role unaffected by X. From the Cold War to the present, the KGB has not only carried on its usual espionage, counterespionage and covert action work, but it has played an indispensable technical role in passing funds and communications to the parties abroad and in channeling Soviet support to rebel or guerrilla groups before the Soviet government gets involved. It has also readily provided advice to new revolutionary regimes on how to set up their intelligence and security services.

In the last 10 years, however, the KGB's foreign directorate has begun to perform an even more valuable service—to advance in secret the Soviet government's open objectives on the official level. Its recruitment of "agents of influence" in Europe and the United States gives Soviet foreign policy a muscle that cannot be matched by the West.

Today, in New York, Bonn, Paris and Rome there are over 200 KGB officers assigned to each city (a hundred were thrown out of London several years ago). Many, if not most, of them are recruiting not spies but "friends." Their job is to develop personal contacts within the power elites of each nation: politicians of the center and right, non-Communist labor leaders, bankers and industrialists, journalists and professors, government officials and legislators.

These contacts range from secret to confidential to public. Some are on the Soviet payroll—the personal assistant to former West German Chancellor Willy Brandt, a key European negotiator on a truck-assembly plant project. Some have been bribed with business opportunities in East-West trade—a British merchant or an Italian banker. Others are close enough acquaintances for a KGB officer to invite to an informal lunch or dinner to talk about current affairs. In many capitals, as in Washington, KGB officers openly lobby among legislators on bills affecting Soviet trade.

These agents of influence within the power groups of Western society give Moscow a useful covert means for affecting the attitudes and decisions of other governments on matters of Soviet concern. The KGB officer under diplomatic cover, socially sophisticated, fluent in English, German, or French, can use his friends or agents to lobby for a European Security Conference, to press for favorable terms in trade or loan negotiations, to promote the investment of capital in a Soviet petrochemical project.

These KGB officers, for the most part, break no laws. Neither spying nor subverting, they are beyond the

purview of Western security services. The lessening of East-West tensions under X not only makes their contact-work easier—and their contacts more susceptible—but as Soviet political and economic interests in the West continue to increase under X, they will have more work to do.

Here, then, at the political action level there is no X, and there can be none. Moscow will not cease subsidizing foreign parties, supporting wars of national liberation or enlarging its reservoir of influence-agents. They are important elements in the Soviet global clout. There is no reason for the Russians to give them up.

It is this depressing fact that Kissinger must deal with in his public defense of X. And he must deal with another frustration: there can be no serious tradeoffs between the X and the non-X level.

It is conceivable, though most unlikely, that Washington can force concessions on Salt II negotiations by curtailing the sale of American wheat to Russia or by refusing to permit American oil companies to provide capital for a new petrochemical plant

in Siberia. It is inconceivable that American concessions on Salt II, trade, or capital investment will buy off Soviet (even less, Cuban) support of the black Rhodesian independence movement.

WHAT WE HAVE today is half an X, a relaxation of tensions only in our official dealings with Moscow. Perhaps the word Mr. Ford is looking for is *demitente*. It is a bastard term, but not inapt. At least it is more realistic than X.

It is a fact of history that the United States cannot match Soviet resources on the political action level. There are no parties abroad even partially devoted to our interest. We have a weak and ineffective propaganda apparatus and a now immobilized capacity for covert action. We can have no agents of influence in Moscow.

In this world of *demitente*:

- The main Soviet challenge is on the political-economic front, not the military.
- A larger American defense budget will not deter Soviet advances on the political-economic front.

• The policy of containment, of simply reacting to Soviet initiatives, will not work any better in the future than it has in the past.

What we have as the basis for a more affirmative foreign policy is our enormous economic clout. If we can delineate clearly what we want in the world to assure our physical security and our national prosperity, we will be able to direct our capital investments, trade and loans to building up stable and friendly societies in the countries that count for us. We are now caught up in a vast program of supplying arms to whoever wants them, and we cannot change our habits overnight, but only a radical shift in our priorities will enable us to shape to our own advantage the world of *demitente* in the decades ahead.

The Soviet stance in the world is hard-headed and forceful. If we can match it with our strategic vision, neither Mr. Ford nor his successors will be frustrated by X, and our secretaries of state will no longer be impelled to whine or bluster in public speeches.

WASHINGTON POST
14 APR 1976

Watered-Down Detente Hit By Schlesinger

By Murrey Marder
Washington Post Staff Writer

Former Defense Secretary James R. Schlesinger Jr. said last night that U.S.-Soviet "detente" is now so watered down as a concept that "it does not mean the continued relaxation of tensions."

The hopes aroused three years ago that detente meant "mutual reconciliation and the gradual normalization of relations" have disappeared, Schlesinger said.

It is now evident, he said, that "detente means precious little regarding policy specifics." Schlesinger said, "Soviet doctrine precludes a serious approach to mutual accommodation that satisfactorily protects the interests of Western civilization."

If detente really amounts only to avoiding nuclear war, Schlesinger said, it differs little from "the Cold War period."

Schlesinger's remarks were prepared for delivery at Harvard University in the Gustav Pollack lectures sponsored by the John F. Kennedy School of Government.

The address was salted with critical allusions to the detente policy of Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger, although the secretary was not named. Schlesinger and Kissinger were graduated in Harvard's Class of 1950.

Schlesinger is contributing advice to two presidential candidates, former California Gov. Ronald Reagan and Sen. Henry M. Jackson (D-Wash.).

Kissinger was on the receiving end in Washington of critical comments yesterday from three other men whom he wryly observed are regarded as aspirants for his job.

In this election year, Kissinger told the American So-

ciety of Newspaper Editors, while it is "essential we have a debate," it is also necessary to avoid confusing the outside world about American intentions.

"We must not create the impression abroad that American foreign policy is subject to constant revision," Kissinger said.

Paul C. Warnke, former assistant secretary of defense in the Johnson administration, said earlier in a panel discussion at the Shoreham Americana Hotel that too much current debate tends to "poormouth" American military capacity.

Warnke said some political campaign talk has "actually succeeded in persuading a number of our allies that we have become militarily inferior to the Soviet Union."

Aspects of Kissinger's diplomacy were criticized by Warnke and by Zbigniew Brzezinski of Columbia University, a foreign policy adviser to Democratic presidential candidate Jimmy Carter, and by George W. Ball, former under secretary of state in the Kennedy and Johnson ad-

ministrations.

Kissinger told the editors in his luncheon address: "You have been conducting your own primary for Secretary of State."

During a question-and-answer period, Kissinger defended his criticism of the dangers of communist participation in the governments of Western Europe, which has aroused considerable controversy in Europe.

Kissinger said that as Secretary of State he has an obligation to make it clear that "the advent of communism in major European countries is likely to produce a sequence of events in which other European countries would be tempted to move in the same direction."

"We should not delude ourselves" about what it will mean if communists enter Western European governments, whether or not they are dependent on Moscow, he said.

In either case, Kissinger said, it would mark "a historic change that will have long-term and serious consequences" for the Western alliance.

NEW YORK TIMES, THURSDAY, APRIL 15, 1976

Moscow Is Said to Modify Expectations of Detente

By DAVID K. SHIPLER

Special to The New York Times

MOSCOW, April 14—The anti-detente sentiments running through the American Presidential campaign have begun to stimulate shifts in the mood in Moscow.

Some Soviet insiders, concerned by President Ford's responsiveness to criticism from the right, are predicting a new restraint in Moscow's foreign military involvement during the coming months, particularly in southern Africa.

Simultaneously, however, they see Soviet-American relations entering what one well-placed Russian termed "a period of small deeds where we try to hold on to what we have, but produce nothing bright and shining."

This outlook does not reflect a dramatic change of policy or even a sudden pessimism, but rather a subtle cooling of expectations, whose tone was caught by a Soviet journalist the other day as he described a book he was writing on Soviet-American affairs. He had originally planned to call it "Dialogue Develops," he said. But now he has chosen a new title: "The Limits of Détente."

To some extent, the current strains between the two nations derive from their different definitions of détente and their contrasting notions of its limits.

For the Russians, the relationship has a somewhat narrower justification than for the Americans. In Moscow's view, it rests on two pillars—the prevention of a nuclear holocaust and the expansion of trade with the West. Other issues, such as the competition between the United States and the Soviet Union in Indochina, the Middle East and Africa, for example, seem to Moscow to lie outside the main field of détente.

Therefore, the Russians have expressed no surprise at continued American efforts to gain influence in the Middle East. "We assumed that the United States would not change its policy and would continue pushing," one Soviet expert on foreign affairs told an American correspondent recently. As for Washington's successes and Egypt's swing toward a pro-American position, "we're mad at the Arabs, not at the U.S.," he said.

In the United States, however, détente emerged in another

context and carried a different set of expectations. The desire to improve relations with the Soviet Union gained strength in the years when American foreign-policy concerns were dominated by the divisive agony of the Vietnam war, and the popular American attitude toward the rapprochement was shaped by this.

As Vietnam became the centerpiece of Americans' debate about their role in the world, the prospect of avoiding other Vietnam-style clashes became a primary justification for improving relations with the Soviet Union. The issue of big-power conflict in the third world, a question the Russians considered peripheral to détente, was integral to the American definition.

Evidently neither side fully understood the other's view until Soviet weaponry and Cuban troops were committed to one faction in the civil war in the former Portuguese colony of Angola. The Soviet-supported side won rather quickly.

Moscow maintained its right to support "wars of national liberation." The outcry from the United States prompted Soviet experts and even some Western analysts to accuse Americans of being naive in thinking that détente could eliminate such competition.

"It Would Do Everything"

"You Americans tried to sell détente like detergent and claimed that it would do everything detergent could do," one Soviet specialist on American affairs remarked several months ago.

"Our Government doesn't understand American society and the American system too well," a Soviet scholar said. "We thought that because America was tired of foreign involvements after Vietnam it wouldn't get involved in Angola. That was right. But we didn't understand that because America was tired, the reaction of American society would be stormier."

Only in recent weeks do some Russians seem to have grasped the seriousness of the American reaction, and only lately do some experts here appear to have understood that the end of the Vietnam war and a sense of helplessness have contributed to the resurgence of conservative elements in American politics.

A few months ago Soviet officials were dismissing the American conservatives' attacks on détente as mere election-year propaganda that would evaporate after Nov. 2. Now they are not so sure.

Notes of Worry

These days notes of worry creep in among the optimistic

pronouncements in the Soviet press that most Americans support improved relations. Last week, Georgi A. Arbatov, director of the U.S.A. Institute, the Kremlin think tank, wrote in Pravda:

"The elections pass, but the consequences of pre-election demagoguery and the concessions made in the course of the election campaign continue to influence American policy, sometimes creating serious difficulties."

"The failures in U.S. foreign policy, specifically in Southeast Asia, have caused obvious lapses into cold-war thinking by some of the U.S. leaders," Mr. Arbatov continued.

"One can, of course, understand that the defeats in Southeast Asia, the changes in Portugal, the miscalculations in the eastern Mediterranean and the events in Angola have caused dissatisfaction in the ruling circles of the U.S.A.," he said. "But emotions do not remove the need to establish correctly the causes of political miscalculations. And these spring in the first place from the fact that the U.S.A. invariably took up the defense of unjust and lost causes."

In private conversations with Westerners, some Soviet officials have indicated that the angry American reaction to Angola and the specter of a swing to the right in Washington have made the Kremlin wary of further such adventures for the moment.

One Soviet insider assessed this shift in Moscow's posture by citing an analysis by Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger that described Soviet foreign policy as a product of twin, often contradictory, influences: a missionary zeal and a bureaucratic pragmatism.

The Angola involvement grew out of the missionary zeal, the Russian said. Now, he explained, the pragmatic bureaucracy has gained ascendancy, and the Angola developments are not likely to be repeated in the near future. Some Western diplomats have speculated that Moscow might choose to give covert support to guerrillas in Rhodesia, for example, in an effort to mask its involvement.

Back to Fundamentals

At the same time, Moscow appears to be focusing its definition of détente more and more on its most fundamental element—the avoidance of nuclear war.

"The way of life existing in the U.S.S.R. pleases far from all Americans," Mr. Arbatov wrote, "while the Soviet people do not like the American way of life. Détente does not remove this, nor can it. But it demands that despite all the differences and problems, the two powers should learn to live side by side so as not to jeopardize the existence of their own peoples and of all mankind."

As the definition has narrowed and the tone of the relationship has begun to change, new tensions have developed. One Soviet journalist observed recently that the hard-

liners in the official press now had increased license to express themselves.

This license may be applied to other areas of the Government bureaucracy where anti-American impulses, restrained in recent years, are now slightly freer to operate. That may be one explanation for the threats and bomb scares directed against American diplomats in Moscow in retaliation for harassment of Soviet diplomats by Jewish protesters in New York.

Exchange Negotiations

On the other hand, at certain levels the relationship has a momentum that keeps countless scientific exchanges, cultural programs and negotiations going. An agreement has just been reached to limit underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, for example, and for the first time the Russians have approved on-site inspection by Americans to verify compliance.

But the likelihood of concluding a much more important treaty limiting the deployment of long-range nuclear weapons seems to have dimmed. For this Moscow tends to blame what it sees as President Ford's unwillingness to hold a firm line against the military and his critics on the right.

One Soviet source said that during Mr. Kissinger's visit to Moscow last January, agreement on an arms treaty seemed close. The Secretary of State appeared to react favorably to a Kremlin proposal, but he was clearly unable to get Washington's approval for agreement then. He flew home, apparently with plans to return to Moscow several weeks later, but he never did.

Doubts on Credibility

One well-placed Russian described the mood in the Kremlin as "quiet desperation with the Administration." He said that there was a feeling that Mr. Kissinger's influence was being eroded, and he remarked: "With Ford, it is a credibility—well, I won't say 'crisis,' but there are doubts."

He even expressed a certain nostalgia for former President Richard M. Nixon, whose policies, he said, seemed firmer and less ambiguous.

If Mr. Ford looks to the Kremlin like a less desirable victor next November than he seemed some months ago, then Ronald Reagan, Henry Jackson and George Wallace are all anathema.

Jimmy Carter is still an unknown here, though some Soviet officials have thought well of his foreign policy statements. The real favorite among official circles seems to be Senator Hubert H. Humphrey, who is not a declared candidate but is regarded here as a strong advocate of improving Soviet-American relations.

Moscow is watching the race closely, and Soviet specialists in foreign affairs are asking Americans they meet more questions than usual. One influential Russian, making a somewhat wishful prediction, declared, "I'll bet it'll be Humphrey-Carter."

The Washington Star

Sunday, April 4, 1976

Crosby S. Noyes

Kissinger's pessimism telegraphs our punchlessness

The foreign policies pursued by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger have fallen on hard times. And since these policies for some time to come will be those of the United States, it is not just Henry Kissinger who is in trouble.

As an articulate exponent in the area of foreign affairs, the secretary remains a considerable asset for the administration, both in domestic politics and throughout the world. But his prominence also assures that he will attract most of the lightning from critics of administration foreign policy. And there is no question that, as the result of political circumstance, his authority has been eroded and diminished in recent months.

In his continuing battles with Congress, Mr. Kissinger has been using a strange kind of pugnacious pessimism, lavishly prophesying doom if the Congress refuses to shape up.

If, as seems likely, his new \$1 billion aid agreement with Turkey is blocked, the secretary says it "would lead to disastrous consequences that would last for decades." Congressional refusal to go along with the administration's decision to sell six C-130 military transport planes to Egypt, he warns, would be a "slap in the face" for President Anwar Sadat, leading to a situation of "utmost gravity with the most serious consequences in the Middle East."

No doubt there is an element of exaggeration in some of these judgments, reflecting a settled conviction that when Congress tries to conduct foreign policy on a day-to-day basis, it will probably make a mess of it. Henry Kissinger, like most secretaries of state, is not shy about asserting executive authority in his own area of responsibility.

But the underlying problem is grave enough. For the hard fact is that the Ford administration lost control of its foreign policy many months ago to an increasingly

assertive congressional opposition. Today almost every aspect of this policy is under attack, both from the Democratic left and the Republican right. And, as Mr. Kissinger himself would be the first to admit, effective American action in any critical area of the world has become more dubious as time has passed.

It is one thing when it is a matter of dealing with Turkey and Egypt. Serious as the consequences of congressional obstruction in these areas may be, the potential for disaster is at least limited. But this is not the case when the problem involves the Soviet Union and its Cuban partners-in-mischief. And that, of course, is the area of Mr. Kissinger's chief concern.

The concern is entirely justified. Ever since Watergate, the possibility of a major Russian move to take advantage of the paralysis of the American government has been an abiding obsession in the administration. Recent developments in Angola and elsewhere in southern Africa have given substance to these fears. Mr. Kissinger is not exaggerating at all when he warns that further moves by the Cubans and Russians would "create the most extreme difficulty for the United States."

The problem, of course, is what to do about it. The secretary, no doubt, means his warnings to the Russians and Cubans to be taken seriously. Yet the administration itself admits that an American intervention in southern Africa at this point, even limited to military equipment, is out of the question. And if Congress became convinced that there was a real probability of military action against Cuba, it would very probably pass a law to prevent it.

Mr. Kissinger himself, by his protestations and warnings, is in the unhappy position of advertising the weakness of the American response to the Communist threat. And that is the very last thing he wants to do.

THE NEW YORK TIMES, MONDAY, APRIL 12, 1976

Europe's Leaders Take a Gloomy View

By FLORA LEWIS

PARIS, April 11 — Western Europe's leaders have settled into a state of gloom in the belief that the United States is retrenching in world affairs, a mood deepened by their own inability to act together.

This was the mood when Common Market heads of government discussed international affairs in Luxembourg early this month, according to participants and other well-informed officials.

The sense of frustration was intense, they said, not only because there are no prospects now for European unity but also because they feel that, while the might of the Soviet

Union is growing, the United States is leaving a vacuum that Europe cannot fill.

Opposition leaders and other politicians have other views. Not even all the leaders agree on what should be done, nor even on the extent of the trouble facing Europe. But they did agree that none of them could really do much more than attend to mending domestic fences and hope for the best.

America's Absence Noted

Chancellor Helmut Schmidt of West Germany, for example, has decided to make a major theme of his election campaign the fact that Germany is much better off than its neighbors, a strategy that effectively prevents him from speaking for Europe or taking a European initiative that would have a

chance of approval by his partners.

The mood of the leaders may have been intensified and exaggerated by their own inability to act together, and by what one called the "blithering absence" of America from the world scene in this election year. This mood may dissipate as recovery progresses and events impose reaction.

But at their meeting, the nine heads of government were "morose," an official said, as they discussed détente, East-West relations, Africa, the Middle East, Lebanon and other international political problems at a dinner held between two

fruitless formal sessions devoted to European questions.

A Helpless Feeling

The atmosphere was so bleak that one of the participants afterward exploded: "We can't even have a crisis any more. There was no blood on the walls, nothing. Just 'But you do understand, my dear friend, in my position —'"

There is general agreement that the situation—it is not called a crisis so much as a decline, a gentle, steady subsidence in quicksand—is more a psychological than a factual loss of ability to deal with events, a loss of will. 31

But when that has been said, what follows is never a proposal of what might be done. It is, these days, a recital of why it is so difficult to do anything.

The European leaders' perception of American policy and intentions varies somewhat, but all are acutely aware that it is an election year in the United States and consider that Washington will probably be unable to act, whatever happens in the world. It makes some angry, since they are also aware of a steady buildup of Soviet power and of Moscow's expanding influence in some areas, notably Africa.

They are accustomed to the electoral cycle in the United States but are more worried than usual this time because they also tend to believe that there have been some fundamental changes in American attitudes, though not to the point of the "neo-isolationism," "eclipse," "withdrawal" that European newspapers have been discussing.

Watergate, Vietnam, Angola, Lebanon are the words most frequently cited when high officials are asked whether they think the United States has really shifted course. At the time of Watergate and the Communist victories in Indochina, the tendency was to say that these traumatic events would leave the United States in a better position to go back to basics, especially to its role of leading and galvanizing the Western world.

But that is no longer their perception. A few feel that when the elections are over, America will resume that role. Most say unhappily that the conclusion to be drawn is that Europe should quickly develop its own cohesion and capacity

to act, but that it cannot and will not.

Africa's Fate Assessed

The French, for example, have been telling their partners that the whole of Africa is teetering, that pro-Western leaders such as President Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire are complaining that they chose "the wrong side" and wondering, in the wake of Angola, if they should not sidle far to the left before they are toppled by Soviet-inspired forces.

Nobody argued when this assessment was presented at the dinner in Luxembourg, one source said, and everybody agreed that "something must be done." But when it came to issuing a joint statement on Rhodesia, which worries the leaders deeply, they could not even agree on supporting Britain's demand for black majority rule within two years and came out with a diluted, deploring communiqué that attracted no attention at all.

There is a great deal of private talk among Europeans in political power these days about Europe's past "ingratitude" to America and its carping. It is accompanied by as much talk about America's failure to understand and accept that powerful countries are always criticized and even disliked by those around them.

But when they are asked why European leaders do not voice their concern openly and appeal to America for leadership with a promise of support, as Britain did in the days that produced the Marshall Plan and NATO, the invariable answer is, "We could never manage to speak together; we couldn't agree on how to go about it."

Giscard Lacks the Power

The Europeans seem to take

it for granted that it is not possible now for President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing of France to take the lead because he has had to throw himself back on the Gaullists for support in hopes of defeating the Socialist-Communist opposition at the 1978 parliamentary elections.

"The only ones who could do it are Schmidt or Callaghan, one leader said, referring to the West German Chancellor and Britain's new Prime Minister. "They won't," he went on. "They boast of being pragmatists and rail at European poetry." All they really pay attention to is their domestic politics and how to add up fractions of a percent of the vote to patch their majorities together.

Optimists among these men whose task it is to make decisions say: "I guess we'll just float along for the time being. Things are getting so bad that they can only get better." The pessimists shrug and say: "It's getting late. Time to break up and go home. We'll talk about it tomorrow."

That was the view of the situation given by one official. Although they have become friends through repeated meetings—they see each other three times a year at European conferences and frequently meet in smaller or larger groups elsewhere — the leaders have reached a state of irritation where they not infrequently mock and deride each other outside of their encounters.

"Nothing but a bunch of timid mediocrities in sight," said an official, including himself.

Confidence Evaporates

The confidence of just a few years ago, when European leaders felt they were shaping policy both eastwards and westwards, has evaporated.

One source said they were beginning to consider détente as a Soviet political offensive and complaining about lost ground at Helsinki, where the East-West European security agreement was signed last summer.

Another said they had long been dazzled by Soviet-American negotiations, on strategic arms, summitry, the Middle East, and thought of détente as something between Moscow and Washington that they did not have to worry about until now, when they have begun to wonder if the United States has the will to keep up the Western side.

While the distress among the European leaders is palpable, it has come when their worst economic troubles are beginning to subside, when none are burdened by the colonial wars that bled them in the 1950's and 1960's, and when none are confronting the open social turmoil of previous decades.

But they point out that most of their governments are fragile, either minorities or holding power with tiny majorities. Some have come to complain about constitutions, not the idea of democracy itself but the failure of existing structures to provide democratic leadership that is both strong and flexible. They even complain about the American Constitution in this context.

Some say they are convinced their own people would rally impressively to clear, ringing declarations of grand policy, and then offer dozens of reasons why that is impossible now. One said the greatest danger is that electorates will come to perceive the Communists as "the only ones with a program, the only ones who really know what they want."

DAILY TELEGRAPH, London
26 March 1976

Nato: the naked truth

ANOTHER authoritative voice has been added to those warning the West of its inadequate defences in face of the Russian threat. It is that of Gen. Steinhoff, the German who in 1974 retired from the chairmanship of the Nato Military Committee after a three-year term.

His description of Nato's predicament is strikingly similar to that given last week by Brig. Close, the Belgian vice-principal of the Nato Staff College in Rome. In a private study paper that unintentionally became public he argued that the Russians could reach the Rhine in 48 hours while Nato was still hesitating to use nuclear weapons.

Nato immediately discounted Brig. Close's hypothesis. Gen. Steinhoff's much wider and more detailed account, which has been serialised in *Die Welt* over the past fortnight, has gone unchallenged.

He likewise records Nato's dangerous and increasing inferiority in all categories and goes on to say that the situation is aggravated by

R. H. C. STEED assesses recent evidence of how the Russians might sweep through Europe

the fact that a far higher proportion of the Warsaw Pact's "ready troops" really are ready.

By contrast a large and increasing part of Nato's supposed front-line strength would, in the event of an "emergency," first need to be mobilised according to a whole variety of different national procedures, and then brought into position over hundreds of miles of illogical criss-cross communications.

Gen. Steinhoff fears that political uncertainties between the alliance members would increase delays and confusion. "A geographically limited crisis situation does not threaten every member to the same extent. Yet an effective defence depends on the synchronised entry into effect of a

state of readiness based on a common assessment of the nature of the threat."

He points out that in the North German plain, where Russia is strongest, Nato is weakest. "The terrain is particularly advantageous for a spear-head thrust by the Russian armoured forces, which are in a favourable starting position for reaching key targets such as the Ruhr and Channel ports."

He emphasises that the whole training, posture and equipment of Russian forces is geared for offensive and surprise, and adds that their "teeth-to-tail" ratio is 75:25 as compared with 50:50 in the case of Nato. The discrepancy is largely due to the fact that the Warsaw Pact has the enormous advantage of total standardisation

and inter-operability of equipment, whereas Nato has to wrestle with a nationally-based heterogeneity that could mean a 50 per cent. loss of efficiency. In addition, Russian divisions would travel light because they could expect to live and refuel off conquered territory.

Gen. Steinhoff is deeply worried about the continued validity of the strategy of "forward defence," an essential requirement for West Germany, which rejects the concept of a destructive war of manoeuvre over its densely populated and highly industrialised territory. Yet whereas this calls for adequate numbers of highly-trained and well equipped troops actually in position, the trend among Germany's allies is to keep increasing numbers of their committed forces at home in various stages of readiness and mobilisability.

He is outspoken in his scorn for the American "Big Lift" concept, so popular with Germany's economy-minded allies. "The attempt to contain, by conventional forces, a massive attack against central Europe until American reinforcements arrive will fail. Russia, with her huge ultra-modern navy and the advantage of surprise, would take care of this. It is pointless for Nato to think of meeting a Blitzkrieg by mobilising its full strength over a period of weeks. If the present trend continues the fighting would not last for months or weeks, but at most for a few days."

Gen. Steinhoff naturally recognises that, in these circumstances, Nato is enormously dependent on nuclear deterrence. Yet he dwells gloomily on the problems of getting finely-tuned decisions on nuclear use and escalation with the necessary speed. Evidently even the smallest member expects to be able to veto the use of nuclear weapons.

Wishful thinking

He is painfully frank about the true extent of the disaster to Nato caused by France's withdrawal from the integrated command in 1966, and by the fact that "she neither shares the common assess-

ment of the Russian threat nor the strategy to meet it. France's withdrawal was the beginning of Nato's erosion. Far from filling the vacuum, the other members have rendered little more than lip-service to their undertakings at the time to do more.

"In view of the increasing weakness on the flanks, and the unwillingness or inability of many members to maintain the size and improve the quality of their contributions, all efforts to make the situation appear better than it is are wishful thinking." France's totally independent nuclear strategy, which is limited to the defence of French territory, increases the uncertainty. "With alarm, France's neighbours realise that the use of 'Pluton' (the French tactical nuclear weapon) would mean their own nuclear destruction." As for the possible stationing of Pluton on German soil, this would not be acceptable except within the existing Nato nuclear framework.

Gen. Steinhoff recognises that the present nuclear balance has reduced the credibility of the American deterrent. In his view it has also finally destroyed the credibility of French nuclear weapons for anything less than attacks on Russian cities in conditions of total nuclear war.

Any combination of French and British nuclear weapons, if this were to become politically possible, would not help. It would, moreover, be opposed by both America and Russia as a complication of their SALT arrangements. If Russia succeeded in her efforts to include British and French nuclear weapons in America's quota, this would endanger Europe by reducing the effectiveness of the whole existing Nato nuclear system.

Russia would "react vehemently" against any European nuclear force in which West Germany had "a finger on the trigger," even if only in the form of a right to participate in decisions. "For this reason alone German politicians and strategists should avoid even the appearance of pursuing such thoughts."

Gen. Steinhoff thinks that the Russians would be chary of launching a massive all-out attack, despite

their great conventional advantages, because of the nuclear risk.

An attack on the flanks might appear to them to involve only slight nuclear risk, and therefore be more attractive. Their preference, however, would probably be for a powerful surprise attack in the centre, combining conventional speed and punch with an initial announcement that they would not make first use of nuclear weapons.

As for the nuclear risk, Gen. Steinhoff suggests that the Russians would expect the American President to hesitate too long for fear of retaliation. This is exactly the controversial view put forward by Brig. Close.

Summing up, Gen. Steinhoff emphasises again the need for intensified efforts to persuade France to co-operate more integrally. He also insists that Nato will not be able either to deter Russia or resist attack unless its members decide what kind of war they want to fight if driven to it.

If they want to reduce the nuclear risk, they must be ready to fight a long conventional war, and provide the necessary numbers of well-trained and equipped ready troops stationed close to the frontier, together with adequate reserves. If, for economy reasons, they are not prepared to do this, they must accept that the only alternative is to be ready to make early use of nuclear weapons—with all the necessary arrangements for rapid and unanimous decisions.

Gen. Steinhoff has served the cause of European defence and freedom as well as an author as he did as chairman of the Nato Military Committee. Will the people and the politicians give his successors the men and the tools for the job?

• "Where is Nato Drifting to?" By Johannes Steinhoff. (Hoffmann und Kampe, Hamburg, DM28.)

THE NEW YORK TIMES, SATURDAY, MARCH 27, 1976

U.S. Is Said to Plan a New Approach on Terrorism

By DAVID BINDER

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, March 26—The Ford Administration is planning a thorough revision of its program for dealing with international terrorism, including consideration of more flexibility on ransom demands, Government officials have reported.

The Administration has been committed up to now to rigid refusal to accede to any demands for money or other concessions by terrorists holding hostages.

The new approaches to terrorist problems emerged at the close of a confidential two-day conference on international terrorism sponsored by the State Department, which drew almost 200 specialists from four

countries.

Expanded Office Considered

State Department officials said proposals were under study for expanding its office for combating terrorism to include emergency teams of psychiatrists and police specialists familiar with that is termed "coercive bargaining" in situations involving terrorists.

"There is going to be a big change," an official said. "But we haven't decided yet whether to do it over a period of four or five months or over a period of a year."

At present the office, under Robert A. Fearey, who is special assistant to Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger as coordinator for combating terrorism, functions mainly as a headquarters for information gathering and policy direction,

drawing on the resources of other Government agencies.

The officials said they believed Mr. Fearey would be replaced later this year by a former Central Intelligence Agency officer who has had considerable field and operational experience.

The critical issue on terrorism confronting the Administration, they said, was how to modify the policy of simply refusing to bargain with terrorists.

Tanzanian Case Cited

They noted that last summer, W. Beverly Carter Jr., Ambassador to Tanzania, became involved in bargaining with terrorists who had kidnapped a group of Stanford University researchers.

The officials said that Am-

bassador Carter's negotiations, in defiance of the standing order, appeared to have been going quite successfully until a relative of one of the hostages offered to pay ransom.

Although Mr. Carter was later reprimanded by Mr. Kissinger, his action provoked fresh thinking about bargaining, the officials said.

The bargaining question came up again and again at the conference, at which Mr. Fearey presided.

"I think the American concept is totally inapplicable," said Martha Hutchinson, assistant professor of government at Wesleyan University. "I think we need to study the possibility of bargaining with terrorists."

Another participant, Seymour D. Vestermark, consultant to the International Association of Chiefs of Police, remarked that the New York Police Department had trained officers who are now experienced in coercive bargaining" and had had successes in dealing with terrorists.

Data Bank Developed

The conference themes included attempts to define terrorism, a review of terrorist actions over the last 15 years, policy planning, international law and regional reports from the Middle East, Europe and Latin America.

A C.I.A. official disclosed that his agency completed development of a pilot data bank last summer for rapid retrieval of information on terrorist actions.

Statistical studies prepared for the conference showed that of 951 terrorist incidents from 1965 to 1975, 333, or more than a third, took place in Western Europe. Latin America had 260 and North America 126. There were 122 terrorist incidents recorded in the Middle East and North Africa during this period.

Reporters were barred from the conference on the ground that the participants "could talk more frankly then," a State Department official said after ejecting a reporter. However, two journalists remained as participants. They were Robert Moss, an editor of *The Economist* of London, and Eugene H. Methvin, a *Reader's Digest* editor.

THE NEW YORK TIMES, WEDNESDAY, APRIL 14, 1976

The Antiterrorist League

By C. L. Sulzberger

BONN—The three principal capitals of Western Europe—Bonn, Paris and London—have quietly established an antiterrorist league to combat the wave of violence for political purposes. That has recently spread in this area.

West Germany has been concerned principally by Arab urban guerrillas; France by the activities of such kidnappers as "Carlos," Europe's most wanted man, who is identified by French security as a Soviet K.G.B. agent; and Britain by Irish Republican Army (I.R.A.) bombers.

Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing and Prime Minister Harold Wilson had been in frequent contact on this matter. However, the primary burden falls on the three national security services, both internal and external, and upon their chiefs: Werner Maihofer, Bonn's Minister of the Interior; Prince Michel Poniatowski, his French opposite number; and Roy Jenkins, Britain's Home Secretary. The three have held a series of meetings and their collaboration is constantly getting closer.

The participating nations have agreed to regard their own intimate contacts as the "pivot" for a broader West European network. Within this larger frame, the Germans have established close bilateral cooperation with the Dutch and Austrians, the French with the Spanish, and the British with the Irish Republic. Spain's security police are reputed to be intelligent and tough but now tending to internal divisions because of post-Franco political arguments.

This "pivot" antiterrorist nucleus is not as close to United States security services as it would normally wish to be. The reason for this is the conviction of the three key Governments that only those security forces acknowledged as fully effective are capable of the swift, efficient and discreet cooperation required.

Such is not thought to be at present true for the American Federal Bureau of Investigation (internal affairs) and Central Intelligence Agency (external affairs) although normally these U.S. agencies are considered excellent and prudent. Nowadays, however, it is believed Moscow has found a way to paralyze the United States by striking at its two principal security services.

As a consequence of such operations (attributed in large part to the K.G.B.'s department of disinformation) the effectiveness of the C.I.A. and F.B.I. is held to have been rendered extremely anemic by apparently internal

U.S. political arguments. The "pivot" countries expect within a very few weeks that a blazing new scandal will break around the F.B.I., greatly weakening its operating abilities.

The three European security partners eagerly await the day when the American services are less flabby and can join in the covert antiterrorist war. This is regarded as a political conflict which, in fact, employs wartime methods of terrorism and therefore must be opposed by far tougher (if little advertised) means than had previously been the case.

It is pointed out here that toughness is now producing results. In France, for example, only about a third the number of crimes involving seizure of hostages have occurred in the first three months of this year as compared with a similar period last year. Moreover, a far higher percentage of those believed responsible have been arrested.

This change is attributed to new arrangements to apply "determined

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

action" in putting down terrorist crimes. While most of the activities involved do not find their way into the press, a continual alert is out.

Thus, for example, within 48 hours of a French television broadcast by Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, the Soviet writer expelled by Moscow, a K.G.B. colonel arrived in Paris among a group of East European tourists and started to sow fear among émigrés by threatening reprisals against their families. He was promptly spotted and expelled.

Although Bonn, Paris and London hope their tough new reactions will do nothing to jeopardize relations between them and the Soviet Government, or weaken attempts to lessen international tension, they privately hold Moscow responsible for igniting as much trouble as possible. In this the Kremlin is globally helped by Cuba, Algeria and (to a lesser degree) Libya. East Germany and Poland have assisted in the European area alone.

In contrast to the firm response of Western "pivot" nations, there is a suspicion here that the sorely beset United States services are if anything easing their previously rigid attitude against terrorists. It is pointed out that at last month's American conference on this subject, sponsored by the State Department, there appeared to be a general wish to accept the idea of bargaining with lawbreakers under coercion, a concept previously rejected by Washington and losing favor in Europe.

THE NEW YORK TIMES, FRIDAY, MARCH 26, 1976

Trading in Doom

By Abraham A. Ribicoff

WASHINGTON—Thirty years ago, when Hiroshima and Nagasaki were freshly imprinted on the mind of a war-weary world, Bernard Baruch presented the United Nations with our nation's plan for peacefully harnessing the atom. "We are here to make a choice between the quick and the dead," he admonished. "That is our business."

That is still our business today. The potential for a holocaust-producing showdown between the superpowers is the most immediate nuclear danger, but the greater danger may lie in the spread of nuclear weapons to many nations, even to terrorists, through the export of civilian nuclear technology.

In 1946, the Soviet Union's refusal to restrict its own development of atomic weapons prevented the United Nations from placing all dangerous nuclear activities and stockpiles under international ownership and control. Today, the refusal of France and West Germany to restrict their civilian nuclear exports poses the greatest obstacle to curbing dangerous nuclear trade.

The French and Germans, seeking to pull multibillion-dollar reactor sales away from the United States, offer an option that we do not—the facilities needed by a nation to produce and process its own reactor fuel. The problem is that these facilities—uranium-enrichment and plutonium-reprocessing plants—produce material suitable for making atomic bombs as well as reactor fuel. Therefore, they constitute the essential component of any nuclear-weapons-development program. Furthermore, these facilities are much harder to safeguard against theft than reactors, and they cannot be operated economically except in industrial nations with very large reactor programs.

For all of these reasons, the United States exports reactors and fuel that is unsuitable for weapons-making—but not fuel facilities capable of producing weapons-grade material.

The French and Germans have rejected our proposals for banning the export of nuclear-fuel facilities.

They also have blocked diplomatic efforts to bar nuclear sales to nations that refuse to ratify the treaty for the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons or that refuse to agree to place all their nuclear activities under the safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

The French and Germans suspect that our warnings about weapon's

proliferation are a smokescreen for protecting our pre-eminent nuclear industry. The Germans approved the export of enrichment and reprocessing plants to Brazil as part of a major reactor deal over strong United States objections. But this action came shortly after the West German Government learned that an American company was trying to sell Brazil an enrichment plant—and this at the very time our diplomats in Bonn were saying that policy prohibits such sales.

Similarly, the French are not prepared to forfeit their technological lead in plutonium reprocessing because the United States objects to the export of these plants. France is going ahead with the shipment of such a plant to Pakistan despite our objections.

These exports are particularly dangerous because Brazil and Pakistan, which refuse to ratify the nonproliferation treaty, are free to have unguarded nuclear activities and set off nuclear explosions.

Unfortunately, the United States, as exporter of 70 percent of the free-world civilian nuclear technology is also the biggest supplier of nations that are not treaty signatories. Thirteen of the 29 countries to which we make nuclear sales refused to ratify the treaty—not a good example for the French and Germans to follow. Moreover, our current and planned nuclear exports extend to most countries suspected of having atomic-weapon intentions, among them India, South Korea, Taiwan, South Africa, Brazil, Argentina, Iran, Israel and Egypt.

Our explanation for exporting to non-treaty nations and to otherwise suspect nuclear customers is the same as that of France and Germany: "If we don't, they will." The difference is that we will not export fuel facilities — only reactors.

The United States must persuade France and West Germany not to engage in dangerous nuclear trade. We should set a nonproliferation example they can follow, and we should remind them that they still depend heavily on us for the technology, components, and particularly the fuel used in their own ambitious nuclear programs.

Our greatest, and perhaps last, opportunity for persuasion is immediately at hand. For at least the next four years, the United States and the Soviet Union will be the sole sources of enriched-uranium fuel for France and West Germany. Furthermore, the Russians seem to be as concerned as we are about the spread of nuclear weapons—the one issue on which the

two superpowers have a strong identity of interest. It provides an excellent opportunity, therefore, to breathe new life into détente.

However, Secretary of State Henry S. Kissinger refuses to approach the Russians on jointly applying pressure on France and West Germany through the denial of nuclear fuel. I agree with Mr. Kissinger that this would be drastic action—even blackmail—but I also believe that drastic action will not be necessary once it is clear that the United States is prepared to act to stop the spread of nuclear weapons.

Therefore, I propose the following steps for the United States.

1. We should immediately explore with the Russians whether a common position can be reached in support of a ban on the export of nuclear fuel facilities to nonnuclear-weapons countries, and on all nuclear exports to non-treaty nations.

2. If a common position can be reached, it should be announced at the next meeting of the nuclear supplier nations, in June, and France and West Germany should be asked to announce their positions.

3. At the same meeting, we should demonstrate our good faith by offering to enter into a cooperative arrangement with the other suppliers, including France and West Germany, that will guarantee each supplier a minimum number of reactor sales a year. A "market share" arrangement among the suppliers may be our best hope for eliminating cut-throat competition in the sale of reactors and for promoting fuel arrangements that will discourage production and stockpiling of weapons-grade materials outside the supplier nations.

4. If agreement on strict export controls and market-share arrangements cannot be reached, the United States should announce that future supply of enriched-uranium fuel and of all other nuclear assistance will be made only to nations that join in meeting these nonproliferation objectives.

If all else fails, the United States should stop supplying reactor fuel to the Germans and French. This would make them wholly dependent on the Soviet Union. I do not believe that France and Germany are prepared to rely solely on the Russians.

Abraham A. Ribicoff, Democrat of Connecticut, is chairman of the Senate's Committee on Government Operations.

Eastern Europe

Monday, April 12, 1976

The Washington Star

IN FOCUS Are East-West Airwaves for Detente or Propaganda?

'Poisoning the ether with deliberate lies'

By Henry S. Bradsher
Washington Star Staff Writer

It looked fairly simple and straightforward. European and North American leaders agreed in Helsinki last summer that "the expansion in the dissemination of information broadcast by radio" was a good thing. They hoped it would continue, "so as to meet the interest of mutual understanding among peoples. . . ."

Leonid I. Brezhnev signed his name to that for the Soviet Union. Gerald R. Ford signed, too.

But rather than leading to good feeling over the airwaves, the Helsinki agreement has been followed by intensified argument over what is in "the interest of mutual understanding."

The argument made by the Soviet bloc focuses on two radio stations which a Moscow newspaper accused the other day of "poisoning the ether with deliberate lies." They are Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe.

RL and RFE are also the subject of a different kind of argument in the United States. Their existence is no longer threatened, as it was a few years ago, but they are being given a new look on Capitol Hill.

BOTH STATIONS are operated by the United States from Munich, West Germany. Greatly changed descendants of Cold War operations by the Central Intelligence Agency, RL and RFE try to provide the kind of information behind the old Iron Curtain that would be normal in the West but is denied by Communist censorship.

About half the people of five East European countries — Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria — are believed to be regular listeners to RFE. An estimated 12 to 25 percent of the Soviet Union's 250 million people listen regularly to RL broadcasts in Russian and 16 other languages spoken in the Soviet Union, but many parts of the Soviet Union can scarcely hear programs aimed at them.

One reason for inaudibility which is now beginning to get attention is that the transmissions are too weak. This is true even without the second reason, Soviet jamming.

In Moscow, Leningrad and Kiev, the three largest Soviet cities, a lot of electricity is expended trying to jam

RL. This is a sign of the detestation that the Kremlin has for this infringement of the Communist ability to decide what is news and to maintain a monopoly of public information.

Since the Helsinki agreement was signed, media attacks on the two stations have increased seven times in the Soviet bloc, according to one count made in Munich. The Communists have also intensified their efforts to discredit them in other ways.

The recent ouster of RFE reporters from the Winter Olympics as a result of bloc pressure was one example. Communists argued that RFE was propagandistic, harming East-West relations. "Propaganda" is usually in the eye of the beholder — or ear of the listener — but the Communist definition managed to convince enough people to succeed in Innsbruck where similar earlier efforts had failed.

IN SEVERAL East European countries people have "come in from the cold" of working for RFE to denounce it as a CIA spy operation for espionage and lying.

Pavel Minarik, an RFE announcer for seven years, recently surfaced in Prague claiming to be a Czechoslovak intelligence officer who had penetrated the Munich studios in order to be able to warn his country of the radio's dirty methods. RFE said he had been fired in a staff reduction and earned his passage home by denouncing it.

The Communist sensitivity to the stations grows from an awareness of their proven impact. It is widely believed, for instance, that the December 1970 strike by Polish shipyard workers on the Baltic coast might have remained localized if RFE had not informed other Poles of the economic grievances being voiced. The trouble spread, and the Polish leadership was changed as a result.

There is a very delicate line in such situations, however. A bit more trouble in Poland and the Soviet Army might have come in, leading to bloodshed. A commitment to providing the news often has major political implications and moral overtones.

This commitment has broad support in the Ford

administration and in Congress.

"There is in effect a coalition of conservatives who believe the stations should be used to hit the Communists over the head, and liberals who believe they are the best way to pursue" the human relations aspects of the Helsinki agreement, according to Walter R. Roberts.

Roberts is executive director of the Board for International Broadcasting. The board was created to establish public "oversight" and supervision of the stations after their covert CIA connection was severed in 1971 and public funding by Congress began.

WHEN THE STATIONS were started, the message was freeing of Europe from the black night of Communism. RL stood for Radio Liberation. The message was hard core denunciation of everything about the red regimes.

Then came the 1956 Hungarian uprising against Soviet occupation troops. The West was unwilling to risk war with the Russians by backing up its preaching of liberation. There were accusations that RFE had led East Europeans on to their doom.

The tone of broadcasts changed. RL was renamed Radio Liberty and the emphasis was shifted to liberalization of Communist regimes. Instead of blanket denunciation, there was increasing attention to specific issues: what the Romanian government was doing about housing problems, for instance, or agricultural problems in Bulgaria, or other things never discussed in those countries' media.

The CIA connection with the stations had never been very well hidden by public appeals to run them as voluntary organizations. From 1951 to last year, such appeals netted \$30 million for RFE — about enough for one year's operations at current costs.

With the advent of detente, the stations finally

became a public issue in the early 1970s. Senator William F. Fulbright argued for closing them as outdated Cold War relics that were obstructing improved relations.

They were in limbo for a while during governmental studies. Several problems were left unattended, especially the worsening transmitter situation.

Congress is now taking a fresh look at the stations. A bill which has passed the House and is awaiting conference with a similar Senate bill directs the president to report by next Jan. 31 on four subjects.

One is "steps to more effectively utilize government-owned transmission facilities." Behind this is the congressional thought that it might make sense for the stations to share transmitters with the Voice of America, the U.S. government's general worldwide information and entertainment radio service.

JAMES KEOGH, the director of the U.S. Information Agency, has testified against this. He argued that VOA's international role should not be associated with, and possibly confused with, the RFE-RL job of substituting for a free press in the Soviet bloc. And, he said, VOA does not have enough transmitters of its own now.

There are also apprehensions by some officials that VOA might incur Communist jamming — it is not presently being jammed in the bloc — and endanger its standing with foreign countries that provide transmitter sites if it were connected in any way with Munich stations.

VOA has on occasion been so careful to avoid antagonizing Communist na-

tions that it has come in for criticism at home. During the Soviet suppression of Czechoslovakia in 1968, VOA talked about the weather, one observer recalled. While RL has spread the word on Soviet dissidents, VOA's Russian-language broadcasts have had little about them.

When it looked for a while last year as if Communists in Portugal might deny RFE use of its transmitters there, it took a National Security Council decision to force VOA to agree to let RFE use some of its transmitters in an emergency.

Roberts expressed his board's attitude in an interview by saying "it's a silly proposition" to think RFE-RL would contaminate VOA. Transmitters are like taxis for various people to use at various times, and it makes no difference where a radio signal originates, so long as the transmitter's host country agrees to the use.

THE HOUSE BILL also asks for study of international cooperation. The BBC is presently using transmitters in the Carolinas to relay its Latin American services, and U.S. broadcasts use facilities in England.

"A comprehensive outline of future facilities needs based on anticipated language requirements and interagency cooperations" is sought in the bill. In the past there has been little comprehensive planning and great criticism of language allocations.

RL sometimes has to virtually shut down its Russian broadcasts to Leningrad in order to reach Soviet Lithuania, one of the areas of particular interest to ethnic groups in the United States. Other decisions on broadcast times

and power used have been made on the basis of outdated personnel alignments and prestige considerations in Munich.

A leading independent expert, Dr. Maury Lisann, told a House committee recently that "RL has been broadcasting for years in languages that cannot be heard effectively at all." He and others have been critical of the failure to pay enough attention to the approximately 50 percent of the Soviet population whose mother tongue is not Russian.

While everyone from Albania to Idi Amin's Uganda has been installing monstrous new high-powered transmitters in recent years, the Munich stations have remained faint. "Every year that major modernization is postponed, between five and 10 million dollars is wasted on inaudible programs," Lisann said. He complained that the Board for International Broadcasting has so far failed to come up with a plan or request for money.

THE BOARD SAYS the situation is being studied in Munich. But Lisann said, and some other outside observers agreed, that "to leave the major responsibility there is equivalent to asking the American Medical Association to design and operate a national health plan."

The transmitter problem has recently focused on Spain. RL sends 90 percent of its broadcasts from there, where propagation conditions are better than directly from the Munich studios. The lease has run out and the Spanish government is now considering an extension.

The fourth point in the House bill is for a report on "possible extension of RFE

and RL-type broadcasts to other countries restricting their citizens access to information." This is the brainchild of Rep. Stephen J. Solarz, D-N.Y., who has mentioned South Korea, the Philippines and India as possible targets.

Officials step gingerly around that one. Some scoff privately at the idea that the United States can take it upon itself to decide who needs enlightening with a substitute for a free press at home. Others simply point to the immense difficulties and time required to build up the expertise for such services — and the possibility that overnight changes of governments would render them superfluous.

The board is wrestling with other problems under the eye of a Government Accounting Office study.

THE INCREASE in value of the West German mark in relation to the dollar has made Munich costs soar, so one idea is moving the main studios to the Washington area. Roberts says some persons might be moved but many would have to remain in close touch with the European scene on which they report.

Before and since the Helsinki agreement, the Soviet bloc has continued its own broadcasts on both official national radios and such other channels as the Soviets' Radio Peace and Progress — which shares studios and frequencies with Moscow Radio.

There has been no change in the tone of these stations, which often attack the West in scathing terms. Communist leaders have always said that detente did not mean an end to the ideological struggle.

Western Europe

NEW YORK TIMES, WEDNESDAY, APRIL 7, 1976

Kissinger Sees NATO End If Europeans Elect Reds

By DAVID BINDER

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, April 6—Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger has asserted that if Communist governments were elected in Western Europe the Atlantic alliance would be smashed and the United States isolated, according to a summary of his remarks.

The summary, obtained by The New York Times, was made on the weekend of Dec. 13-14 in London, where Mr. Kissinger addressed a group of 28 American ambassadors stationed in Eastern and Western Europe. A State Department official said two note-takers were present and cooperated in making the nonverbal summary.

The summary was sent to the ambassadors in cablegrams on Feb. 12 along with a parallel summary of remarks on United States policy toward the Soviet block at the same December meeting by Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Mr. Kissinger's adviser. The summary of Mr. Sonnenfeldt's remarks was privatised in The Times today.

Copies of both summaries—stamped "secret"—were made available to The Times and, apparently, to at least one other publication, Human Events, a conservative Washington weekly. It appears that both summaries came into the hands of Senator James L. Buckley, the New York Republican-Con-

servative, who then made them available to other members of the Congress last week.

It appears that the original intent of the disclosure, by some unknown Administration official, was to provide ammunition for conservative politicians against Mr. Kissinger, Mr. Sonnenfeldt and, ultimately, President Ford.

At a State Department briefing Mr. Sonnenfeldt said today that the summary printed in The Times was "a reasonable though very compressed version of the discussion that took place in London last December."

The summary of Mr. Kissinger's remarks had the following to say about the impact a possible accession to power of Communist parties in Italy and France would have on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization:

"It is difficult to see how we could continue to have NATO discussions if these various Communist parties did achieve control of Western European governments. We would, as with China, perhaps have parallel policies. But the alliance as it now is could not survive."

"The Western alliance has always had an importance beyond military security. The United States would be alone and isolated in a world in which we had no relations by values to other countries."

A little later, the summary said that if Communist parties came to power in Western Eu-

rope, "there would be a shocking change in the established patterns of American policy." The summary continued:

"It could result in a situation where the United States would be an island in its own values and thereby forced to manipulate various Communist centers of power against each other. The United States could probably survive this situation, but only through the use of a ruthless balance of power policy. If we were to do this we would have lost the moral foundation we have operated on for our entire history."

Mr. Kissinger has aired similar thoughts in public, most recently in Boston on March 11, but never in such tough language.

Soviet as a Superpower

The premise on which Mr. Kissinger based his remarks, as did Mr. Sonnenfeldt regarding Eastern Europe, was "the emergence of the Soviet Union as a superpower," according to the summaries.

Explaining his views on American policy toward Eastern Europe today Mr. Sonnenfeldt said it had been his intention in London to project concepts that encouraged "independence, autonomy" and a "normal evolution" among the countries of that region.

He said he regretted using the word "organic" to describe the relationship between Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union that the United States should seek to foster, because of misunderstanding it has generated.

In a separate statement Mr. Kissinger said American policy toward Eastern Europe was as he described it in testimony March 29 before the House International Relations Committee, and that American policy toward the Soviet Union was as he outlined it in a Feb. 23 speech in San Francisco.

"Mr. Sonnenfeldt did not present a new policy, but rather an explanation," he said.

Confidence in Sonnenfeldt

Mr. Kissinger reiterated "full confidence in Mr. Sonnenfeldt"

in the statement released by his press spokesman, Robert L. Funseth. He also deplored "this practice of leaking classified documents for any reason, including either in order to impugn a policy or to impugn officials of this department."

At the White House, Ron Nessen, the spokesman of President Ford, said at his noon briefing, that "the President's policy on Eastern Europe was clearly stated in Milwaukee on Friday." In Milwaukee, Mr. Ford said that United States

Policy is "to support the aspirations for freedom and national independence of the peoples of Eastern Europe."

In the summary of Mr. Kissinger's remarks in London, he recalled that in the mid-1950's it was argued by some American policymakers, presumably Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, that the "strategic balance provides increasing opportunities for regional pressure." This was "wrong then," and "is true now," the summary said.

As a result "regional balances gain more significance," the summary continued.

The implication for his thinking, the summary said, was "a United States policy which would make it impossible even for those Western European parties which are anti-NATO to describe the United States connection as a threat to peace."

This was behind "efforts at conciliation," as during the United Nations special session with regard to developing countries last year.

Mr. Kissinger then blamed contests over policy within the United States for many of the foreign developments that he termed undesirable. The summary continues:

"A great deal of what has gone wrong is not the result of detente or Soviet policy. Examples are Portugal and Italy. The problems of Greece, Turkey and Cyprus are in part a result of domestic paralysis in the U.S."

Monday, April 12, 1976

The Washington Star

Coping with communism

Though we share his concern about the consequences of a Communist takeover of one or more governments in Western Europe, the recently reported thoughts of Secretary of State Kissinger on the subject strike us as excessively apocalyptic. The more so since they were not meant to be made public, in which case they might be read simply as a warning to the countries involved against a particular political eventuality.

As it is, although the "official summary" leaked to the press consists of notes of Mr. Kissinger's remarks to a group of American ambassadors in London last December, the substance of what he said has not been denied and presum-

ably represents an accurate reflection of what the secretary really thinks.

When Mr. Kissinger says that the dominance of Communist parties in Western Europe—in Italy, Spain, Portugal or France—is "unacceptable" to the United States, we concur in hoping with the secretary that it won't happen. We also go along with the thought that it has little to do with the degree of independence of these various Communist parties from the Soviet Union. What would be at stake, in case of Communist domination, would be the survival of the democratic process in the countries involved and how they would fit into the security relationship that exists between Western Europe and

the United States. No one can deny that on both points the history of Communist governments in other countries is anything but reassuring.

Quite obviously if a Communist government came to power in Italy, Portugal or France, the relationship of the country involved to the NATO alliance would be drastically affected. But Mr. Kissinger's assertion that it is "inconceivable" that the United States could maintain ground forces in Western Europe in such circumstances, or that "the alliance, as it is now, could not survive," does not necessarily follow. Granted that we should do our utmost to assure the survival of the democratic process in Western Europe and its orientation toward the United States, it is not necessary to assume that one breach in the system will cause the whole edifice of Western security to disintegrate.

What the secretary is proclaiming, in effect, is a kind of Brezhnev Doctrine in reverse — the theory that the Western community cannot and should not tolerate any deviation from democratic orthodoxy in the same way that the Russians insist on crushing deviations from ortho-

dox Marxism in their part of the world. He also appears to make the worst-case analysis of the problem. For the immediate future at least, there is little probability of a Communist "take-over" in any of the countries of Western Europe. Even in Italy, where the party is strongest in terms of popular support, the limit of its ambition seems to be to share political power with the powerful Christian Democrats — a possibility that would appear to be less than catastrophic in terms of Western interests.

Especially, however, we disagree that if any country in Western Europe should fall under Communist domination, the United States would "be alone and isolated in a world in which we had no relations by values to other countries." In fact, the values which this country has represented for its entire history are shared by a vast majority of people throughout the world, regardless of the form of government that they happen to be living under. And whatever turns the political evolution of Western Europe may take, that fact is most unlikely to change.

THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR

Tuesday, March 30, 1976

Joseph C. Harsch

Communism in Italy: not fatal?

It is being widely assumed in Washington these days that the entrance of communists into Cabinet position in the Italian Government would be a disaster for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and for American foreign policy.

To avoid that presumed disaster all the top people in the American Government in Washington have been urging the Italians to not do it. These efforts, which have been so vigorous as to annoy Italians of all political complexions, have probably increased the chances that the Christian Democrats will invite the communists to share the burden of government with them.

It is certainly possible, and many observers think it probable, that this event referred to in Italy now as the "historic compromise" will happen, and fairly soon, in spite of anything Washington can say or do.

That being the case let us consider not whether it can be prevented (it perhaps being too late for that) but how damaging it is likely to be to NATO and American policy if and when it does happen.

First of all, there is nothing certain. It is all very well for the doomsayers to assert that the leopard cannot change its spots, that once a communist always a communist, that all communists practice tactical retreat as part of their long-term strategy, that all communists are loyal to Moscow at heart.

The record proves no such thing. President Tito is a communist, but to the despair of Moscow. Communism has developed different features in each communist country. China and Albania are communist countries and engaged in cold wars with Moscow. Apparently there has just been another instance of local war along the Chinese-Soviet border in the Issuri River sector. Not all communists are Stalin-

ists.

The real question is whether the Italian communists, who appear to be the most Western and anti-Stalinist, are being truthful or deliberately dishonest when they claim that they will accept the verdict of the ballot box and leave government if voted out.

Most Westerners would of course prefer not to have the issue put to the test. It would be safer. Certainly no Westerner in his right mind would embrace the experiment just to find out what really would happen. But if it cannot be avoided, which seems more likely than not, it can be noted that there are several reasons for thinking that the result would not necessarily be fatal.

The first is that Italian communist leaders themselves are of different minds. Some undoubtedly hope and intend to play the Trojan horse game on the Italians and take them over from within. Others are apparently sincere in thinking that their party in Italy will do better in the long run if it accepts the rules of democracy, renounces "dictatorship of the proletariat," and enters into an accommodation with the Roman Catholic Church. Which line of communist thinking will rise or decline inside the party if it finds itself inside the government? Anyone can theorize. No one can know, not even the communists themselves.

The second reason is that historical experience would seem to indicate that nationalism is a stronger force in today's Europe than is ideology. At the beginning of World War I most governments assumed that they would have trouble with their socialists who had been preaching the brotherhood of the proletariat. But in practice every socialist party in Europe backed its own country in the war, on both sides. Communism seems to be more resistant

to nationalism than other current political ideologies, but is by no means immune. The Tito doctrine of "separate roads to socialism" is the result of the impact of nationalism on communism.

Nationalist communism has been suppressed by Soviet tanks in East Berlin, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia. But it did exist overtly in those three places for a time and continues to exist underground now. There is no reason to believe that communism is infected by nationalism only in Eastern Europe.

There is nothing in the original theory of communism which requires that a communist be an instrument of Soviet imperialism. Many of them have been such instruments, but that is an accident of history, not the result of essential doctrine.

What we are really talking about is whether Italian communists in Cabinet posts in Italy would give their first loyalty to the Kremlin. In social and economic matters they would of course behave as believers in Marxism. But that does not necessarily mean serving Moscow.

Perhaps it is being romantic to add to the above another historic fact. Rome has been overrun time and time again by barbarian conquerors — Gauls and Goths, Visigoths and Ostrogoths, Vandals and Huns, Franks and Teutons and Normans. Yet somehow, in the end, Rome absorbs and tames her conquerors and reemerges as the "Eternal City" and is in a vague, nonmaterialistic, symbolic sense, still the heartland of Western civilization.

We can hope that the communist test will still be avoided. But if it does happen, we need not wring our hands in hopeless despair. All is not necessarily lost.

LONDON TIMES
30 March 1976

THE US AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNISTS

The word is being passed around Washington that the presence of communist ministers in Western governments would portend the end of Nato. That this is not right does not diminish the fact that the United States is faced with a difficult dilemma as it sees communists advancing to within sight of cabinet seats in Italy and possibly even in France.

If the United States says that the advance is inevitable and acceptable it strengthens the communists and further demoralizes the non-communists, especially the Christian Democrats of Italy. This is the main reason why it has not talked with the Italian communists or authorized the special waiver that would be necessary to grant them visas to the United States. But if it huffs and puffs and issues dire warnings it provokes nationalist resentment and ensures that the situation will be even more difficult if the communists do acquire a share of power.

The best way out of this dilemma is to try to stick to the cool truth rather than strike tactical postures. Obviously it is undesirable that communists

should enter west European governments in Italy, France or anywhere else. Obviously, too, it is not inevitable that they will, and nothing should be done to make it more likely. But the possibility opens up a very mixed bag of implications and options which need not lead uncontrollably to disaster.

Of course there would be severe difficulties. American public opinion would feel that an alliance set up against communist expansion had been infiltrated by the enemy and was therefore not worth defending. The issue could also enter the West German election campaign, with the Christian Democrat raising the spectre of communism creeping up from the south and the Social Democrats replying that the trouble originates with the failures of Italian Christian Democrats and the absence of an effective social democratic party as a barrier against the extreme left. Nato would have to look to its security procedures and there would have to be new contingency plans.

The damage would, however, be more limited if it were not exaggerated in advance. The

Italian communists are acutely aware of the risk of provoking a right-wing reaction, which is one reason why they seek a coalition with the Christian Democrats and continuing membership of Nato. They are also deeply at odds with Moscow, so that many of them would regard Nato as necessary protection against Russian imperialism. They could also be a valuable influence in sustaining Yugoslav independence, which they regard as necessary to their own independence. Moscow itself is worried by the influence which heretical Italian communism has in eastern Europe.

If, therefore, the problem is seen in political more than military terms, and with all its interacting implications and openings for influence by the European Community, it offers far more opportunities for judicious management than if presented as a stark and unavoidable threat leading straight to the abyss. Dr Kissinger needs to beware of self-fulfilling prophecies. He is in danger of building up a confrontation that will increase the dangers he seeks to avert.

NEW YORK TIMES
8 APR 1976

Disclosures of Two Secret Summaries On U.S. Policy in Europe Are Traced

By DAVID BINDER
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, April 7—Washington newsman said today that confidential comments on Europe by Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger and his adviser Helmut Sonnenfeldt, which emerged as the focus of a disclosure controversy this week, were passed to him as long as a month ago. The motive, the newsman said, was "outrage" over the international policy aspects, rather than domestic politics.

The correspondent, who asked to remain unidentified, said that "in the first week of March" he was given a summary of Mr. Sonnenfeldt's remarks last December at a meeting of American ambassadors in London, dealing with the Communist challenge in Europe, and was shown remarks made by Mr. Kissinger at the same meeting.

The New York Times published the summaries — from cablegrams stamped "secret" by the State Department — yesterday and today. The newsman who described the motive does not work for The Times.

The reporter, who appears to have been the first to receive the material, works for a major American publication. He said he was unable to persuade his editors to use the material. Only an allusion to it was printed at the time.

He described the officials who gave him the confidential

documents as "apolitical" and "liberal," but lacking any desire to have the become topics in political campaign contests.

Source Is Disputed

It was mistakenly reported in the Times today that Senator James L. Buckley, the New York Republican-Conservative, had made copies available to other members of the Congress. Senator Buckley called this "an outright lie" in a letter to the Times and Leonard Saffir, his administrative assistant, supplemented this statement with a denial that the Sonnenfeldt and Kissinger summaries had been supplied to The Times or "to anyone" by an associate of Senator Buckley.

The source of the Times material, a member of Congress, said he had acquired it from an aide of Senator Buckley.

The reporter who said he had received the material a month ago said one of the officials who had passed the copy of the Sonnenfeldt summary to him was in the State Department, while the other worked for another branch of the Administration. Both summaries were sent out Feb. 12 to United States embassies in Europe.

More and more copies of the Sonnenfeldt and Kissinger remarks at the London meeting were circulated in Washington to members of the Congress and to journalists.

But there was also a qualitative change in the disclosure pattern. In the last 10 days,

the receivers of the State Department summaries have, with few exceptions, been political conservatives and the intention was apparently to provide material for campaign speeches against the Ford Administration.

It is difficult to reconstruct the sequence of disclosures, but it appears that the next persons to receive the material were Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, the columnists, who published an article based on the summaries on March 22.

Their column asserted that Mr. Sonnenfeldt had proposed a United States policy fostering a permanent "organic" union between the Soviet Union and its East European allies.

This was immediately denounced by the State Department as "a distortion," as was the suggestion in the column that Mr. Sonnenfeldt had said Yugoslavia should be encouraged to smooth its relations with the Soviet Union.

Since then there has been controversy about what Mr. Sonnenfeldt did or did not say in London regarding United States policy toward the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe and Communist activities in Western Europe.

Mr. Novak said today that the officials who supplied him with the summaries were people "very opposed to Kissinger and Sonnenfeldt" and "not very political."

Since their original column, their phrase, "the Sonnenfeldt doctrine," has been used by conservative politicians to attack the Ford Administration.

Ronald Reagan, the Republican Presidential candidate, assailed Mr. Sonnenfeldt in his national television address last week. On the floor of the Senate, Jesse A. Helms, the North Carolina Republican, accused Mr. Sonnenfeldt on April 1 of making "a policy statement which is obviously contrary to American moral standards."

In the House of Representatives, Edward J. Derwinski, Republican of Illinois, asked Mr. Kissinger whether he intended to repudiate his adviser's remarks, and was dismayed when he was told that he could not be shown the original summary.

By the middle of last week, however, copies of the cablegram had been made available to Senator Helms, to Senator Buckley, to at least one unidentified member of Congress, and at least two newsmen associated with conservative publications.

Near East

Christian Science Monitor
9 April 1976

Cutting the Soviet chain of allies

By Russell Brines

President Sadat of Egypt has given American diplomacy an impressive victory and probably a massive dilemma.

In a surprise move last month, Mr. Sadat started the machinery to abrogate the five-year-old Soviet-Egyptian Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation. This could have a major impact on the global power struggle. But Mr. Sadat also made clear he wants American arms — and fast — at a time of increased nervousness in Israel.

Mr. Sadat, in essence, is playing the last card in a major gamble with Egypt's future, by throwing his poverty-stricken, restless country into American arms. The stakes are well worth the risk to Washington, but if the State Department decides to plunge fully into the game it could be gunned down by Congress.

The issues go beyond the Arab-Israeli conflict.

The Russians slowly and carefully have been attempting to create a chain of powerful non-communist allies, bound to Moscow by arms and willing to carry out Moscow's destructive objectives because of their own ambitions and fears. The relationship varies from simple base agreements, as in several African nations, to the de facto alliances created by treaties of friendship and cooperation which, so far, have been concluded by three trusted affiliates. The Soviet intention clearly is to add many more nations to the chain of active

allies.

The Moscow connection and massive supplies of Soviet arms helped to involve Egypt in two proxy Soviet wars against Israel and the United States. India carved up the sometime American ally and the Soviet-Indian enemy, Pakistan, as soon as Moscow signed a "friendship" treaty. Iraq, the third ally, has maintained armed hostility toward other Soviet objectives, Iran and the gulf sheikhdoms, for more than a decade.

The West's only effective counterstrategy is to break the chain, and this is what President Sadat says he intends to do. He has been feuding publicly with Moscow since 1972, when he ejected 15,000 Soviet military advisers and technicians because Moscow refused to re-supply arms. But the treaty officially remained in force, and while it did, the chain held.

Now, if Mr. Sadat's example and other pressures encourage the reportedly restless Iraqis to break the chain, and this is what President Sadat says he intends to do. He has been feuding publicly with Moscow since 1972, when he ejected 15,000 Soviet military advisers and technicians because Moscow refused to re-supply arms. But the treaty officially remained in force, and while it did, the chain held.

But any nation breaking the Soviet hold automatically becomes dependent on the West, particularly the United States, in the logistics of the modern world. Egypt needs financial support beyond the estimated capacity of private U.S. investors. Mr. Sadat made clear he also expects to replace his arsenal of heavy weapons, mostly Soviet-supplied, before the Soviet embargo turns it into "mere scrap" in a year or 18 months. He must have an effective army to remain in power and, perhaps, to defend against Soviet retaliation.

Israel and its American supporters, however, have become increasingly concerned over the Soviet build-up of Syria and the apparent Muslim thrust for power in Lebanon. A proposal to supply six American C-130 transports to Egypt created a major flap. Any effort to furnish Cairo with significant arms could set off an uproar in both the U.S. and Israel.

Yet Israel's principal hope for survival may depend upon keeping Egypt neutral in any future struggle. If the Soviets could use arms to thrust Egypt into war, the West may be able to use arms and economic aid to provide the security and the stability to keep it out of war.

Even if the administration agrees with Mr. Sadat, however, it will have to convince a pro-Israel Congress.

Mr. Brines is a free-lance writer on foreign affairs.

THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR

Wednesday, April 14, 1976

Syria's intervention gains tacit U.S. nod

By Dana Adams Schmidt
Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

Washington

The impression grows here that the United States has implicitly given its blessing to Syria's intervention in Lebanon so far — and that the Israelis know it.

U.S. officials do not make any flat statements or admissions. But the words they use to describe Syrian President Hafiz al-Assad's moves so far carry the tone of approval. They speak of Mr. Assad's "clever balancing act," doing "a little at a time," never engaging in sudden or overwhelming movement.

And they praise President Assad for "keeping the options open" for an eventual Arab-Israeli settlement.

At the same time, officials say, "We are keeping in touch with all the actors" — and it is generally assumed here that this means that Israel knows that President Assad has at least implicit approval from Washington.

American officials say that Washington is opposed, in principle, to military solutions — that it objects to Syrian or Israeli military intervention. They sharply reject reports of "collusion" between Washington and Damascus.

But the officials clearly believe that the Israelis will remain tolerant as long as Syrian intervention does not go too far.

The United States would not at all like to see

the Syrian Army take over Lebanon because Israelis would then probably lose patience and launch a counterintervention.

But, while recognizing the lure of the traditional Syrian ambition to control the Lebanese coastland, the U.S. believes that President Assad will focus on objectives that are in line with those of the United States — preventing the victory in Lebanon of political elements who would refuse to work for settlement with the Israelis.

That President Assad, who used to be classified as "extremist," should be cast in such a role is the wonder of the political season. Not quite so surprising, however, to those who remember that Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger during his Middle Eastern shuttles always took lightly the blood-and-thunder statements emanating from Damascus, and described Mr. Assad as a reasonable man and "the most interesting political figure in the Middle East."

Returns from the elections on the Israeli-occupied West Bank of the Jordan have, meanwhile, strengthened the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and its leader Yasser Arafat.

Sources closely connected with the Lebanese infighting believe that with this political reinforcement behind him Mr. Arafat may emerge as the man most able to bridge the differences between the leftists and Mr. Assad.

Yasser Arafat is regarded by Middle East

experts as a moderate who has been forced by circumstances to bury his differences with George Habbash and the other "rejectionists" who would not hear of a settlement with Israel under any circumstances.

On the strength of the recent West Bank elections, these sources say Mr. Arafat can assert himself more openly as moderate and can ward off the challenge to his leadership from Saïqa, the Syrian-sponsored fedayeen organization.

Monitor contributor William Blakemore reports from Beirut:

The position of Palestine Liberation Organization leader Yasser Arafat remains unclear in the midst of the Syrian initiative. The Palestine news agency Wafa denies that Mr. Arafat sent an urgent message to Egyptian President Sadat saying that the Syrians were trying to suppress the Palestine movement in Lebanon and establish pro-Syrian Saïqa leader Zuhair Mohsin as its leader.

Mr. Arafat was reported in Beirut's authoritative newsletter "the Arab World" to have conferred in Beirut Monday with Mr. Mohsin and other Palestinian leaders.

Rumors have been circulating in Beirut since the beginning of the year of a power struggle within the Palestinian movement between Mr. Mohsin and Mr. Arafat.

Africa

NEW YORK TIMES, FRIDAY, APRIL 16, 1976

U.S., Stung in Angola, Forges Africa Policy

By LESLIE H. GELB

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, April 15—The United States Government's attitude toward Africa, long unfocused and drifting with events, has hardened since the crisis in Angola into a determination to eliminate superpower conflict from black Africa.

In pursuit of the goal, the Administration has adopted a twin approach: brandishing a verbal stick at the Soviet Union and Cuba to deter future Angolas while giving new emphasis to calls for majority rule in southern Africa and economic development across the continent.

Although Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger will go to Africa later this month, his visit is not expected to bring any changes in this approach. In fact, as part of the effort to carry out the policy, several moves are being considered in conjunction with the trip.

One would be to cement agreements on short-term aid to Zambia and Mozambique to ease the economic cost of having closed their borders to trade with Rhodesia. Another move being contemplated is a comprehensive program involving many countries to alleviate the effects of droughts in the sub-Saharan region. The trip is also being envisioned as an opportunity for Mr. Kissinger to make more visible contacts with leftist African leaders.

Some critics of the Administration's twin approach, like Senator Dick Clark, believe that the waving of a stick at the Soviet and Cuba undermines rather than reinforces the call for support of majority rule in southern Africa. The Iowa Democrat charges that Mr. Kissinger's recent threats designed to deter further Cuban military action in Africa only encouraged Rhodesian intransigence because the white minority Government got the impression that the United States would not stand idly by—American denials notwithstanding.

Mr. Clark said in an interview that the way to deal with the Soviet threat in Africa was to remove the causes and excuses for the presence of the Russians and Cubans. He said that could be achieved by mak-

ing real progress toward solving the problems of southern Africa. "The Africans turned to Moscow and Havana for help in moving toward majority rule only after we turned them down," he said.

Senator Clark notwithstanding, many critics in and out of the Administration feel that the new twin approach represents an improvement over the attitude of neglect and the policy of straddling the black-white issue that characterized the last six years.

In carrying out the new policy, officials say, a coalition of black African nations will have to be organized that will state its opposition to intervention by superpowers. At the same time, these officials say, a coalition of support will have to be developed in Congress among conservatives who insist on a strong stand against Soviet intervention and liberals demanding ideological support of black African aspirations.

The old policy toward southern Africa was set out in a memorandum of January 1970, prepared by Mr. Kissinger and approved by former President Richard M. Nixon. That memorandum, which formed the basis of a later decision memorandum, stated that the black-white problem was "extremely long-range (and probably insoluble)," and recommended a policy of "quietly relaxing bilateral relations with South Africa," avoiding pressures on the Portuguese to give up their colonial holdings in Mozambique and Angola, and "increasing aid and making other gestures to black states."

A Policy of Nonattention

The policy toward central Africa, according to Administration officials, was one of nonattention. This gave way to some focus in 1973, the year when rising oil prices portended that the insistent voices of small and poor states could not be ignored. Mr. Kissinger decided that Zaire, with its potential wealth in raw materials and its pivotal location, held the key to central Africa's future.

The twin approach was forged in the heat of the Soviet-backed victory in Angola. Confrontations that had not been expected for years suddenly had to be dealt with.

The sense of urgency has dissipated somewhat in recent weeks, according to Administration officials. Instead of having only weeks to forestall a Soviet-Cuban move against Rhodesia, they now speak of many months. Instead of hav-

ing months to deal with the question of South-West Africa, which was declared independent by the United Nations but is still ruled by South Africa, they talk of a year. Intelligence reports estimate that the Cubans will spend months helping the new Government in Angola consolidate its control before thinking about moving on.

Gone also is the panic in some high State Department quarters about immediate threats to Presidents Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire and Kenneth D. Kaunda of Zambia, who opposed the Soviet-backed force in Angola.

An Eye on Somalia

Still a year off is the possibility of armed conflict between Ethiopia and Somalia, with Moscow, Peking and Washington jockeying for position. The prize is the French Territory of Afars and Issas, with its port city of Djibouti. The French are expected to leave this last of their African colonies next year.

In addition to the general policy now evolving, interviews with over 30 officials and legislators disclosed that other factors were influencing United States policy. As the interviews made clear, what has worried Administrations past and present was not so much Africa itself as the outsiders and the outside consequences of events in Africa. Except in efforts to stop the Russians, there has been little coherence and purposefulness in the welter of policies fitted to particular situations in the countries of Africa south of the Sahara.

It is also evident that what concerns the Ford Administration most today is that the victory of Soviet-backed forces in Angola has become a symbol of United States helplessness. While Administration policymakers see Russian moves in Africa as aimed almost exclusively at the United States, many Chinese and Soviet specialists believe that Moscow's main aim, or at least equal aim, is to displace China as the ideological leader of wars of national liberation. If the specialists are correct, trying to deter Moscow by warning that détente with Washington is at stake is not likely to prove effective.

South Africa a Key

Another factor in policy discussions is the fact that South Africa's share of the almost \$3 billion in direct American investments in sub-Saharan Africa jumped from 38 percent in 1972 to 56 percent in 1974 and is still rising. This gives a powerful voice to the 300 American companies who favor a stand-pat policy in southern Africa. Among those with the biggest business stake are Union Carbide, the Fluor Corporation and Westinghouse.

A number of Congressmen

also favor the status quo. Representative Wayne L. Hays, Democrat of Ohio, and Senator Harry F. Byrd, independent of Virginia, are among the leaders.

A review of United States policy in Africa shows that the lack of focus goes back a long way.

In 1957, Mr. Nixon then Vice President, visited Africa and came home sounding the warning that imminent independence for many African states might prove a breeding ground for communism. The fear was that as the Europeans moved out, the Russians would move in.

The general approach of the Eisenhower administration was, to work with and through the Europeans and their political protégés in Africa and to do nothing about the white majority regimes.

The Kennedy Approach

President John F. Kennedy took a new approach with the same aim—working with the African progressives to head off the Communists. As one career specialist explained: "Kennedy found time to receive African heads of state, and even to see leaders of countries that had not yet reached statehood, and he increased aid."

He also imposed an embargo on arms sales to South Africa and the Portuguese colonies, and cut off United States Export-Import Bank loans to South Africa. At the same time, he ordered the Central Intelligence Agency to begin making covert contacts and giving covert aid to leaders of liberation movements in Angola, Mozambique and elsewhere.

The Kennedy administration's interest in Africa reached its peak during the crisis in the Congo (now Zaire), a crisis that spilled over into the Johnson Administration. What was seen as a major Soviet effort to gain a foothold in Africa was beaten off, and once again interest in Africa, and aid to it, decreased.

An experienced State Department official summed up the period: "The Democrats didn't do that much, but they looked like they cared about the African experiment in democracy. When Nixon and Kissinger took over, Africa had gone through one military coup after another, then became very quiet and remote. It looked like nothing would happen, and if it did, it wouldn't matter. It began a period of neglect."

Revival of Interest

After a long interagency study and a meeting of the National Security Council, Mr. Kissinger sent a memorandum to Mr. Nixon on Jan. 2, 1970, titled "policy decisions on Southern Africa." It contained recommendations that were adopted by President Nixon and became United States policy for the next five years.

The first issue in the memor-

andum was "General Posture." Mr. Kissinger noted his agreement with the general feeling that the black-white issue should be straddled, but not by arbitrarily restricting United States interests to the white states.

"As for lifting the arms embargo on South Africa, he explained that a complete lifting would be unwise, but that a "behind the scenes" relaxation would improve American intelligence-gathering facilities, among other things. He recommended selling certain equipment and aircraft to South Africa and "a partial resumption of military contacts."

On South-West Africa, which those supporting independence call Namibia, Mr. Kissinger recommended maintaining that South African rule was illegal but playing down the issue.

On Rhodesia, Mr. Kissinger opposed removing the American consulate, saying "it seems to me premature to give up Salisbury now." He took a dim view of fulfilling United Nations directives to stop importing chrome and other minerals from Rhodesia, saying: "U.S. firms are penalized in a program which has failed to coerce the Rhodesians and which others increasingly ignore. The political costs would be heavy if the U.S. took the lead in relaxing sanctions. But we should be prepared to loosen our own enforcement over the

next few years if others begin to withdraw (which seems likely to me)."

On the Portuguese colonies in Africa, Mr. Kissinger reasoned, "We should avoid identification with either side. But there is nothing to be gained—with Lisbon or the Africans—by pressing Portugal in marginal areas. A slight and quiet loosening of the arms-supply policy would be an inexpensive gesture."

These recommendations were all carried out in the ensuing years. As one official said of Mr. Nixon and Mr. Kissinger, "They believed the blacks could be ignored without any trouble."

Two events refocused attention on Africa: the quadrupling of oil prices and Portugal's decision to leave Angola.

The increased price of oil dramatized the dire poverty of most African states and portended their sinking into even deeper economic difficulties.

Liberal Pressure Mounts

With pressure mounting from liberals, Mr. Kissinger began to do battle with the Treasury and Commerce Departments. By last fall, he achieved modest success, particularly in efforts to buttress black African economies against fluctuations in raw-material prices. He did not, however, seek a significant increase in American aid, which continues at about \$300 million per year.

Mr. Kissinger also saw, according to associates, that the

oil and raw-materials issues were beginning to forge these states into diplomatic unity against the United States.

To break this anti-American stand he relied heavily on Mr. Mobutu. Many in the State Department's African Bureau urged instead, a focus on Nigeria because its oil accounts for about half of all American imports from Africa.

Mr. Mobutu, however, remained Mr. Kissinger's choice.

When the Portuguese began withdrawing from Angola—Zaire's neighbor—Mr. Mobutu urged Mr. Kissinger to begin covert aid to the two Angolan factions opposing the dominant faction supported by Moscow.

Warnings to No Avail

Mr. Ford and Mr. Kissinger issued threats to Moscow to stop backing the Cubans or risk the collapse of détente. The threats failed. Congress disavowed Administration policy and cut off the covert aid.

Stymied, the Administration began a series of policy reviews of Soviet goals, American economic strength and influence and the options for a future course.

As for the Soviet, high Administration officials feel that Moscow's position in Africa and the third world is weak compared with the Chinese. They believe Moscow is trying to deal with this problem by flexing its military muscle.

Some specialists argued,

however, that in its competition with China, Moscow would not want to hurt its relations with the United States.

Other officials argue that Moscow wants to block American influence in Africa, but not at the risk of destroying détente. Still others insist that whatever Moscow's aims, the United States will be a major factor in Africa's future. They say that African economies are so inextricably bound to the United States and Western Europe that they will have nowhere else to turn.

Pentagon officials, who showed little enthusiasm for involvement in Angola, never spoke of using military power. Actually, some of them gave the impression that the Angola crisis was a blessing in disguise because it proved that the Russians were still not to be trusted, that détente was dangerous.

As for the future, Administration officials say that the positive part of the new twin approach to Africa—majority rule—will be underlined in Mr. Kissinger's forthcoming trip. They said that he would stress the need for rapid change to majority rule with the protection of minority rights. One State Department official noted that in Mr. Kissinger's Dallas speech in March "he didn't say 'peaceful change'; he said 'rapid change'."

LONDON TIMES
2 April 1976

THE UN TURN A BLIND EYE AGAIN

The monocular vision of the United Nations has long ceased to surprise anyone, but even among the most hard-bitten observers there must be a slight quiver of raised eyebrows at the news that the Security Council has condemned South Africa for aggression against Angola without a mention of the Cuban troops who put the MPLA into power. The omission is all the more glaring because the South Africans have now departed while about 13,000 Cubans remain.

Admittedly the South African invasion was wrong in every way. Among other things it was decisive in swinging a great deal of African opinion reluctantly in favour of the MPLA. And if the Americans turn out to have encouraged the South Africans, they must share heavy responsibility for the blunder and its consequences. Certainly there is no evidence that they tried to discourage it. The condemnation of South Africa is therefore in itself justified. But its meaning becomes wholly changed when it is not coupled with an equal condemnation of the massive engagement of Cuban troops on African soil. What could have been a high-principled condemnation of foreign interference becomes instead a declaration of partisan support for

one interventionist against another.

It is of course possible to argue for a long time over who intervened first. The South African armoured column was certainly well into Angola by mid-November, but the Soviet and Cuban presence in Luanda was already fairly substantial by that time. According to Dr Kissinger, who admittedly failed to persuade the Senate, the signal for the full-scale commitment of Cuban forces was given not by the South African intervention but by the Senate's decision in mid-December to cut off funds. Before that, he says, the Soviet Union had stopped the airlift for a period of nearly three weeks. After that, within a period of three weeks, the Cuban forces nearly doubled and the Soviet airlift resumed with great force. In other words, he claims, it was not the presence of the South Africans but the absence of American opposition that fully opened the door to the Cubans.

Be that as it may, the Cubans did arrive in very large numbers to support what was then merely one faction in a civil war. A clearer example of armed intervention in a foreign country would be hard to find. The fact that the Cubans are staying on

by permission (one assumes) of a legally recognized government does not in any way alter the impropriety and illegality of their arrival. By ignoring this the Security Council not only discredits itself but almost entirely negates its condemnation of South Africa, which would otherwise have received wider support and made a greater impact. It also in the long run endangers African interests. As Mr Ivor Richard told the Security Council on Wednesday: "Western imperialism is dead. It would be a tragic irony if new imperialisms were to arise in their place".

Nobody can say that the Soviet Union has not been frank about its aims. It is not interested in the principles of non-intervention, merely in who wins. As a commentator of the Soviet Defence Ministry paper *Red Star* said in a recent broadcast: "To a great extent the changes in the balance of forces in the south of Africa are due to the all-round support the peoples of the continent received from countries of the socialist community. The possibility is that this support will grow. . . . Relations with the MPLA, Frelimo and PAIGC among other fraternal national liberation movements now develop on a firm intergovernment basis".

East Asia

Los Angeles Times

Sun., Mar. 21, 1976.

China Urges a Pacific Triumvirate

BY HARNED PETTUS HOOSE

The history of American relations with China has been largely one of missed opportunities, culminating in our failure so far to follow up the rapprochement of 1972 by establishing full diplomatic relations with Peking.

But the opportunity we now are on the verge of missing could make these seem relatively insignificant. It is the chance to recast relationships

The son of missionary parents, Harned Hoose was born and raised in China and speaks Chinese fluently. Now a Los Angeles lawyer, he has made eight trips to China since 1971 on behalf of U.S. companies. He helped with the preparations for President Nixon's 1972 visit to China, and maintains close contacts with American and Chinese officials and private individuals concerned with U.S.-Chinese relations.

in East Asia and the Pacific so as to shift world power equilibriums that have tilted dangerously against us.

The People's Republic of China is offering us just such a deal. That this is hardly recognized and barely discussed in this country is one of the surprising facts of American public life.

It is common knowledge that the Chinese have been trying to influence U.S. policy toward Moscow. But public reports of these efforts have stressed the negatives—that Peking is dwelling on the perfidy of the Russians, warning us of the dangers of detente and "lecturing" our President and secretary of state, as the American press put it.

What is not generally understood is the fundamental realignments Peking proposes, and the enormous benefits that would result for the three major Pacific powers—the United States, China and Japan—as well as for much of the rest of the world.

Nor would the benefits be only military and strategic. Major economic and diplomatic gains also could be expected.

The Chinese messages to America have become more urgent in the last few months. Peking's leaders obviously are frustrated that their proposals apparently are not taken seriously in Washington and are not part of American public debate over what to do about the souring of detente with the Russians.

The invitation to Richard Nixon to visit China last month can be read in part as a measure of that urgency and frustration. The Nixon visit, of course, also had far-reaching consequences within China, where the

people and future leaders now must know that Chairman Mao Tse-tung personally endorses improving Sino-American relations and the 1972 Shanghai Communiqué, which therefore are immune from serious attack.

The Chinese may have miscalculated Nixon's usefulness as a channel for conveying messages to the American government and people. It would be unfortunate, though, if the post-Watergate mood and the stresses of the election campaign resulted in hearing defects among our key governmental and private listeners. More critics of Nixon's latest journey to Peking have preferred that such an honor be bestowed instead on Leonid Brezhnev or some former Russian leader?

However one evaluates China's choice of Nixon as a messenger, clearly the Chinese hoped that the dramatic reenactment of the 1972 Nixon visit and long talks with the former President would help break through what they see as the Pacific blindness of the Ford Administration.

Here are the main points we can be quite certain were made to Nixon by Chairman Mao and Acting Premier Hua Kuo-feng—directly or by typical Chinese allusions and symbolic pantomimes and actions—based upon what has been publicly stated and upon high-level contacts on both the Chinese and American sides:

—A solid, effective Washington-Peking-Tokyo triumvirate involving expanded diplomatic, economic and strategic cooperation would fill the post-Vietnam power vacuum in Asia. China, the United States and Japan should work to form this Pacific triumvirate.

—Such a tripartite relationship would open a strong second front against Soviet encroachments in Africa, Asia and elsewhere. Moscow would be deterred from adventures in the Mideast and such places as Angola and Southern Africa.

—Militarily, the three nations would cooperate in such protective operations as satellite reconnaissance, radar watches and antisubmarine patrols. The United States would supply defensive weapons to China for the purpose of deterring Soviet aggression.

—Economically, the three nations have complementary strengths—U.S. and Japanese industry and technology, Chinese oil, and U.S. and Chinese

food, grains and rice. All could benefit from expanded trade in these items.

—Diplomatically, the three could cooperate to head off trouble in such potential hotspots as Korea and Southeast Asia.

—The Taiwan issue, a major stumbling block in the way of full Washington-Peking relations, could be handled in a way satisfactory to both sides.

—The time for discussing and negotiating the realignments needed to effect such a tripartite arrangement is not unlimited. There are forces within China skeptical of the value of close ties with the United States, and they could gain the upper hand after Chairman Mao is gone. Moreover, a pro-Soviet, or at least "equidistant between U.S. and U.S.S.R.," faction in China has bedeviled the Chinese leadership for many years.

Many of these same points have been made by the Chinese to other Americans, including at least in part to President Ford and Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger last fall and in various but parallel versions to David and Julie Eisenhower during their recent visit to China, to a few prominent travelers and to some businessmen presumed to have access to U.S. leaders, and as trial balloons floated by third-nation diplomats and citizens.

The Chinese proposals apparently have been ignored by official Washington, sometimes with the comment that they were of "doubtful authenticity," or that "foreign countries should deal with us through established channels." Such prim American governmental preferences overlook the fact that the Chinese see "established channels" as sometimes clogged by bureaucratic filters, as well as a long Chinese history of making delicate inquiries or proposals through middlemen in order to retain the option of face-saving disavowal or unrebuffed silent dignity if the message is ignored.

So the American public has been largely unaware of how specific and positive are these Chinese suggestions for a much closer mutually-beneficial relationship with the United States. Preoccupied with recession and inflation and the political distractions of an election year, we have not been receptive to the series of rather vague and poorly defined signals and

messages from Peking.

Part of the blame for poor communications must rest with the Chinese, of course. They have not yet learned how to deal effectively with our press, on which we rely for information and interpretation of government policies.

In London, Paris, Tokyo—or even Moscow—a Western newsman can have helpful background talks with policy-makers that guide him in illuminating official moves. With China, though, Western newsmen must try to divine from the language of the official Chinese press, from the number and duration of key meetings, the wording of toasts, the guest list and seating order at functions, the sites visited and similar esoteric indicators what nuances may be significant in Chinese events.

That is not the best setting for public understanding of U.S.-China policy, and we can only hope it will improve as relations develop, as American newsmen are regularly admitted into China, and as the Chinese leaders learn how to communicate with the American people through on and off-the-record interviews with our newsmen.

Despite murky public communications, however, we can be quite certain of what it is the Chinese now are proposing. And because it could be so important to our national interests, China's invitation to form a Pacific triumvirate ought to become at least as familiar in our public discussions and political debate as what posture we should take on another SALT accord, what role to play in the Mideast, or how to deal with events in Southern Africa.

The idea of a triumvirate linking us with a Communist nation seems startling at first to many Americans. But despite our obvious ideological differences, we have much in common with China, as we do with Japan.

All three countries want stability in Asia. The Chinese should be given credit for helping to cool off North Korean President Kim Il Sung last spring, when he talked belligerently of moving against the south after the collapse of Saigon. China doubtless can be expected to restrain any such North Korean adventurism in the future, especially as part of a Peking-Tokyo-Washington arrangement for peace and security in Asia.

Similarly, in Southeast Asia the Chinese might be expected to withhold significant support from guerrilla movements sporadically harassing governments in Thailand, Malaysia and the Philippines.

The Chinese, Japanese and Americans share a common interest in blocking expansion of Russian influence and power in Asia. The Japanese still chafe at the Soviet occupation of their former northern islands occupied by the Soviets at the end of World War II. The Chinese have a deep historical distrust of the Russians—the "white-eyed wolf" of the north—now capitalizing on their

backing of Hanoi's success in Vietnam. The Chinese fear the Russians may gain a major naval base at Cam Ranh Bay to augment their Pacific bases in Siberia and their planes and missiles poised along the long and tense Soviet-Chinese border.

China and North Vietnam have rival claims to the Spratly and Paracel Island groups in the South China Sea (some of which also variously are claimed by Taiwan and Cambodia). China seeks benign neglect by America in those areas.

In return, China offers the potential for influencing emerging nations to tilt toward America and against Russia; articulate support for U.S. military facilities in Japan, Thailand, the Philippines, the Indian Ocean and elsewhere; cooperation with America in Africa and South America; the pinning down of more than 1 million Russian troops on the Sino-Soviet border; and sources other than OPEC for some of the oil required by Japan and the United States.

A firm diplomatic alignment among Peking, Tokyo and Washington certainly would give the Russians pause. But the Chinese go further. They suggest possible coordination of certain military operations. Satellite reconnaissance data could be shared, as well as radar watches along Soviet borders. Anti-submarine patrols could be coordinated, even to the point of stationing reciprocal observers on some patrol vessels.

China's requests for certain American defensive military equipment—perhaps advanced radar and other electronic equipment, for instance—would have to be weighed with an eye to Soviet reaction. The United States does not want to see a wobbly detente with Moscow deteriorate into another cold war. America only wants to right a slipping power balance and to recognize China's legitimate defensive needs whenever they coincide with U.S. interests in countering Soviet expansion. It is quite possible that a modest U.S. investment in carefully selected defensive weapons for the Chinese would pay large dividends in a reduced Soviet presence in Europe, relieving pressure on NATO.

The man named by President Ford last week to head the U.S. Liaison Office in Peking, Thomas S. Gates, former secretary of defense in the Eisenhower administration, will be well equipped to help develop any future military cooperation and coordination between the United States and China.

On the economic front, China, Japan and the United States already are major trading partners. The United States is Japan's largest customer. Japan relies heavily on raw materials and food from this country and from China. And Japan gets some of its oil from China.

Fortunately, the three countries' resources and needs are complementary. Among them, they combine

China's vast oil reserves (not yet fully proven, but reliably estimated to rival those of the Mideast) and other mineral resources; U.S. and Japanese high technology and industrial development; and Chinese and American capacity to produce grain and other foodstuffs. Japan and the United States have demonstrated great economic strength (current recessions notwithstanding), and China has the potential and the will for comparable economic development. Both private high-level talks between Americans and the Chinese and official Chinese statements make it clear that China's current domestic struggle will not be allowed to interfere with economic development.

American private firms now are negotiating massive transactions with China, relating to Chinese oil and other commodities. One of these negotiations, if consummated, would mean a deal initially paying the American side about \$7 billion, and later developing approximately \$13 billion for American suppliers during the few years of manufacturing and supply. Massive further benefits to both sides would follow.

Japanese firms also are negotiating deals with the Chinese in addition to current trading arrangements.

Such trades—American oil-drilling and processing equipment in exchange for marketing participation in some of the Chinese oil, for instance—provide a solid economic foundation for cooperation in other fields.

Taiwan usually has been the issue that has hampered closer relations between Washington and Peking. But senior Chinese contacts, including some who are close to recently designated Acting Premier Hua Kuo-feng, have indicated to me that this issue can be put behind us.

Basically, the Chinese urge America to adopt the "Japan formula"—that is, to acknowledge that Peking has de jure jurisdiction over Taiwan, revoke our 1954 defense treaty with Nationalist China, and withdraw U.S. forces and advisers from the island. That would return U.S. policy to the position taken originally by President Truman before the outbreak of the Korean War. The way then would be cleared for the United States to close its embassy on Taiwan (perhaps maintaining a consular or liaison office for nongovernmental business, as Japan does), and to set up an American embassy in Peking. China would have its embassy in Washington.

In exchange, China has indicated it will give formal open assurance that it would not seek to take Taiwan by force (an operation for which it may not be well equipped militarily at this time in any case), or would work out a formula by which Taiwan would be declared a zone of peace, free from military danger from any source, including Peking. (The Chinese occasionally have hedged on what they would do in return—evidently to reserve bargaining options—and have been more forth-

right in informal talks with unofficial Americans than with government officials).

In addition, these same high-level sources have indicated to me that China may be willing to give the United States assurances that Taiwan's extensive business with Western countries can continue as before—that all American and Japanese investments there would be safe. I believe the Chinese use of the word "may" was intended to retain bargaining position, and that business-as-usual on Taiwan can be ensured in such an arrangement.

If the Chinese are in earnest on this and the other points of their proposal, the United States is being presented with a foreign policy choice

which could affect the world balance for years to come.

Most of this discussion has dealt with U.S.-China interests. But the role of Japan would be a major one—strategically, politically and economically. Japan may be emerging into a new international maturity after decades of following the American lead. The Lockheed affair has cast a cloud over Washington-Tokyo relations, and a positive approach to a tripartite Pacific partnership could be a wholesome corrective.

It may be too much to expect that our government can rapidly take the steps to make sure exactly what the Chinese are offering and would want in return, to negotiate the many de-

tails, and begin to make decisions. But it is not too much to expect that China's proposed Pacific triumvirate be made part of our public discussion—and of our political debate during the presidential campaign.

The American people at least should pick up the Peking hot-line, which has been ringing unanswered for several months, and try to understand and evaluate the muffled message from the Chinese. Perhaps the Nixon trip to Peking will help call attention to the ringing and encourage us to engage in a public dialogue.

Then, with the issues out in the open and a fresh or renewed administration in Washington early next year, we may be prepared to decide whether the road to world peace through strength runs through Tokyo and Peking.

WASHINGTON POST

Monday, April 12, 1976

U.S. Weighed Giving China Military Aid

By Walter Pincus

Washington Post Staff Writer

Former Defense Secretary

James R. Schlesinger said yesterday that American officials have discussed in recent years giving military assistance to the People's Republic of China but "there was never a formal addressing of the issue" while he was in government.

Schlesinger added that depending on the circumstances surrounding such aid, "I would not reject it out of hand."

He argued that the United States supplies technological and economic aid to "a major foe," the Soviet Union, while denying the same to China, which he termed a "quasi-ally."

His disclosure of the military aid discussions came in an appearance on "Face the Nation" (CBS, WTOP) in which he also termed relations with the Soviet Union as "very close" to the cold war status of the 1950s.

After the interview, Schlesinger disclosed that he had accepted an invitation to visit China this summer.

A high State Department official confirmed yesterday that military assistance to China has been "discussed... as we look at future options." But he emphasized that aid had not been "considered that specifically." He said the matter had come up when U.S. companies applied for permits to export certain restricted items to China.

"I'm not saying it will never be done," the official said, but suggested that any

reversal of past U.S. policy would begin with sales of advanced technological equipment not directly related to military items rather than with a military assistance program.

The official said that U.S. policy "now is essentially evenhanded" in approving such sales to Soviet and Chinese buyers.

It might not appear that way, he said, because export control rules do not permit sales of items such as computers that would give the receiving country a sizable advance over its current technology level.

The official said that recently a U.S. company was turned down for an export license on "an extremely advanced computer" for China, but that a similar sale to the Soviets would also have been barred. "We would not favor one or the other," he said.

The official said that in weighing the option of sending China military assistance, the United States had to take into account the American defense treaty with Taiwan and the concern such assistance would evoke in South Korea and Japan, two other U.S. allies in the area.

He said another consideration was that such aid "could be provocative to the Soviets."

Balanced against those factors, the official listed the "pressure on the Russians" such a move would achieve, plus the "tilt toward the Chinese" and the "building of a better bilateral" relationship with them.

Observing that the Chinese are "not exactly allies, but rather ideological adversaries," the official said the advantages "don't yet add up, though over a long period of time they might."

Latin America

THE NEW YORK TIMES, SUNDAY, MARCH 21, 1976

Cuba's Influence in the Caribbean Rises

By DAVID BINDER
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, March 20—In the last two years Cuba has gained considerable influence among the small republics of the Caribbean and is now enjoying some regional support

for its military ventures in Africa, in the assessment of Marxist Popular Movement for top-ranking United States policymakers.

The principal friends in the region of the Government of Prime Minister Fidel Castro are Guyana and Jamaica, both of which endorsed Cuba's intervention on behalf of the Liberation of Angola, which won the civil war in Angola.

In addition, Administration officials believe that the younger generation of political leaders throughout the Caribbean view Cuba as the most successful model of social and economic development in their experi-

ence. "The young leaders are very radical," one official observed, adding that they are "sympathetic to Castro."

As a result, the Ford Administration recently began to examine the implications for United States security posed by expanding Cuban influence in what had largely been a United States sphere.

Two United States specialists on the Caribbean said that it would be "relatively cheap and easy" for the Soviet Union and Cuba to acquire an additional base or two in the region simply by offering to bail out one of the smaller, heavily indebted Caribbean republics.

Already, Prime Minister Forbes Burnham of Guyana has promised Cuba that it could use Guyana airfields to transport troops and supplies for Cuban forces in Africa in any effort to liberate Rhodesia and South-West Africa from white minority rule.

Mr. Burnham, the uncontested political leader of Guyana even though his fellow blacks are outnumbered by East Indians, has recently put his country on a path toward a Marxist society. He has stimulated high-level contacts with Cuba to the point where Administration officials believe that Prime Minister Castro has become his most important ally.

Jamaican Ties to Cuba
At the other end of the Caribbean, Prime Minister Michael N. Manley of Jamaica has also been cultivating closer relations with Mr. Castro, whom he first met in September 1973.

There are understood to be 83 Cubans in Jamaica helping build a dam, a school and a factory. "With 20 percent unemployment in Jamaica, it makes you wonder why they need Cuban construction crews," a United States official remarked.

In the Administration assessment, Mr. Manley is basically a democratic socialist who does not seek to impose a Communist system on the 1.9 million Jamaicans. But the United States officials worry that Jamaica's grave and deteriorating economic situation—with "only a week and a half's foreign exchange validity," as one put it—may drive Mr. Manley to assume authoritarian powers.

There is concern in Washington, too, over Mr. Castro's presentation in the Caribbean of Cuba as a revolutionary liberator of blacks—not only Cuba's blacks, but also blacks in Angola and perhaps in other parts of Africa in the future.

'Really Worried'

"I'm really worried about

The Japan Times Sunday, April 4, 1976

Cuba's Armed Forces

Soviet Weapons, Training Make for Strong Military

By FRANCOIS RAITBERGER

HAVANA (Kyodo-Reuters) — Press reports that the United States might consider military reprisals against Cuba in response to another Angola-type action in southern Africa have raised little concern on this island fortress.

On March 22 U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger warned that America would not tolerate any further Cuban military interventions. Dr. Kissinger did not specify any U.S. action, but ever since 1959 revolution of Premier Fidel Castro, Cuba's armed forces have been in training against a possible "powerful invader."

Cuba has built a formidable defense force and turned the island into a real fortress, according to diplomatic observers here.

The Cuban Army, a mere handful of guerrillas 20 years ago, is now considered the most powerful in Latin America. Its quick victory over South African-supported liberation movements in Angola was an impressive show of its maneuverability and fire power.

It demonstrated mastery of modern warfare techniques and of sophisticated weapons supplied by the Soviet Union. Including the "Katyusha" multiple rocket launchers.

The efficiency displayed in Angola is the result of years of organization and training in close collaboration with the Soviet Union, under the command of Defense Minister Raul Castro, Dr. Castro's brother and the No. 2 man in Cuba.

Technical Standards

It also stems from a new policy started five years ago with emphasis on improvement of the Army's technical standards. The trend is expected to continue over the next five years, when Cuba is supplied

with "a considerable quantity of even more modern weapons with increased fire power," in Premier Castro's own words.

Cuba's Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR) were symbolically born 20 years ago when Fidel Castro's 70 followers landed on the eastern coast of Cuba at the beginning of a successful three-year guerrilla war to overthrow the Batista dictatorship.

During the decade following the 1959 revolution, military manpower swelled to 300,000 men to face countless sabotage raids by counter-revolutionary groups from within and without, and the threat of a large-scale invasion similar to that of the Bay of Pigs in 1961.

One Cuban out of 25 wore the olive green Army uniform, not including thousands of blue-shirted part-time militiamen and women.

Manpower Cuts

The burden, as Premier Castro told the Communist Party Congress last year, was "well above the economic and demographic possibilities" of an island with eight million inhabitants.

By 1970 the danger of invasion had faded away and sabotage raids were diminishing while the Cuban Army had improved its standards with the help of Soviet advisers here and the training of officers in the Soviet Union.

Cuba started cutting its military manpower. From 1970 to 1975, 150,000 men were released from active service and injected into the economy to ease the labor shortage.

To maintain its strength, the Army put emphasis on training reservists. Twice as many were trained in 1975 than the year before, and the number will double again by the end of the decade.

Reservists take part together with the regular armed forces, in yearly large-scale maneuvers invariably aimed at fighting back an invasion, sometimes after a nuclear strike on Cuba.

Soviet Weapons

According to the London Institute of Strategic Studies, the Cuban Army numbers about 120,000. Wartime mobilization of reserves would bring this number to 300,000 in two days and 500,000 within a week, according to unofficial figures. Some observers say that Cuba could mobilize over one million men in a short period.

Weapons supplied free of charge by the Soviet Union run into thousands of millions of dollars. The Army, according to "Comandante" (Major) Raul Castro, has more tanks than all the rest of the Latin American countries together.

The Air Force is equipped with Soviet-built MIG-17 and MIG-21 jetfighters, and some pilots are believed to have been trained to fly the sophisticated MIG-23. Cities are protected against air strikes by batteries of Soviet-made SAM ground-to-air missiles.

The Navy is composed of small units, with fast missile-launching ships patrolling the coasts.

The Cuban armed forces are highly politicized. Over 85 percent of the officers are members of the highly-selective Communist Party or of the Communist youth organization. Most of the top comandantes — the highest rank in the Cuban Army — earned their stars alongside Fidel Castro in the guerrilla war, and some are members of the policy-making central committee of the party.

This ensures a highly combative spirit, strict discipline and total adherence to the line of the party.

"this" a high-ranking State Department official said. "Of course there has been a race problem in the Caribbean for a long, long time—poor blacks and rich whites. The slavery heritage is not remote to them. With Castro—its dynamite—heroic blacks fighting white oppressors."

Another official took a somewhat calmer view, noting that Mr. Castro had used the black revolutionary theme occasionally in the past "whenever he thinks it is a good time to flail the United States." He recalled that in the 1960's Mr. Castro sponsored black-power broadcasts by Robert Williams, a fugitive from North Carolina courts, over what was called "Radio Free Dixie." Mr. Williams later returned to the United States disenchanted with Cuba.

Administration officials also say that Prime Minister Burnham of Guyana was recently disappointed to find few blacks in positions of authority in Cuba.

Marginal Economies Decline

But the rise of leftist sentiment among the 15.7 million people of the Caribbean coincides with decline of marginal economies in Haiti, the Dominican Republic and such islands as Barbados, Grenada and St. Lucia. This, together with a spread of racial tensions, could create a volatile situation, the Administration officials believe.

"Mind you," said one, "the moderate leaders still predominate," and he named the leaders of Barbados, Trinidad-Tobago, Bahamas and Haiti.

Few if any United States officials believe that Mr. Castro would attempt to send Cuban military forces to assist revolutionaries in other parts of the Caribbean.

Rather, it is noted at the highest levels of the Administration that in the last two years the Cuban leader has taken pains to portray himself as a Latin American statesman—entertaining heads of government from Jamaica, Trinidad-Tobago, Venezuela, Mexico and Panama and cultivating official state relations.

However, Cuba's links with subversion in the hemisphere apparently have not expired.

Cuban-Trained Robber

Last Feb. 18, when Panamanian authorities captured Augusto Arauz Wilcox, a convicted bank robber, after he had attempted a holdup of a bank in Puerto Armuelles, they learned that he had received guerrilla training in Cuba.

Interrogation of Mr. Wilcox and an accomplice established that he had obtained Cuban asylum in 1974 after the first robbery and had been trained under the supervision of Maj. Manuel Losado Pineiro, the Cuban counterintelligence chief, who reportedly gave him \$1,000 before he returned to Panama last November.

Mr. Wilcox, Panamanian security authorities said, was working with Nicaraguans and Colombians as well as Panamanian underground leftists. Mr. Wilcox and his accomplice have been executed.

The affair so alarmed Brig.

Gen. Omar Torrijos Herrera, the Panamanian chief of government, who had been warmly welcomed by Mr. Castro on a state visit only a month before, that he ordered tight controls on all Cubans visiting Panama.

BALTIMORE SUN
5 April 1976

The Lasting, Sour Taste of a Kissinger Trip

By AGOSTINO BONO

Buenos Aires.

Throughout much of Latin America, a sour aftertaste persists from Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's whirlwind tour of the region last February.

The trip was supposed to build on the "new dialogue" announced at the 1974 Kissinger meeting with Latin foreign ministers in Mexico. Instead, U.S. policy, as seen through Latin eyes, has turned into a monologue by which Kissinger tries to get increasingly independent-minded Latin nations back into step with U.S. interests.

The key factors creating this image were the official recognition of Brazil as the region's leader and the attempts to censure Cuban intervention in Angola.

Acknowledging Brazil as the region's most powerful and influential country was pragmatically justified, as it is the biggest and most industrialized nation in the area. But officially recognizing this angers much of Latin America and reinforces suspicions that the U.S. is pushing Brazil as its regional political satrap and as the best model for economic development.

An accord signed during Kissinger's stay pledges continual bilateral consultations on international affairs and on U.S.-Brazil cooperation. In terms of U.S. foreign policy, this puts Brazil on a level with Japan. The accord, unprecedented in U.S. policy toward Latin America, was adopted because Brazil is about to enter the developed world, explained Kissinger.

The event caused deep worry in other countries, which feared this meant U.S. blessing of Brazil's repressive political system.

Whatever honor the accord brings to a Latin American country is nullified because "the concept of a state rigid in its form of governing and dangerous in its authoritarian extension is undoubtedly re-enforced," *El Tiempo*, a moderate daily of Bogota, Colombia, said in an editorial. More leftist critics complain this also means U.S. reinforcing of Brazil's capitalist approach and of its openness to foreign investment as the model for development in the face of Latin America's growing nationalism and the worldwide bribery scandals of U.S. companies.

Another worry is what some see as Brazil's expansionist tendencies. Geographically the largest country in the region, Brazil borders every South American nation except two. Despite official denials of expansionist designs, policy-makers frequently discuss the need for a Brazilian outlet to the Pacific Ocean. The government has engaged in heavy diplomatic and economic offensives in the countries separating it from the Pacific. The government encourages colonization along border regions, and numerous Brazilians spill over to establish communities in neighboring countries.

Kissinger's recurring criticism of Cuban adventuring in Angola is seen as signaling an attempt to keep the foreign policies of Latin nations from becoming completely untied from U.S. interests. Also worrying to Washington have been the support of oil-hungry Latin countries for Arab anti-Israel resolutions in the U.N. and the growing tendency to tie foreign policy to Third World interests. Even the U.S. favorite, Brazil, has recognized the Soviet-backed Angolan government.

While Cuban adventuring has re-chilled U.S. relations, the rest of the hemisphere continues its thaw with Havana. Many Latin policy-makers believe that Fidel Castro now prefers to push his aims in Latin America through normal diplomatic and economic relations instead of armed subversion.

Continued U.S. harping is starting to irritate Latin leaders, who see some hypocrisy considering previous U.S. military intervention inside and outside the hemisphere.

Colombian President Alfonso Lopez Michelsen was asked his opinion of Cuba's Angolan activities. With Kissinger sitting alongside him, Lopez answered: "This is not the first time that a nation of this hemisphere intervenes outside of the hemisphere."

When asked if he was referring to the Vietnam war, the president replied: "Draw your own conclusions."

Instead of dialogue, Kissinger's trip produced back-talk.

Mr. Bono is an American free-lance correspondent covering Latin America.